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i.
INTRODUCTION
Between 1868 and 1890, Japan advanced from an 
agglomeration of feudal principalities rapidly escaping 
from central control to a modern, centralised state 
equipped with a constitution and a national assembly 
in line with the advanced states of the world. Centred 
on the person of the young Emperor Meiji, a government 
largely drawn from the samurai executives of a handful 
of feudal principalities slowly but steadily tightened 
its grip upon the country, until in 1890 a new regime 
had been established which lasted basically unchanged 
until 194-5.
The technical problem of building a centralised 
state involved new economic and social policies, such 
as new systems of taxation, new conscription laws and 
improved communications. The human problem was to 
attract leading men to the new government; and having 
done so, to get them work well together on a common 
policy and to rise above the factions and rivalries 
inevitable in a government dependent at the outset 
for its existence upon the support of several independent 
principalities, none of which was alone strong enough
ii
to impose its will upon the rest.
The Meiji government began with a civil war, but 
from the start it was of necessity a government based 
upon some measure of accomodation of different interests. 
The alternative to accomodation was further civil wars 
and a return to a discredited regime which in the past 
had left Japan at the mercy of foreign powers.
The person of the young Emperor enabled his factious 
servants to formulate a new concept of national loyalty; 
the more so since in feudal Japan loyalties were to 
persons rather than to principles. The undivided sov­
ereignty necessary for the creation of a modern central­
ised state could be convincingly attributed in their 
eyes to the young Emperor for whom they acted in trust. 
Thus while power had to be shared, all power could be 
attributed to the Emperor.
It is in the Council, a body that changed its name 
and shape several times during this period but which 
never lost its control of the sovereign power, that 
these dilemmas may best be seen. While maintaining a 
Jealous control of sovereign power in the name of the 
Emperor, accomodation demanded that this control should 
never attain the dimensions of "preponderance’.’ Behind 
the doctrine of the separation of Legislature, Executive 
and Judiciary, the one principle with which western
iii
political thought provided Japan, there lay the more 
immediately human concern to avoid the domination of 
the country in the name of the Emperor by a single person 
or faction, an evil of which the past history of Japan 
was largely made up. But before power could be shared, 
it had to be defined; and the course of constitutional 
progress between 1868 and 1890 is largely one of legal 
definition.
This thesis is an attempt to describe the evolution 
of the Council between these dates. While tracing the 
steps towards the final definition in the light of the 
legal ordinances, an attempt will be made to describe 
the personal factors involved at each successive stage. 
The legal definitions had to be arrived at; but the 
personalities were ready-made. In the course of the 
evolution of the Council, the discrepancy between how 
things were intended to work and how they actually worked 
provides an essential commentary upon the forces of 
constitutional change.
ICHAPTER I,
THE FIRST STAGES. 1868-1871«
On November 9th, 1867^^ Tokugawa Keiki submitted, 
a proposal to the Emperor in which he offered to return 
the governing power which had been held for over two 
centuries by his family in their office as Shogun, He 
declared that the growing pressure of foreign relations 
made a unified national government essential, and briefly 
outlined a system of government in which the Imperial 
Court would bear the final responsibility for the ad­
ministration, but in which the public deliberation(Kogi) 
of the realm should be widely promoted. The resulting 
conclusions were to be submitted to the final decision 
of the Emperor in a spirit of unity and co-operation 
in the defence of the country which would enable Japan 
to maintain itself on an equal footing with the nations 
of the world.
Tokugawa Keiki had been warned by the friendly Tosa 
Han of the plot of powerful elements in the Satsuma Han 
to precipitate a civil war against the Bakufu in alliance 
with the rebel Choshu Han. His offer to return the
I. Keio 3 10m I4d. HRZS. No.I. note*
2^
governing power to the throne disarmed the charge of 
disloyalty by which his enemies sought to discredit 
him and promised to relieve him of an office which had 
incurred all the odium of the repeated concessions to 
the foreign powers and which had failed to exert its 
authority over the rebels in Chöshü. It seemed likely 
that a new Imperial government would consist of a 
Council of great Daimyo controlling the Executive, with 
the Dairnya as a whole acting as an Assembly in which 
important measures of national policy would be discussed 
and submitted to the Emperor for final approval. With 
powerful friends at Court and with the support of Tosa, 
Owari and Echizen, Tokugawa Keiki as the greatest Daimyo 
in the realm could expect to play a leading role in the 
new regime.
While tentatively accepting the offer to return the
governing power, the C ourt was in no position to assume
the immediate direction of affairs; accordingly, on the
(2)10th of Novemberv y an Imperial edict was issued to the 
Daimyo requesting them to assemble in Kyoto as soon as 
possible to confer upon the Shogun's proposal, foreign 
affairs and other important matters which were to be 
submitted to common deliberation (Shügi).
2. Keio 3 10m I5d. HRZS. No.I
3.
Thereafter, affairs remained, at a complete stand­
still. Tokugawa Keiki was ordered to conduct state 
affairs as in the past, and his petitions to return his 
Court rank and to be relieved of his office as Shogun
C 3)were hoth rejected. However, on the 12th of December^ 
Tokugawa Keiki and the Daimyo were required to forward 
their opinions on the establishment of an Imperial 
government on the ancient model of a Department of 
State Religion (Jingikan), a Council of State (Dajökan) 
and eight Executive Departments (Sho) in which Court 
nobles and Daimyo would take office and serve by turns. 
But nothing could be decided until the Daimyo had 
assembled in Kyoto, and as yet besides the Daimyo of 
Satsuma, Aki, Owari and Echizen only a handful of minor 
Daimyo had responded to the Imperial summons.
In fact, the Shogun’s offer to return the govern­
ing power to the Emperor had brought the balance of 
forces within Japan to a virtual stale-mate which only 
the use^ of force was to resolve. The mass of the 
Daimyo would not respond to the Imperial summons to 
assemble in the capital, but waited in their domains 
to observe the struggle for control among the leading 
Daimyo. The powerful Choshu Han had defied the Bakufu
3. Keiö  ^Ilm I7d. HRZS. No.7
4from its seat in south west Japan since 1865; in 1866 
a secret alliance had been formed between Satsuma and 
Choshü and thereafter Satsuma had sought to embarrass 
the Bakufu by refusing to join the punitive expedition 
against Choshü, by demanding that the major Daimyo 
should, ratify important decisions taken by the Bakufu 
and by attempting to form a co-alition of Daimyo to 
challenge the Bakufu monopoly of governing power. 
Finally, in 1867,through the agency of Iwakura Tomomi, 
a Court noble of low rank with a marked talent for 
intrigue, Satsuma obtained a secret Imperial edict 
ordering the overthrow of the Bakufu by force of arms 
which it prepared to execute in alliance with Choshü.
On the other hand, Aizu and Kuwana the die-hards of 
the Tokugawa House were willing to fight to maintain 
the supremacy of the Bakuku and regarded the proposal 
of the Shogun to return the governing power to the 
Emperor as unwarranted weakness. Between them stood 
Tosa, Owari and Echizen with hereditary ties with the 
Tokugawa House who realised that the Bakufu must be 
replaced by a more broadly based co-alition of Daimyo 
to form the basis for a unified national regime. They 
therefore strove to prevent an armed clash by persuading 
the Shogun to return the governing power to the Emperor
and by establishing the principle that national policy 
should be determined by an Assembly of the Daimyo as 
a whole.
But while the Daimyo were supposed to be gathering 
in the capital to determine important matters by common 
deliberation, and while the opinions of the Shogun and 
the Daimyo were being elicited on the form of the new 
Imperial government, Saigö Takamori entered Kyoto at 
the head of 3>000 Satsuma troops on the I8th of December
(i±) _ _1867, and 700 Choshu troops disembarked in readiness 
to march on the capital on the 3rd of January, 1868.^' 
With military forces at his disposal, Iwakura* was ready 
to act.
On the 2nd of January, Iwakura called a meeting 
of the principal retainers of Owari, Bchizen, Satsuma, 
Tosa and Aki to inform them that the Restoration was 
imminent and to secure contingents of troops to guard 
the gates of the Imperial Palace. On the same day, 
the Regent(Sesshö) Nijo called a conference in the 
Palace to discuss the granting of pardons to the Daimyo 
of Choshu and to those Court nobles in exile or under 
domiciliary confinement as a result of conflicts between 
the Court and the Bakufu since 1862. The mast intportant
4. Dai Saigö Zenshu. 3* p*544.
5* ibid, p.562-3
6. Iwakura Ko Jikki. 2. p.I36 ff.
6of these were San jo Sanetomi in exile in Kyushu since
the failure of the Choshü ronin to gain control of the
capital in 1864-, and Iwakura himself who had been in
domiciliary confinement in Kyoto since 1862. 1'okugawa
Keiki, Aizu and Kuwana were invited to this conference
but refused to attend on pleas of illness; the other
major Daimyo present in the capital were also invited,
and after much discussion it was finally resolved that
(7)pardons should be granted.Kry In the early morning 
of January 3rd, the Regent Nijo who had always worked 
for compromise with the Bakufu retired from the Palace 
with his followers, leaving behind Nakayama, ögimachi- 
Sanjo and the Daimyo of Owari, Echizen and Aki. Iwakura 
was summoned^ to the Palace, and went at once taking 
with him the Restoration Edict and other papers in a 
box; shortly afterwards the Satsuma troops under Saigo 
took up their positions around the Palace, followed 
by the contingents from the other four Han.^^
When other Court nobles of the Restoration party 
and the Daimyo of Satsuma and Tosa had arrived, the 
Restoration Edict was read out by the young Emperor. 
This E d i c t a b o l i s h e d  the offices of Sessho, Kampaku 
and Bakufu, and set up an Imperial Council of a single
?. Iwakura Ko Jikki. 2.p.I32 ff.
8. ibid. p.146-7.
9. Keio 3 I2m 9d. HRZS. No.13.
7President (Sösai), IO Senior Councillors (G-ijo) and 
20 Junior Councillors (Sanyo). Collectively, the new 
Council was termed the Three Offices (Sanshoku). The 
Council consisted of Arisugawa Taruhito as President 
and two other Imperial Princes as Senior Councillors; 
Nakayama, Ögimachi-Sanjo and Nakamikado, the three 
Court nobles who had worked closely with Iwakura in 
his intrigues, were also appointed Senior Councillors 
with the Daimyo or heirs of Owari, Echizen, Aki, Tosa 
and Satsuma. Iwakura and four other Court nobles were 
appointed Junior Councillors, and it was envisaged that 
the five Daimyo would each appoint three of their 
retainers to this position.
It is clear that this Council was to form the 
nucleus of a future Executive, since it was empowered 
to administer all affairs of state preparatory to the 
erection of a Council of State (Dajokan) in the near 
future. But its members were also enjoined to holdi 
"proper public deliberations" (Shito no Kogi) in the 
interests of the realm regardless of social distinctions 
and thus took on the character of an Assembly. The 
appointment of large numbers of Senior and Junior 
Councillors in the succeeding months reinforces this 
impression. In relation to the country at large, it
8was stated that the promotion of men of talent was an 
urgent necessity, and that persons of suitable merit 
were to be speedily reported to the government; free 
expression for the reform of existing abuses was also 
to be encouraged regardless of social status. The 
employment of talented men from all the Han as officials 
in a new national government was a commonplace of 
Bakumatsu political thinking; this and the concern 
to promote the free expression of opinion underlay the 
desire to establish Assemblies of the Han samurai on 
a national and local scale which was to be a feature 
of the new Imperial government.
The first meeting of the new Council took place 
on the evening of the 3rd of January. A bitter dispute 
arose between Iwakura backed by Satsuma and Aki who 
insisted that Tokugawa Keiki should only be allowed 
to participate in the deliberations of the Council if 
he surrendered his lands and revenues to the Emperor, 
and Yamanouchi of Tosa backed by Echizen and Owari who 
insisted that he should take part without conditions.
A complete deadlock ensued in which the three Court 
nobles Nakayama, Ögimachi-Sanjo and Nakamikado began
10.. For example, Sakamoto Ryuma. Vid. Osatake. Nihon 
Kenseishi Taikö. I. p.36-7, points I and 3. The Bakufu 
had recognised this principle in its schools of naval 
and military science, in which selected students from all the Han were trained.
1 1 • °tsu. DNHXSS. I. p.I83 ff.
9to waver towards? compromise, and only the promise of
Saigo to use force if necessary steeled Iwakura to
insist on the point. Finally, through the agency
of Goto Shoqjiro, his chief retainer who was well informed
of the trend of the times, Yamanouchi was prevailed
upon to give his reluctant consent to the exclusion of
Tokugawa Keiki from the Council until he had surrendered
(12)his lands and revenues to the Emperor*
Thereafter, Tosa, Owari and Echizen continued to 
work for a compromise. They failed owing to the deter­
mination of Saigo and Okubo of Satsuma to precipitate 
a struggle at all costs, and it was on the news of the 
violence of the Satsuma ronin in Edo that Tokugawa 
Keiki decided to march on the capital from his head­
quarters in Osaka to which he had politically withdrawn 
while the negotiations were still going on. The. result 
was the battle at Fushimi and Toba on the approaches 
to Kyoto, when after four days of fighting his troops 
were defeated by the Imperialist forces and fell back 
on Osaka in disorder on the 30th of January. During 
this interim period, the compromise party were the 
most active in insisting that the new Imperial government 
should be based upon consultation of the Daimyo: as a 
whole, and in drawing up schemes for the structure of
12. Goto might well have been aware of Iwakura*s 
influence with an important section of the Tosa military 
forces. Vid. Oe Tenchi Denki. p.53*
IO
the new government. Yamanouchi sent in a memorial on 
the 6th of January to insist that an Assembly should 
be speedily set up which the major Daimyo should be 
summoned to attend, and that regulations should be 
drawn up for the deliberations of the Council to make 
it clear that the new regime was to be based on open- 
ness and impartiality.v On the same day, ten Han 
including Awa, Higo* Chikuzen and Hizen memorialised 
the Court to form a government based on the principle 
of general deliberation. But the first detailed 
proposal for government by Assembly was made by Goto 
Shojiro and Fukuoka Kotei, two Junior Councillors of 
the Tosa Han, in a memorial of the same month.(^5)
They proposed that regulations should be drawn up for 
a new enlarged Assembly; the Upper House to consist 
of the President of the Council(Sösai) and the Seniior 
and Junior Councillors of Court noble or Daimyö rank, 
and to be the place to which any other Daimyo resident 
in the capital could address their proposals. The 
Lower House was to consist of officials selected to 
serve in the Executive departments for a specific period 
(Choshi) and several representatives from each Han and 
from the country as a whole who were to concern themselves
13# Iwakura Ko Jikki. 2. p.168-9
14. ibid. p.169-172.
15. Ishin Shi. 5. p.519-21.
II.
with public deliberation and the handling of memorials. 
(Koshi). The Lower House was to be presided over by 
a Senior Councillor, assisted by the Junior Councillors 
of samurai rank. The two Houses were to meet daily; 
draft proposals (Gian) were to be drawn up in the Upper 
House, put before the Lower* House on the following day, 
reconsidered by the Upper House and its decision finally 
ratified by the President of the Council (Sosai).
At this early stage, there were no definite Council 
functions or specific Executive departments; the new 
government was a loose association of Court nobles,
Daimyo and Han retainers meeting together to discuss 
matters of government policy. By the 30th of January, 
the day when the defeat of the Bakufu forces outside 
Kyoto made the future of the new government secure, the 
original 10 Senior Councillors of January 3rd had in­
creased to 14 with the appointment of Sanjo Sanetomi 
and Date. Muneshiro, the Daimyo of Uwajima, and the 
promotion of Hase Nobuatsu and Iwakura Tomomi from 
Junior Councillor. The number of Junior Councillors 
had increased to 35, of whom 9 were Court nobles. The 
rest were samurai retainers of Daimyo attached to the 
new government; three of them were retainers of Choshu.^^)
16. Dates of appointment and numbers of incumbents of 
government offices are taken from the Kenya. Shokumu 
Honinroku, unless stated otherwise»
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The first step in the creation of an organised 
Council was perhaps the appointment of Sanjo Sanetomi 
and Iwakura Tomomi as Vice-Presidents (Fuku-Sosai) on 
Fehruary 2nd* Sanjo with the special support and trust 
of Chöshü, and Iwakura with a similar backing from 
Satsuma were already the two mainstays of the new regime* 
They were both appointed Senior Councillors on the 21st 
of January on the arrival of Sanjö at Court , and had 
immediately begun to work well together in spite of 
fears of the contrary* Their elevation to joint 
Vice-Presidency marks them out from the other members 
of the Council as the men by whom decisions were in fact 
made, under the nominal Presidency of Arisugawa*
On the 10th of February, 1868^®^ the first 
regulations for the structure of the new government were, 
issued. The withdrawal of the Bakufu armies: to Edo had 
left the three major cities of Kyoto, ösaka and Nagasaki 
and the newly opened port of Hyogo in the hands of the 
Imperial government. In keeping with its new Executive 
responsibilities, the Council now consisted of a 
President charged with the general supervision of the 
administration and powers of decision on all matters of 
government business. Under him, the Senior Councillors
17* Vid. Iwakura Kob Jikki. 2. p.201-2.
18. Meiji 1 lm l?d. HRZS. No.36.
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drawn from the Imperial Princes, Court nobles and Daimyo
acted as the Heads(Sotoku) of seven Executive Departments
(19)in addition to their collective duties as a Council.
The Junior Councillors participated in their deliberations 
and worked under them as Executives(Kakari) in the various 
Departments# Talented men from the Han samurai and from 
the country as a whole were to be selected as lesser 
officials of the Departments(Chöshi); and all the Han 
were required to provide one, two or three representatives 
according to their size to be members of a Lower House 
of a national Assembly for the expression of public 
opinion and for public deliberation(Yoron Kogi)# The 
lesser officials(Choshi) were to be selected by the 
Junior Councillor Executives and by the public deliber­
ation of the Han representatives. They were to serve 
for a period of four years, after which they were to 
give way to men of greater talent# The Han represent­
atives (Koshi) were to be appointed and dismissed by their 
Daimyo and served for an indefinite period; if they 
displayed talent, they could be selected as lesser 
officials#
In this tentative arrangement, there was clearly ,^c 7
19« The seven Departments consisted of six Ka, handling 
^  /Home, Foreign, Military, Financial and Judicial affairs,
and one Ryö to draft official legislation. Hence, this 
arrangement was termed the seven Ka. However, the 
President, Senior and Junior Councillors collectively were regarded as forming another Department, and it soon 
became termed the eight Ka,
14
division between the Council and the Executive, or 
between Legislative and Executive functions• In order 
to build up support for the coming campaign against: the 
Bakufu, it was necessary for the new government to make 
as many appointments as possible to the senior positions 
and to accomodate many Han samurai in the capital who. 
were willing to serve in the lesser executive or deliber­
ative positions. On the day the new arrangement was 
announced, there were already 18 Senior and 40 Junior 
Councillors. Each of the seven Executive Departments 
was staffed by from one to four Senior Councillors, and 
roughly the same number of Junior Councillors. Plural 
office holding had been a feature of Tokugawa admin­
istration, and with the need to travel constantly to 
and from the capital and the localities it served some 
purpose?; at this time; but the new government was soon 
to find it a formidable bar to administrative efficiency.
Collectively, the Senior and Junior Councillors 
formed a Deliberative Assembly in which important matters 
were debated and determined. In this capacity, they 
formed the Upper House of a proposed Legislature, of 
which the lesser officials and Han representatives 
formed the Lower House. An account of a meeting of 
the Senior and Junior Councillors in their deliberative
15.
capacity on the I2th of February suggests that it was
not a very promising group; only the tact of Iwakura
brought the Court nobles to a sensible conclusion in
the critical question of foreign relations• On
several subsequent occasions formal deliberative sessions
of the Council were held to determine important matters
of policy. On the I6th of February,the proposed transfer
(21)of the capital was debated;v J on April 1st, the Emjberor 
attended a debate on the future of Ezo and on April I7th 
Iwakura presided; over the deliberations of the Senior 
and Junior Councillors and the lesser officials(Choshi) 
on the administration of B z o . ^ ^
But the real direction of affairs at this time lay 
in the Presidents Department(Sosai Ka). In the new 
structure wide powers of administrative control and 
decision had been reserved to the President; Sanjö 
and Iwakura remained Vice-Presidents in addition to 
their posts as Senior Councillors. In addition, Sanjo 
was appointed one of the Heads of the Foreign Affairs 
Department, and Iwakura a Head of both the Military 
and Finance Departments. Kido Koin, the senior retainer 
of Choshü was appointed Adviser(Komon) to the President's 
Department on the I8th of February, followed by ökubo
20. Boshin Nikki, Meiji I Im I9d.; quoted, Osatake..
Nihon Kenseishi Taiko. 1. p.188-9.
21. O^ubo Toshimichi Nikki. 1. p.437.22. Ishin Shi. 5- p.522.
16.
Toshimichi of Satsuma two days later. These four men 
formed a kind of inner Council, controlling the agenda 
of the main Council and the administrative policies of 
the Executive Departments.
On the 24th of February, 1868,^^ new regulations 
were issued for the structure of the government which 
streamlined the arrangements of the previous month.
As before, the President(Sösai), Senior Councillors 
(Gijo) and Junior Councillors(Sanyo) formed a deliberative 
Council, and acted as Heads and Executives of eight 
Departments(Kyoku)• The chief of these was the Presidents 
Department(Sosai Kyoku), the other seven being concerned 
with State Religion, Home, Foreign, Military, Finance 
and Judicial affairs and the drafting of Official 
Regulations. Arisugawa remained President, and Sanjo 
and Iwakura Vice-Presidents;; Nakayama and Ögimachi-Sanjo, 
two Court nobles who had worked closely with Iwakura in 
the Restoration movement, were appointed to a new post 
as Imperial Assistants(Hohitsu), and Kido of Choshü, 
Komatsu of Satsuma and Goto of Tosa were appointed 
Advisers(Komon) to the President's Department. Under 
them, eight other Junior Councillors were appointed 
Council Executives(Benji)• These new appointments 
reflect the growing importance of the President's
23. Meiji I 2m 3d. HRZS. No.73
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Department as the co-ordinating office of the Executive 
Departments, and the medium through which decisions of 
the Council were transmitted to the Executive, and the 
actions and enquiries of the Executive were ratified 
or put up for Council approval.
Some streamlining of the Executive Departments 
was achieved in this reorganisation by placing each 
of them under a single head* But the day on which 
the new regulations were issued was also the day on 
which the campaign for the subjection of the Bakufu 
forces in Edo was announced. For this campaign, the 
support of the Daimyo and their retainers was essential 
and the new government could not afford to narrow its 
numbers or fail to widen the basis of support by making 
the Council into a kind of Upper House of a deliberative 
Assembly and by pushing forward its plans for a Lower 
House of Han representatives. A to this time, 35 men 
were serving as Senior Councillors and 89 as Junior 
Councillors. The Council and the chief positions in 
the Executive Departments were cluttered up with office 
holders of high rank but little administrative ability.
Speaking of the government at this time, Higashikuze 
declares that although on the surface there was an 
appearance of order with Sanjö, Iwakura, Kido, Ckubo
18
and Goto at the centre and a number of Court nobles and 
Daimyo in the highest places, in fact it was a motley 
gathering in which each upheld his own opinion with 
little unity in government policy# Although the Daimyö 
in Kyoto had attached retainers to the Imperial army, 
they had not yet given their sincere allegiance to the 
Court. The two Court nobles serving as Imperial Assist­
ants (Hohitsu) were completely ignorant of some of the 
orders issued by the Junior Councillors, and the Junior 
Councillors were unaware of matters on which the Senior 
Councillors conferred directly with Sanjo. Rumours 
were current that another Shogun would emerge from 
Satsuma or Choshu who were merely using the Imperial 
Court for the overthrow of the Tokugawa. Iwakura was 
also being slandered by many people as covetous of power 
and as handling matters in an arbitrary fashion.
In order to display to the realm that the Imperial 
government was a truly National government, the ratific­
ation of important measures by an Upper House of Court 
nobles and Daimyo and a Lower House of Han representatives 
was an urgent necessity. The Court nobles and Daimyo 
were provided with posts as Senior and Junior Councillors 
and assented to government measures in Council meetings; 
provisions for a Lower House of Han representatives(Koshi)
24. Higashikuze. Chikutei Kaikoroku Ishin Zengo. p.252-5
19
(pS')were issued on the 3rd of Februaryv requiring all
the Han to sendi representatives within 30 days to be 
members of the Lower House of a national Assembly. On 
the 6th of M a r c h t h e  Emperor swore the famous Charter 
Oath before an assembly of Court nobles, Daimyö and 
officials, proclaiming in the first article that "an 
Assembly widely convoked shall be established and all 
matters of state determined by public discussion!'
The need was for a system that would strike a proper
Ibalance between the seemingly irreconcilabe dictates of 
wide support and administrative efficiency. On the one 
hand, Fukuoka Kötei of Tosa and Soejima Taneomi of Hizen 
complained in a memorial of March or April that the 
press of executive business had led to the loss of the 
conception of public deliberation in spite of the original 
intention to establish a Legislative body and to determine 
matters by public opinion and discussion. They therefore 
proposed, that the government should be divided into 
a Legislative Department(Giseikan) consisting of an 
Upper and Lower, House, and an Executive Department 
(Gyoseikan) headed by two Imperial Assistants(Hosho) 
controlling four Executive Departments of State Religion, 
Finance, Military and Foreign affairs with a fifth 
Department of Justice to exercise the judicial power
25. Meiji I 2m 10d- HRZS. No.88.
26. Meiji 1 3m 14d. HRZS. No.156
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independent ly  ^ On the other hand, Yokoi Shönan at
this time wrote of the need to cut the number of officials
by half and for the present office holders, starting
with the Court nobles, to be replaced by men of talent*
He proposed that the number of Senior Councillors be
reduced to seven, and the Junior Councillors to eight,
to form a compact Council determining matters of policy
put to them by the Emperor and ratifying the decisions
of the Executive D e p a r t m e n t s * ökubo seems to have
shared his low opinion of the capacity of the Court
nobles who thronged the upper ranks of the Council and 
('29')Departments* "
A new organisation of the government embodying these 
ideas was accordingly announced on June 11th, 1868.^°^ 
While claiming that all authority in the realm was 
vested in the Imperial government in its collective 
capacity as the Great Council of State(Dajökan) lest 
there be any division of sovereignty; yet within the 
government the Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
powers were to be kept distinct in order to prevent 
"preponderance "(Hencho) *. The Legislative power was to 
be exercised by an Upper House of Senior and Junior 
Councillors; its powers were specifically defined as
27. Ishin Shi. 5. p.523-4.
28. ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.223-6. 
29* ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 2* p.360 
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the establishment of the Constitution, the making of 
laws, the determination of administrative matters, the 
appointment of officials of the third grade and above, 
the clarification of rewards and punishments, the 
determination of Treaties and declarations of war and 
peace. The Lower House was to: consist of the Han repre- 
sentatives(Koshi) and was to debate the following matters 
under the orders of the Upper House; taxes, posts, 
coinage, weights and measures, treaties, domestic and 
foreign commerce, reclamations, declarations of war and 
peace, arrests on sea and land, the levy and provisioning 
of troops, military contributions, the establishment of 
forts and storehouses on Han territory and disputes 
between Han.
The Executive was headed by two Imperial Assistants 
(Hosho) drawn from the Senior Councillors who aided the 
Emperor, reported the decisions of the Legislature to 
the throne, exercised a supreme direction over internal 
affairs and controlled the business of the Palace. Under 
them, ten Council Secretaries(Benji) and Assistant 
Secretaries received and transmitted documents relating 
to internal and external business and handled the affairs 
of the Palace. From the duties of the six Clerks(Shikan) 
of this department, it is clear that it acted as the 
drafting office for government orders. While the Upper
22.
House was empowered to make laws, the technique of 
drafting legislation was developed in the executive 
office of the Hosho ; no provision was made for it to 
draft legislation in committee. Moreover, the Upper 
House deliberated under the presidency of the two 
Hosho who also acted as directors of the Executive 
Departments. Similarly, the Lower House deliberated 
under the presidency of two Council Secretaries(Benji) 
serving under the Hosho» The continued "preponderance” 
of the Executive was more or less assured by such an 
arrangement.
In the new system, Arisugawa was no longer President; 
Sanjo and Iwakura held the key posts as Hosho. and may 
thus be termed the joint Presidents of the new Council.
The Senior Councillors were reduced to ten; consisting 
of Sanjo, Iwakura, Nakayama, ögimachi-Sanjö, Nakamikado 
and Tokudaiji, and the Daimyo of Echizen, Hizen, Awa 
and Choshu. The Junior Councillors were also reduced 
to ten; consisting of ökubo and Komatsu of Satsuma,
Kido and Hirosawa of Choshu, Goto and Fukuoka of Tosa, 
Soejima of Hizen, Yokoi of Kumamoto and Yuri of Echizen. 
These men were all senior retainers of their Han, and 
they were to act as a Council distinct from the Executive 
Departments. Technically, they formed the Upper House 
of a proposed Legislature; in fact they formed a Council 
and the division of the Legislative from the Executive
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w h ich  was th e  o b j e c t  o f  th e  new sy s te m  was i n  f a c t  an  
a t te m p t  t o  s e p a r a t e  C o u n c il  and  E x e c u tiv e  f u n c t i o n s .
Many y e a r s  w ere to  e la p s e  b e fo r e  t h i s  awkward p o in t  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  s o lv e d .
One im m e d ia te  r e s u l t  o f  th e  new sy s te m  was th e  
re m o v a l o f  a l a r g e  num ber o f  S e n io r  and  J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  
who h ad  c l u t t e r e d  up th e  p r e v io u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  I n  a l l ,  
14 S e n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  and  7 4  J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  w ere  
d i s m is s e d .  Many o f  them  w ere  d is m is s e d  o u t r i g h t ;  th o s e  
w i th  any  t a l e n t  w ere  a p p o in te d  to  e x c l u s i v e l y  e x e c u t iv e  
d u t i e s  i n  th e  s i x  D e p a r tm e n ts . I n  l e t t e r s  o f  t h i s  t im e ,  
Y okoi S honan , one o f  th e  J u n io r  C o u n c i l l o r s ,  e x p re s s e d  
h i s  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  th e  new sy s te m  f o r  e l i m in a t i n g  
many u s e l e s s  C o u rt n o b le s  from  h ig h  p o s i t i o n s ,  and 
d e s c r ib e d  th e  governm en t a s  c a r r i e d  on l a r g e l y  by  th e  
P r e s i d e n t s ,  th e  S e n io r  and  J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  and  th e  
C o u n c il  S e c r e t a r i e s . ^ 1 ^
The Lower House o f  th e  L e g i s l a t u r e  was s e t  up on 
J u l y  1 3 th ,  1 8 6 8 . ^ ^  U nder th e  t i t l e  o f  K osh i T a isa k u sh o  
i t  m et t h r e e  t im e s  a m onth t o  d e b a te  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
m a t t e r s ,  b u t  th e  w r i t t e n  m em o ria l was th e  m ost c o n v e n ie n t  
fo rm  o f  c o n s u l t i n g  th e  Daimyo and th e  Han s a m u ra i ,  and  
r e g u l a r  s e s s io n s  o f  th e  Lower House w ere su sp e n d e d  on 
th e  1 6 th  o f  S e p te m b e r . C$3)  s h o r t l y  a f t e r ,  on th e  3 th
7 A M ft Z.A K | .
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of Octoberw  ' the office of Han representative in the 
Lower House(Koginin) was defined as that of receiving 
Imperial orders and reporting conditions in the Han 
to the government. The legislative character of the 
Lower House of Han representatives had clearly lapsed,
A government notification of November 3 r d ^ ^  
declared that although it had been intended to establish 
an Assembly by dividing the Legislative and the Executive, 
in actual practice these two powers had become so inter­
mingled that it had proved impossible to establish an 
Assembly, While reiterating that popular participation 
in the government in a national Assembly was essential 
to the firm foundation of the regime, especially in 
the matter of finance, yet for the present the Legislative 
branch of the government was abolished and the Senior 
and Junior Councillors were to enter the Executive branch 
under the direction of the Presidents(Hosho)«. The 
task of drawing up a new Assembly system was entrusted 
to a special investigation Bureau, (Giji Torisirabe Kyoku) 
Prior to this notification, Senior and Junior 
Councillors had already taken over posts in the Executive 
Departments, Komatsu was appointed Vice-Head of the 
Foreign Department on October I8th, and Nakamikado was
34. Meiji 1 8m 20d. HRZS. No.643
35. Meioi 1 9m 19d. HRZS. No.760
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appointed Head, of the Finance Department on the 7th of 
October, At this time, the link between the Council 
as a whole and the Executive Departments was provided 
by the Council Secretaries(Benji), whose duties were 
defined as follows on December 2nd, 1868.^^) The 
ten Secretaries divided government business into six 
broad sections to which two or three of them would be 
assigned. These sections consisted of the Palace; the 
Daimyo; the upper samurai; the Fu and Ken, temples and 
seals; the receipt and transmission of official documents, 
proclamations, petitions, enquiries and reports of the 
Executive Departments; the University, appointments and 
promotions. The Secretaries received all incoming 
official documents, scrutinised them and passed them on 
to the Council after affixing their seals. Clerks were 
attached to the Council to record its decisions and to 
return them to the Secretaries concerned, who then 
transmitted them to the person or Department concerned. 
This Council Secretariat was by far the largest 
in the government, employing 10 Secretaries, 12 Under­
secretaries and 35 clerks, it was here that the 
documentary proceedure of the government was evolved 
and the records of the government kept. In the extreme 
press of business, the Legislative and the Executive
36, Meipi 1 10m 29d. HRZS. No.911.
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were indeedb difficult to separate, since the Council 
was responsible for decisions on a flood of memorials, 
petitions, enquiries and reports from individuals and 
from Executive Departments to which its answers had 
the force of legislation. At a time when there were 
no legal codes, no administrative precedents and no 
clear division of Departmental functions, the Council 
was bound to engross a huge amount of business.
On the 2nd of January, 1869 the Senior and 
Junior Councillors were themselves divided into sections 
for the handling of official business; Nakayama taking 
shrines and temples, Hachisuka taking military affairs 
and official appointments, Higashikuze taking foreign 
affairs and justice, Kido and Ökubo taking the Daimyo, 
upper samurai and the Fu and Ken, Soejima and öki taking 
finance, the University and Tokyo Fu. On the 28th of 
F e b r u a r y w h e n  the government had definitely, settled 
in Tokyo, these provisions were extended and the Senior 
and Junior Councillors and the Council Secretaries were 
organised into five sections handling the whole range 
of government business. Takatsukasa, Nakayama, Ano 
and Fukuoka handled the Department of State Religion, 
official ranks and ceremonies and the Court nobles;
38. HKBRTZ.I. KSM 2. KS. Dajokan Naikaku. 1. p.127
39. Meiji 2 lm 18d. HRZS. No.55.
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Iwakura, Nakamikado, Ano, Yuri, Kido, ökubo, Goto, Ökuma 
and Hirosawa handled the Finance Department, the Fu and 
Ken, shrines and temples; Iwakura, Tokudaiji, Matsudaira 
of Echizen, Nabeshima of Hizen, Kido and Ckubo handled 
the Military Department, the Daimyo and upper samurai 
and appointments to office; Tokudaiji, Date of Uwajima, 
Fukuoka and Soejmma handled the Foreign Department, the 
University and the Bureau of Official Legislation; 
Takatsukasa, Nakamikado, Hirosawa and Iwashita handled 
the Justice Department, the Palace guard and gates*
The Council Secretaries were also assigned to these 
five sections, and to special duties connected with the 
receipt and transmission of official documents*
On the same d a y ^ ^  regulations were issued for the 
conduct of business in the Council* The Councillors 
were to hold a conference daily from ten till twelve, 
to which the Council Secretaries and the Heads and 
Executives of Departments could be invited if necessary. 
After a meal at twelve, the Councillors then retired 
to their offices to handle their respective sections 
of government business* Petitions, enquiries and other 
official documents were sent to the Junior Councillors 
by the Council Secretaries concerned with their opinion 
attached; the Junior Councillors considered them and
40. Meiji 2 lm 18d* HRZS. No.54.
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presented them in turn to the Senior Councillors. The 
Senior Councillors deliberated and determined (Gihan) 
upon them and forwarded them to the Presidents, who 
obtained the sanction of the Emperor and returned them 
to the Council Secretaries for disposal. Strict in­
junctions were given to avoid delays, and a separate 
regulation^'1'^ enjoined that a document received by 
the Council Secretariat should be considered by the 
Secretaries by noon of the day following and determined 
in Council conference by noon of the day after. On the 
same day it was to be transmitted to the Presidential 
Secretaries and returned to the Secretaries responsible, 
who returned it with the decision to the originator 
on the fourth day. All mat-ters were thus to be dis­
posed of within four days.
At this time, the Council was acting both as the 
Legislative and the office for the co-ordination of 
the Executive. The system was extremely unwieldy in 
spite of injunctions to avoid delays, and it could 
not be long before a new organisation would have to 
be drawn up.
Meanwhile, the government was still committed to 
setting up a Legislative Assembly and was still much 
in need of support from the Han for the spring campaign
41. Meiji 2 lm 18d. HRZS. No.56
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against the Bakufu remnants in the north. Within the 
Council, Kido Koin was a strong advocate of government
(IL O')by Assembly^ J and Iwakura also regarded the erection 
of an Assembly as vital for the stability of the new
(tLX\ -regime.v Yamanouchi, the Daimyo of Tosa, had been 
appointed Head of a special Bureau for the investigation 
of Assemblies on the 3rd of November,1868. Other members 
of the Bureau were Akizuki Taneki, Daimyo of Takanabe 
and a Council Secretary, Fukuoka and Öki, Junior Council­
lors, Sameshima and Mori, executives in the Foreign 
Department, and Kanda Kohei, an ex-Bakufu official who 
had made a special study of Assembly systems.
On the 3th of November 1 8 6 8 a government 
notification re-affirmed the intention to establish an 
Assembly and to determine important affairs by public 
deliberation*- The Han representatives were urged to 
devote themselves to clarifying opinion in their Han 
andi to, avoid the empty arguments and vain discussions 
of the Koshi Taisakusho  ^On December 8 t h t h e  Han 
representatives were required to be appointed from the 
incumbents of the two highest executive offices of the 
Han government.
42. Kido Köin Bunsho. 3. p.186-7. Letter of the 27th of December, 1868.
43. Iwakura KÖ Jikki* 2. p.687-8. Memorial of March 7th, 
1869.
44. Meiji 1 9m 21d. HRZS. No.771.
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On the 22nd of January, 1869^^^ the Han were 
ordered to send their representatives to a new Assembly 
called the Kogisho to be opened in Tokyo on the 27th 
of March. Detailed draft regulations for this Assembly 
were drawn up in January or Februaryv r/. The chief 
object of the Assembly was stated to be the determination 
of Laws(Horitsu), but not exceptional or emergency 
matters. The members were to draw up draff proposals 
(Gian) which were to be introduced, discussed and deter­
mined on consecutive days, and if passed by a majority 
of three fifths were to be immediately sent up for the 
Imperial decision by the President. Executive officials 
could be summoned for questioning when necessary. In 
April or May^^^ the President of the Assembly issued 
instructions to the members encouraging them to form 
committees specialising in 18 separate administrative 
matters such as agriculture, taxes, posts and currency 
in which groups of members sharing a special knowledge 
or interest would draw up draft proposals from the 
memorials and petitions received by the Assembly. On 
April 29th the President of the Assembly informed 
the Executive Departments that when the members of the 
Assembly in committee were engaged! in drawing up draft
46. Meiji 1 12m lOd. HRZS. No.1063.
47. HKBRTZ.l. KSM. 17. KS. Kogisho/Shügi-In. p. 259-62.48. ibid. p. 272.
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proposals, they were to confer with the Executive Depart­
ments when necessary; on the other hand, officials of 
the Executive Departments could participate in the 
deliberations of the Assembly. Tbae Kogisho was clearly 
intended to act as a Legislative Assembly, and its 
framers took an optimistic estimate of the capacity of 
the Han representatives to draft legislation.
On the 18th of April, 1869^°'> 227 Han represent­
atives took their seats in the Eogisho, and were 
immediately given a government Enquiry to debate. There­
after, under the Presidency of Akizuki Taneki, öhara 
Shigesane and Kanda Kohei?it debated over 20 topics 
in the next few months until its final session on the 
19th of July. Kanda, Mori and Suzuki who had served 
on the committee which planned the new Assembly pro­
vided the most important draft proposals for debate, 
but none of these men held high positions in the govern­
ment. The Kogisho was in fact eclipsed by important 
movements taking place within the government during 
its sessions, and in any case its debates were marked 
by much disorder and discord.
Early in 1869, the future of the new government 
was by no means secure. Ezo was still in the hands of
50. MJBKZS. 4. Kenseihen. p.ll
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the Bakufu remnants, the northern provinces were in a 
state of great chaos and turbulence, and considerable 
friction had arisen between the Satsuma and Choshü
(51}troops during the course of the campaign.w  ' The
finances of the new government were extremely embarrassed
- TS2')and the country swarmed with Ronin. ^ ' The officials 
of the government were alarmingly given up to drunkeness 
and d e b a u c h e r y ; w h i l e  in the Imperialist Han import- 
ant reforms had to pushed through to pacify the tur­
bulent spirit of the returning troops, keeping majay of 
the principal men of the time busy in the Han rather 
than in the central government. J
The creation of an Assembly was proposed as one 
answer to these problems. But two other policies were 
being mooted at this tim,e; firstly, the return otf 
land registers to the -Emperor by all the Daimyo to 
demonstrate that sovereignty resided in the central 
government and not the individual Han; secondly, to 
carry out a thorough reform of the official system 
to increase efficiency, to attract men of talentIto 
the government and to elevate its status in the eyes 
of the nation.
On March 5th, 1869?the Daimyö of Satsuma, Choshü,
51. Tsumaki. Maebara Issei Den. p.642-3.
52. ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 3. p.131 ff; p.144-5.
53. Iwakura K5 Jikki. 2. p.714-6.
54. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.258-9, for Tosa. 
iDai Saigo Zenshu. 3. p.640-1, for Satsuma.
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Tosa and Hizen sent in a joint memorial offering to 
return their land registers to the throne. In the 
succeeding months, some 200 Daimyo followed their 
example. But it was felt that these memorials should 
not be accepted until the surrender of land, registers 
had been ratified by a grand Assembly of the officials, 
Court nobles, Daimyo and upper samurai of the realm.
It was this Assembly rather than the Kogisho which 
occupied the attention of the government in the first 
half of 1869. In January or early February, 1869^'^ 
the Daimyo and upper samurai of the Han were informed 
of the intention to consult them in a grand Assembly of 
the whole realm, and they were required to be present 
in the capital by the 21st of April. On March 11th 
the Governors and senior executives of the Fu and Ken 
were required to send one of their number to attend 
this Assembly.
But before the Assembly met, reforms were carried 
out within the government itself. Talented men from 
the Han were invited to join the central government 
and after much discussion among the officials as a whole 
it was decided to hold an election for the posts of 
President(Hosho), Senior and Junior Councillor(Gijo,
Sanyo) and Head and Vice-Head of the seven Executive_%____ ___  ____________________
55. Meiji 1 12m. HRZS. No.1165.
56. Meiji 1 lm 29d. HEZS. No.82.
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34-
Department s(Chiji, Fuku-Chiji). Since the Restoration, 
the posts of Senior Councillor and Head of an Executive 
Department had been confined to Court nobles and Daimyö; 
but election to all these posts was to be performed by 
a ballot held among the officials of the top three 
grades(Chokunin). This election was carried out largely 
on the insistence of Iwakura and ökubo, who were both 
anxious to weed out superfluous officials particularly 
in the higher posts, and regarded an election as the 
only practical way to do so.^®^
( ' R Q )Accordingly, on June 22nd in the presence of 
the Emperor an election was carried out which resulted 
in a new and more compact Council of one President,
Sanjo, three Senior Councillors, Iwakura, Tokudaiji, 
Nabeshima, and six Junior Councillors, Higashikuze,
Kido, ökubo, Goto, Soejima and Itagaki. This was an 
attempt to create a smaller Council of able men enjoy­
ing the support of the higher officials as a whole and 
balancing the claims of the four major Han to the 
direction of the government# Since the previous attempt 
on June 11th, 1868,to limit the Senior and Junior 
Councillors to ten apiece, numbers had swollen until 
just before the election there were 19 Senior and 16 
Junior Councillors# As a result of this election,
58. Iwakura Ko Jikki. 2. p.725 39. Meiji 2 5m I3d. HRZS. No. 443.
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seven Daimyo Senior Councillors and two Daimyo Junior 
Councillors were dismissed and appointed to honorific 
posts in the Palace; with the exception of Nabeshima of 
Hizen as Senior Councillor and a handful of Daimyo still 
in executive positions, the Daimyo thus followed the 
Court nobles of the previous year in being quietly 
dropped as officials of the central government•
On the same day^*^ the Legislative branch(Giseikan) 
of the government which had been suspended on the 3rd 
of November, 1868^62  ^was formally replaced by Upper 
and Lower Assemblies(Jo/Ka Gikyoku). The new Council 
of President, Senior and Junior Councillors and Council 
Secretaries was to act as the Executive branch(Gyoseikan)• 
The stage was now set for the Upper Assembly of Court 
nobles, Daimyo and Imperial officials to debate the 
retui'n of land registers to the Emperor and other crucial 
issues of the time. On June 30th, the Emperor
consulted the Upper Assembly(Jokyoku Kaigi) on the three 
questions of the promotion of the Imperial regime, the 
appointment of the Daimyo as Imperial Governors of their 
Han and the colonisation of Ezo; present at the Assembly 
were government o£ officials of the fifth grade and above,
60. The Daimyo concerned were Tsuwano, Tokushima, 
Yamaguchi, Okayama, Tottori, Hiroshima, Nagoya, Saga 
and Kumamoto.
61. Meiji 2 5m 13d. HRZS. No.44-3.
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the Imperial Princes, Court nobles and Daimyo. In sub­
sequent meetings diplomacy and finance were also dis­
cussed, but once the Daimyo had approved the return of 
land registers the Upper Assembly had largely served its 
purpose. On July 25th the previous memorials for 
the return of land registers were accepted and the 
Daimyo were appointed Imperial Governors of their Han, 
Sessions of the Lower House(Kogisho) had by this time 
been suspended; after the final session of the Upper 
House on the 3rd of July, the Daimyo were never again 
summoned to participate in a national Assembly,
Within the Council at this time there was much 
dissatisfaction with the existing structure of the 
government. On July 12th^5) ö^^o wrote to a friend 
that many useless arguments had arisen in the Kogisho 
and that he was proposing to have it closed as unsuit­
able to the national tradition(Kokutai). Iwakuraa 
earlier in the year advocated in a memorial to Sanjö 
that official titles should be drawn from the ancient 
Taiho Code, since the prevailing opinion despises the 
new and reveres the old.^^) Kido was pressing at this 
time for a clear line to be drawn between the functions 
of Junior Councillor and Vice-Head of Executive
64. Meiji 2 6m 17d. HRZS. No.543.
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Departments; failure to do so in his opinion was leading 
to the formation of "little Departments of State" which 
by-passed the Council
On August 15th, 1869 an Ordinance was issued 
revising the structure of the government. The Department 
of State Religion(Jingikan) was exalted to the rank of 
the cnief Department of State. Next came the Great Council 
of State(Dajokan), consisting of Ministers of the Left 
and Right(Sa/U Daijin) acting as Council Presidents over 
three Senior Councillors(Dainagon) and three Junior 
Councillors(Sangi). The Presidents advised the Emperor 
and exercised over-all supervision and control of the 
administration. The Senior and Junior Councillors 
assisted the Presidents in carrying on the administration, 
in accepting or rejecting proposals and in promulgating 
Imperial Edicts. Under the direction of the Council 
were six Executive Departments(Sho) handling Civil, 
Financial, Military, Judicial, Palace and Foreign affairs. 
Finally Institutes(In) were established for the Receipt 
of Petitions(Taishö-In) and for the Assembly of Han 
representatives(Shugi-In).
In keeping with the reduction of the Councillors, 
the Council Secretariat was also reduced to three.
Chief Secretaries(Daiben), 5 Second Secretaries(Chuben)
67. Kido Koin Bunsho. 3. p.317} 321.68. Meiji 2 7m 8d. HRZS. No.622.Generally known as the 
Shokuinrei.
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and six Third Secretaries(Shoben). Associated with this
reduction of the Council Secretariat was an attempt to
define the routine matters of government which could be
handled in the Executive Departments without being sent
up for Council approval* On May 19th ^ 9) the Departments
were ordered to handle routine matters at their own
discretion and to settle routine matters which concerned
other government offices by direct conference with them.
Very important matters and matters upon which decision
was difficult were to be sent as enquiries(Ukagai) to
the Council Presidents; matters to be issued as Imperial
Proclamations(Fukoku) to the Fu, Han and Ken were to
be sent to the Council Secretariat. On May 31st
it was further stipulated thatfc important matters such
as the- revision of previous regulations or the compo­
teqpJL
sition of new systems(Hösei) were to be reported to the
Council Presidents for Imperial sanction after discussion
and decision in the Department concerned. Decisions
taken in respect to the enquiries of the Fu, Han and
Ken were to be reported twice a month to the Presidents;
but the reports(Todoke) on business handled within the
Department were to be settled within the Department
(71)itself. On June 2nd, J the Departments were authorised
69. Meiji 2 4m 8d. HRZS. No.347
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to appoint clerical officials without prior reference 
to the Council Secretariat.
The definition of important matters to be reported 
to the Council and routine matters to be determined by 
the Departments themselves was a vital one for the proper 
working of both the Council and the Executive Depart­
ments. If too much business was reported to the Council 
for decision, stagnation was bound to result; if too 
little, the Departments tended to escape from central 
control. Striking the correct balance demanded a constant 
series of legal definitions as official business expanded.
Another feature of the new system was the abandon­
ment of the Legislative Assembly. Prom the regulations 
issued for the Shügi-In in October 1869^^ it clearly 
had no powers of initiating legislation since draft 
proposals were put before it by the Council of State, 
and those proposed by the Shügi-In itself could only 
be debated after informing the Council. By an order 
of the 25th of Sept ember the Institute for the 
Receipt of Petitions(Taisho-In) was reduced to a Bureau 
(Kyoku) within the Shügi-In ; which thus emerged as 
an Institute in which representatives of the Fu, Han 
and Ken met to discuss proposals put to them by the 
government, and in which the petitions of the people
72. Meioi 2 9m. HRZS. No.9^9. Clause 2
73. Meiji 2 8m 20d. HRZS. No.779.
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could be received and considered.
The revision of August 15th was above all an attempt 
to create a strong and cömpact Council, which was hence­
forth designated the Great Council off State(Dajokan), 
a term that had been applied to the government as a 
whole in previous usage. But there was much tension 
and rivalry between various factions within the govern­
ment at this time and it proved extremely difficult to 
get the principal men to assume the highest posts in 
the new Council. Kido of Choshü headed a faction 
composed of Ito, Inoue and ökuma handling the financial 
and civil affairs of the new government. Kido worked 
closely with San^ jo but disliked and distrusted Iwakura, 
who in turn was always in close correspondence with 
Ökubo and the Satsuma men. Goto and Itagaki of Tosa 
disliked ökubo and tended to side with Kido. Kido was 
also on good terms with Yamanouchi Yodo, the Daimyo 
of Tosa, and often visited him whereas ökubo never did 
so. Since the dispute over the treatment of Tokugawa 
Keiki on the evening of the Restoration Edict, Yamanouchi 
had nursed a hatred of Iwakura, who alone of all the 
Court nobles had directly opposed him. On the other 
hand, Soejima of Hizen allied himself to Iwakura and 
Okubo, and the Daimyo of Hizen also had close connections 
with Iwakura.
74. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.81-3.
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In the formation of the new Council, Iwakura 
insisted on giving way to San jo, who wage appointed 
President(Udaijin). Iwakura and Tokudaiji were ap­
pointed Senior Councillors(Dainagon). On the proposal 
of Iwakura, Ökubo, Kido and Itagaki were appointed to 
posts as Doctors in the Institute for the Receipt of 
Petitions(Taishö-In Gakushi). Iwakura wished them to 
leave active posts and to act as advisers(Komon) to 
the Emperor in their capacity as the three great states­
men of the realm. But Kido refused the post on the 
grounds that he was not a man of scholarship, and the 
three men were appointed simply as officials(Shusshi) 
of the Institute on the 18th of August.(75) soejima 
Taneomi of Hizen was appointed Junior Counci11or(Sangi) 
on the 15th of August, with Maebara Issei of Chöshu 
who accepted the post with the greatest reluctance and 
refused to attend to his duties* The appointment 
of ökubo, Kido and Itagaki to retired positions caused 
considerable consternation among the higher officials, 
and so Iwakura on the 25th of August recommended to 
Sanjo that his previous plan should be scrapped and
that ökubo, Kido and Itagaki should be appointed Junior 
(nn \Councillors.vf J ökubo was appointed Junior Councillor 
on the 29th of August, but Kido refused to serve on
75.
76.
77.
Iwakura Ko Jikki. 2. p.764-5. 
Denki Bainihonshi. Seijikahen. Iwakura KQL Jikki. 2. p.765-6. p. 44.
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a plea of illness, and Hirosawa Saneomi of Choshu was 
appointed Junior Councillor on the 30th of August*
Kido disliked both Maebara and Hirosawa of his own Han 
and was offended at the failure of his own candidate 
ökuma Shigenobu to be appointed to the new Council. J 
Tosa was not represented in the new Council at all, and 
Hizen wass represented by the conservative Soejima to the 
exclusion of the progressive Ckuma of his own Han who 
was by now a powerful force in the Executive*
Thus while the creatibn of a small Council was 
necessary for the efficient directiün of affairs, the 
staffing of such a Council was difficult in a time of 
factions and rivalries. However, soon after the form­
ation of the new Council a step was taken towards the 
concept of Council solidarity in the Oath which the 
President and Senior and Junior Councillors jointly
(79)swore before the Emperor on the 15th of September,1869# 
They pledged themselves to preserve Council secrecy, 
to express opinions freely and without rancour, and to 
visit each other several time's a month in their own 
homes for informal discussions. Important measures 
which were to be determined by public deliberation(Koron) 
under the terms of the Imperial Oath were to be sent up
78. Kido Koin Bunsho. 3. p.389-90.
79* Okubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 3* p.247-8
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for Imperial decision only after full deliberation in 
the Council after consultation with Heads of Executive 
Departments, the Council Secretaries and the Assembly 
of Representatives*
New instructions for the conduct of business in 
the Council were issued on the 13th of August and 
again on the 12th of September. As before, a Council 
conference was held daily from ten till twelve in which 
matters sent up to the Council were deliberated and 
determined upon. The Council Secretaries(Benkan) in 
their respective sections(Bunka) received and considered 
the petitions, enquiries and- reports and other official 
papers daily from ten till twelve, and forwarded them 
with their written opinions to the Junior Councillors 
when they retired to their offices at one. The Junior 
Councillors considered them, introduced them for 
discussion in the Council conference of the following 
day, and returned them to the Council Secretaries of 
the section concerned when they again returned to their 
offices between one and two. The Senior and Junior 
Councillors were empowered to handle and effect matters 
which had been deliberated upon and determined in the 
same way as the President. Heads of Executive Depart­
ments could attend the Council conference on the prior
80. Meiji 2 7m 13d. HRZS. No.64781. Meiji 2 8m 7d. HRZS. No.716.
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permission of the Council Secretaries, and could be 
summoned to attend with their under officials when an 
important matter arose« No official documents were to 
be put before the Council conference without passing 
through the Council Secretaries. It seems that the 
handling of business in the Council had become rather 
too informal, at any rate in the opinion of Ckubo who 
declared that although the free expression of opinion 
was the basis of enlightened government and should be 
observed by men in important posts, yet for mere country 
samurai to go to and fro before men in the highest 
positions adversely affected the dignity of the govern­
ment. It should be therefore forbidden to all except the 
men in the chief positions to discuss government affair^?^' 
The new instructions for the handling of business in the 
Council attempted to limit all approach to the Council 
to the Council Secretariat; further instructions issued 
later in the year on the .24-th of December^85) again 
declared that during the Council conference, officials 
were forbidden to enter without obtaining permission 
even if the matter was urgent; and to present official 
documents to the Council other than through the Council 
Secretaries was classed as a misdemeanour.
The new Council was strengthened by the appointment
82. ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 3. p,229-30, Sanjo and Iwakura. August 30th, 1869. Meiji 2 11m 22d. HRZS. No.1073.
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of Nabeshima, the Daimyo of Hizen, as Senior Councillor 
on the 21st of September, Nakamikado was also appointed 
Senior Councillor on the 22nd of December, In an 
attempt to strengthen the foundation of the government, 
ökubo and Kido were ordered to return to their Han on 
the 6th of January, 1870, to persuade the Daimyo of 
Satsuma and Choshu and Saigo Takamori to come up to the 
capital and assume office. It was clear that sooner or 
later the Han would have to be abolished, and ökubo was 
now advocating a co?>alition of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa 
to provide the military backing for the abolition of 
the Han and the creation of a strong central government£8^ 
While ökubo and Kido were engaged in persuading their 
Daimyo to support this policy, the Daimyo of Tosa 
independently approached the Daimyo of Satsuma with 
a similar proposal/8^  But the attempt to persuade 
the Daimyo of Choshu and Satsuma to come up to the 
capital failed, and Saigo also refused to leave Satsuma 
when his Daimyo would not do so.^88^
However, some new support from Tosa was acquired 
by the appointment of Sasaki Takayuki % 0 . J unior 
Councillor on the 6th of March, followed by SaitS 
Toshiyuki on the 13th of June* While the future of the 
new government was once more in the balance oven the
84. Ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 3. p.347ff.
85. Tsuda. Meiji SeiJo to omi iakayuki. p,174.86. ibid.p.177.
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critical issue of the abolition of the Han, a bitter 
dispute arose within the government over the control 
of the Executive Departments.
On the 17th of September, 1869>the Department of 
Civil Affairs(Mimbusho) and the Department of Finance 
(ökurasho) had been amalgamated, and the combined 
Departments had come to possess wide executive powers 
which increasingly escaped from Council control. On 
the return of the Imperial armies to the Han, the vast 
majority of government business was concerned with 
finance and local administration. The need to construct 
a sound system of government finance and to establish 
the basis of a modern industrial economy demanded a 
specialised knowledge which only a handful of young 
executives like ökuma, Ito and: Inoue possessed, ökuma 
had early distinguished himself by his ability in 
handling the diplomatic and financial crises which had 
arisen since the Hestpration, and on the amalgamation 
of the two Departments he was appointed joint Vice-Head 
under the nominal control of Date, the Daimyo of Uwajima. 
Ito served directly under him, and together they drew 
into the combined Departments a number of able young 
men who laboured to promote the rapid financial, 
industrial and administrative progress of Japan on 
Western lines.
4 7 .
But t h e i r  y o u th ,  t h e i r  seem ing  a r r o g a n c e ,  t h e i r  
w e s te r n  ways and e x t r a v a g a n t  s t y l e  o f  l i v i n g  o f f e n d e d  
th e  more c o n s e r v a t iv e  members o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t; w h i le  
th e  v o lu m e , c o m p le x ity  and  s p e c i a l i s e d  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  
b u s in e s s  th e y  t r a n s a c t e d  te n d e d  to  p u t  them  b ey o n d  
e f f e c t i v e  C o u n c il  c o n t r o l .  When e n f o r c in g  new f i n a n c i a l  
and  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  th e  o r d e r s  o f  th e  com­
b in e d  D e p a rtm e n ts  w ere o f t e n  r e s i s t e d  by  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s ;  
and  t h e r e  was s t r o n g  o p p o s i t io n  i n  c e r t a i n  q u a r t e r s  t o  
i t s  p o l i c y  o f  r a i lw a y  and  t e l e g r a p h  e x p a n s io n  w h ich  w ere  
r e g a r d e d  a s  a w a ste  o f  f i n a n c e s  b e t t e r  s p e n t  on  m i l i t a r y  
p r e p a r a t i o n s  ^
I n  th e  C o u n c il ,  ökubo i n  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s l i k e d  th e  
m ethods o f  <3kuina and  h i s  a s s o c i a t e s ,  and  p la n n e d  t o  
c u t  down t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  by s e p a r a t i n g  th e  two D e p a r t ­
m e n ts , ökuma an d  I t o  n a t u r a l l y  r e s i s t e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  
and  th e y  w ere  s u p p o r te d  by  K ido and  Goto who w ere  n o t  
i n  th e  C o u n c il  b u t  whose s u p p o r t  th e  go v ern m en t was 
m ost a n x io u s  t o  g a in .  K ido a c c e p te d  an  a p p o in tm e n t a s  
J u n i o r  C o u n c i l lo r  on th e  5 th  o f  J u l y ,  1 8 7 0 ,and  t h e  
p r o p o s a l  t o  s e p a r a t e  th e  com bined D e p a rtm e n ts  so o n  
t h r e a t e n e d  to  p ro d u c e  a d e a d lo c k  i n  th e  C o u n c il  w i th
8 7 . F o r a n  exam ple o f  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  p o l i c y  o f  th e  
com bined D e p a rtm e n ts  by a l o c a l  G o v e rn o r, v i d .  Iw a k u ra  
Tomomi K ankei B unsho . 4 .  p ,4 1 2 f f .  F o r o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
r a i lw a y  d e v e lo p m e n t, v i d .  W atan ab e . M e i j i  Bunka K enkyü.
4 .  p .1 8 .
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Ökubo and Soejima for the proposal, Kido and Goto 
against, and Hirosawa, Sasaki and Saito neutral. At 
this juncture, Sasaki suggested a compromise by which 
the two Departments should be separated and ökuma raised 
to Junior Councillor in compensation.Sanjo, who 
was anxious to protect ökuma and Ito in this crisis, 
readily agreed to Sasaki's proposal. In a letter to 
Sasaki on the 11th of July, he wrote that the promotion 
of ökuma would open the way for the appointment of men 
of talent to the Council, which would be strengthened 
by the addition of men conversant with civil and financial 
business, and would work to avoid the danger of pre­
ponderance (Hencho)•(90) however, was pressing
not only for Ökuma to be appointed Junior Councillor but 
for him to be put in charge of the combined Departments
as part of a general plan for the improvement of the 
(91}government.
For several weeks the conflict remained unresolved, 
and ökubo and Soejima strongly resisted the appointment 
of ökuma to the Council. The compromise that emerged 
after much dispute was the separation of the two
88. Goto was not a Junior Councillor, but his opinion 
was influential. On the 8th of August, he was appointed 
to an honorary post in the Palace and ordered to advise 
the Emperor on national affairs.
89* For a full account of this dispute, vid. Tsuda.
Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.l97ff.
90. Ökuma Shigenobu Kankei Bunsho. 1. p.P56-8.
91. Ibid. p.260. Letter of Kido to Ito, July 15th 1870.
49
Departments on the 4th of August, followed by the ele­
vation of ökuma to Junior Councillor on the 26th of 
September. When the two Departments were separated,
Date remained Head of the Finance Department with ökuma 
as Vice-Head over Ito and Inoue; Iwakura, ökubo and 
Hirosawa attached themselves to the Civil Affairs 
Department as executives(Goyö-kakari) from the 6th of 
August until the 7th of December to assist the Vice-Head 
öki Takato to conduct its business.
Henceforth, the establishment of a proper relation 
between the Council and the -Executive Departments was 
to remain an exacting problem of personalities and 
definitions. On top of the dispute over the separation 
of the combined Departments, Maebara Issei resigned from 
his post as Junior Councillor on the 26th of September; 
since January 3rd he had combined his post in the Council 
with the position of Vice-^ead of the Military Department, 
and determined to resign after a series of disputes with 
the Finance Department, the Council and his own Depart­
ment Secretary Kuroda Kiyotaka over his plans for the
(q?)expansion of the army and navy.w  ' Maebara was a man 
of a difficult disposition, but to some extent his 
resignation was due to the difficulties of his dual 
position as Councillor and Vice-Head of an Executive
92. Tsumaki. Maebara Issei Den. p.806-11, p.874.
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Department•
After the separation of the combined Departments 
and the appointment of ökuma as Junior Councillor, the 
rivalry between Kido and the progressives and ökubo and 
the conservatives was still much in evidence. On the 
12th of December, 1870,, a new Department of Industry 
(Kobusho) was set up to control the industrial, mining, 
steel manufacturing, lighthouse and telegraph business 
of the government. The new Department was erected 
largely on the proposal of Kido and ökuma, who advocated 
that it should be directed by officials of the Finance 
Department as an additional post. Soejima objected 
to this, and ökubo advocated that the new Department 
should be attached for the moment to the Department of 
Civil Affairs£^3) As a result, the Department of Industry 
remained a skeleton organisation.
Morale was not high in the central government at 
this time* While the Council and the Executive Depart­
ments were rent by factions and disputes, the spirit 
of resolution grew weaker, red-tape grew ever more 
burdensome and the officials increasingly subject to 
criticism for their dissolute habits.^5) A great
95* Iwakura Tomomi Kankei B unsho. 4. p.445.
94. An appointment to the top position in the Department 
of Industry was not made until Goto was appointed Yice- 
Head on August 14th, 1871. He was assisted by five 
Secretaries and three clerks only.(Vid. Shokuinroku, Meiji 
t yni») Detailed regulations and a full complement date from March 1872.
95* Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.206-8.
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stir was caused "by the public suicide of Yokoyama 
Yasutake of Satsuma on the 18th of August to draw 
attention to his petition against the inefficiency and 
corruption of the government. The three great Han 
seemed uncommitted to the new government; Shimazu, the 
Daimyo of Satsuma, and Saiga Takamori had refused to 
assume office and were known to be critical of some of its 
policies. Itagaki Taisuke with his large following in 
Tosa was also still outside the government*
It was therefore resolved in the Council on the 
20th of November to send Iwakura as Imperial Envoy to 
persuade the Daimyo of Satsuma, Choshü and Tosa to 
come up to the capital, while ökubo was to persuade 
Saigo and Itagaki to join the government. Qn 
March 29th, 1871,it was agreed that Satsuma, Choshü 
and Tosa should provide between them a body of 10,000 
troops to form the nuceus of an Imperial army and as 
a necessary preliminary to the abolition of the Han.
By mid-1871, these troops had arrived in the capital 
and after a little wavering, the Han were finally 
abolished on the 29th of August.(97)
The abolition of the Han was the signal for another 
, major reconstruction of the central government. Since 
November 3rd, 1870^98; Skubo had advocated reforms
96- Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. o.206-8.97. Otsu. DHHKSS. I. p.428-30.98. Okubo Toshimichi Nikki. 2.p.l27; Okubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 4. p.68ff.
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to ensure Council control of the Finance and Civil 
Affairs Departments, He advocated that a Senior Council­
lor should be appointed to each Department to exercise 
control, and that the Junior Councillors should also 
be assigned to the business of the Departments as part 
of their duties, ökubo also advocated that two or three 
men should be selected from among the Junior Councillors 
to act as Instructors(Go Hodo) to the Fmperor, and that 
reforms should be carried out in the Palace to sweep out 
useless officials and to appoint specially selected Han 
samurai as Imperial Attendants(JiJu)•
In July or August, 1871*^^ Okubo advocated to 
Iwakura that the office of Junior Councillor should be 
abolished and their duties assumed by Heads of -Executive 
Departments. Goto and Eto were advocating a Council of 
Senior Councillor^ DaiJin) over Junior Councillors acting 
as Heads of Executive Departments; Iwakura, ökubo and 
Sasaki inclined to this proposal, but were alive to the 
dangers foreseen by Sanjo of the disputes which might 
result from such a combination of functions.(^0)
Finally, Saigo and ökubo proposed that a single Chief 
Councillor(Shusai) should be elected from ^atsuma, Choshu 
or Tosa under whom all the other officials should work 
in willing obedience in the Executive Departments.^0"^
99* Okubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 4. p.304-5.
100. Tsuda. Meiji SeiJo to omi Takayuki. p.244-5.101. Dai Saigo Zenshu. 2. p.516-9; iwakura Ko Jikki. 2. 
p.908-9.
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They p ro p o se d  K ido f o r  t h i s  p o s t ,  and  g o t th e  c o n s e n t  
o f  S a n jo ,  Iw ak u ra  and I t a g a k i .  Y am agata and  In o u e  w ere 
s e n t  t o  p e r s u a d e  K ido to  a c c e p t ,  b u t  he r e f u s e d  to  do 
so on  th e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  S a ig ö  a s  th e  m ost r e s p e c t e d  man 
o f  th e  re a lm  s h o u ld  assum e t h i s  p o s t . ^ ^ ^
K ido was o p p o sed  to  th e  c o m b in a tio n  o f  th e  f u n c t io n s  
o f  J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r  and  Head o f  E x e c u tiv e  D e p a r tm e n ts , 
a s  t e n d in g  t o  th e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e  L e g i s l a t u r e ,  I n  
a m em o ria l o f  A ugust o r  S e p te m b e r , 1 8 7 1 he  a d v o c a te d  
t h a t  th e  S e n io r  and J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  sh o u ld  b e  com­
b in e d  t o  fo rm  a Suprem e L e g i s l a t u r e ( S u k i  R ippo  no Kan) 
on th e  l im e s  o f  w e s te rn  c o u n t r i e s  to  d e te rm in e  p o l i c y ,  
t o  s u p e r v i s e  th e  w o rk in g  o f  th e  E x e c u tiv e  D e p a r tm e n ts , 
to  c o n t r o l  o f f i c i a l  a p p o in tm e n ts  and  re w a rd s  and  p u n is h ­
m en ts and  t o  d e te rm in e  T r e a t i e s .  To a b o l i s h  t h e  S e n io r  
and J u n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  w ould  be t o  a b o l i s h  th e  L e g is la tu r e ;  
and t o  g o v e rn  by  th e  H eads o f  E x e c u tiv e  D e p a rtm e n ts  
w ould l e a d  n o t  o n ly  t o  th e  u n c h ec k ed  su p rem acy  o f  th e  
E x e c u t iv e ,  b u t  w ould r e s u l t  i n  e ac h  D ep artm en t lo o k in g  
o n ly  t o  i t s e l f  and  to  u n b a la n c e  and  f a c t i o n s .  K ido 
r e g a r d e d  th e  L e g i s l a t i v e  and  th e  E x e c u tiv e  a s  th e  two 
w h e e ls  o f  th e  governm en t w hich  m u tu a l ly  a l i g n e d  each  
o t h e r ;  w i th o u t  a Suprem e L e g i s l a t u r e  t h e r e  w ould  be  no 
body t o  a d j u d i c a t e  i n  d i s p u t e s ,  and  th e  governm en t w ould
102 . Iw a k u ra  Ko J i k k i .  2 . p .9 0 9 .
103 . K ido K oin  B unsho. 8 . p .5 8 - 6 1 .
54-
c o l l a p s e .  K ido a d v o c a te d  t h a t  10 o r  15 s ta te s m e n ( J im b u ts u )  
s h o u ld  be c o l l e c t e d  t o g e t h e r  t o  fo rm  t h i s  Suprem e 
L e g i s l a t u r e ,  and  G oto and I t o  came to  s h a r e  h i s  v ie w s  
On th e  o th e r  h a n d , K ido o p p o sed  th e  p r o p o s a l  o f  
I t a g a k i  t h a t  Han r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s h o u ld  be a p p o in te d  t o  
th e  Suprem e L e g i s l a t u r e . ( - ^ 5 )  j n  m e m o ria l, one 
r e a s o n  he a d v an c ed  f o r  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a Suprem e 
L e g is l a t u r e  was th e  d a n g e r  t h a t  v/hen a Lower H ouse was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  th e  f u t u r e  i n  r e s p o n s e  to  th e  dem and f o r  
l i b e r t y  w hich  w ould r e s u l t  from  th e  g ro w in g  e n l ig h te n m e n t  
o f  th e  p e o p le ,  a l l  g o v e rn in g  pow er w ould  go im m e d ia te ly  
t o  t h i s  lo w e r House i f  i t  was c o n f ro n te d  by  an  a r b i t r a r y  
E x e c u t i v e B y  t h i s  t im e ,  th e  A ssem bly  o f  L o c a l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ( S h ü g i - I n )  h ad  gone i n t o  d e c l i n e .  The 
s e s s i o n  o f  J a n u a ry  1 5 th ,  1 8 7 0 ^ ^ ^  w hich  h a d  d e b a s e d  
th e  p ro m o tio n  o f  men o f  t a l e n t  t o  th e  Navy had  b e e n  
a t t e n d e d  by  f tr is u g a w a , Iw ak u ra  and ökubo . The o p e n in g  
o f  th e  A ssem bly  on Ju n e  2 6 th ,  1 8 7 0 ,h ad  b e e n  a t t e n d e d  
by  th e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  C o u n c i l lo r s  and  i n f l u e n t i a l  C o u rt 
n o b le s ;  w h ile  th e  E m peror h im s e l f  a t t e n d e d  th e  d e b a te  
on th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and e x p a n s io n  o f  th e  arm y an d  navy  
on th e  2 1 s t  o f  O c to b e r , 1 8 7 0 ,w ith  th e  P r e s i d e n t ,  S e n io r  
and  J u n i o r  C o u n c i l lo r s  and  H eads o f  D e p a rtm e n ts  a t  h i s
104 . T su d a . M e i j i  S e i jo  to  omi T a k a y u k i. p .2 3 3 - 4 .  I t o  
H irobum i D en. 1 . p .5 6 6 f f .
105 . T su d a . M ein i S e i jo  t o  omi T a k a y u k i. p .2 3 3 - 4 .
106 . K ido K o in  B unsho . 8 . p .6 1 .
107 . MJBKZS. 4 .  K e n se ih e n . p .1 9 7 *
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s i d e ^ 1 0 8 )
But th e  q u a l i t y  o f  i t s  members drew  a d v e r s e  comment 
fro m  th e  governm en t on Ap r i l  1 4 th ,  1 8 7 0 . i n  th e  
f o l lo w in g  m on th , th e  A ssem bly  i t s e l f  a sk e d  f o r  g u id a n c e  
from  th e  E x e c u tiv e  D e p a rtm e n ts  on f u t u r e  p o l i c y  s in c e  
p r e v io u s  A sse m b lie s  h ad  b e e n  i n  i l l - a c c o r d  w ith  th e  
t r e n d  o f  th e  t im e s .  I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s ,  th e  C e n s o ra te  
(D a n jo d a i)  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  a law  s h o u ld  be s p e e d i ly  
e n a c te d  t o  weed o u t in c a p a b le  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
A t t h i s  t im e ,  T a n i K an jo  w ro te  t h a t  " th e  S h u g i - I n  h a s  
none o f  i t s  fo rm e r  i n f l u e n c e ,  and i t  i s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  
a l l  men w ith  any  a s p i r a t i o n  h av e  t u r n e d  t h e i r  b a c k s  on 
i t "  The c o n c e p t o f  a Lower House o f  l o c a l  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e s  i n  a n a t i o n a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A ssem bly  was by 
no means d e a d ; E to  and  Okubo a p p ro a c h e d  B an jo  on t h e  
1 9 th  o f  Novem ber, 1870 w ith  a p r o p o s a l  f o r  a L e g i s l a t i v e  
A ssem bly  o f  w hich  th e  S h u g i - I n  s h o u ld  a c t  f o r  th e  
moment a s  th e  Lower H ouse , and f o r  A sse m b lie s  t o  be s e t  
up i n  th e  P r e f e c t u r e s ,  r u r a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  tow ns and  
v i l l a g e s . ^ 1 1 2 '* But w i th  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  H an, th e  
S h u g i - I n  l o s t  much o f  i t s  r a i s o n  d ' e t r e ,  and i t  was 
c l e a r  t h a t  th e  c o n c e p t o f  th e  Lower House o f  th e  
L e g i s l a t u r e  w ould h a v e  to  be b a s i c a l l y  m o d if ie d  i n  th e
1 0 8 . I s h i n  S h i .  5 . p . 5 4 2 -3 .
1 0 9 . M e ij i  3 5m 1 4d . HRZS. N o .199 , n o t e .
1 1 0 . Ö ts u . DNHKSS. 1 . p .3 4 4 - 5 .
1 1 1 . S h im a n o u c h i. T a n i K anjo  I k ö .  1 . p .4 1 6 .
1 12 . O ts u . DNHKSS. 1 . p .5 4 3 f f .
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new system.
Just before the reform, the Council consisted of 
San^ jo as President, Iwakura, Tokudaiji and ögimachi- 
Sanjo as Senior Councillors, and Soejima, ökubo, Sasaki, 
Saito, Kido and ökuma as Junior Councillors. The 
President and Senior Councillors had not shown great 
powers of direction in the disputes of the last year, 
and some signs of irritation towards them on the part 
of the Junior Councillors may be sensed in ökubo's 
reference to the absent-mindedness(Ukatsu) of Sanjo 
in a letter to a friend on the 18th of February,1870, 
and in Kido's statement in his diary on the 27th of 
August,1871,that it had been planned to abolish the 
Han without informing Iwakura, but the leaders of the 
Han decided to inform him out of consideration for his 
past services to the R e s t o r a t i o n . T h e  proposals 
to abolish the distinction between the Senior and Junior 
Councillors, and to elect a Chief Councillor fronk the 
Han samurai reinforce this impression.
Kido finally assented to becoming Chief Councillor 
on condition that Saigo would serve with him; accordingly 
on the 11th of August, Kido and Saigo were appointed 
Councillors(Sangi) while all the other Junior Councillors 
were dismissed!. The next step was the formation of
113. ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 4. p.124-5.
114. Kido Koin Nikki. 2. p.68-9.
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o f  a n  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  B u re a u ( S e i do T o r i s h i r a b e  Kyoku) t o  
d e te rm in e  th e  new s t r u c t u r e ,  t o  w hich  a p p o in tm e n ts  w ere  
made on  th e  1 5 th  o f  A u g u s t, 1871« S a ig o  and  K ido
w ere a p p o in te d  j o i n t  P r e s i d e n t s ,  w i th  ö k u b o , ökum a, 
T e ra s h im a , G o to , Y am agata , E to ,  F u k u b an e , I n o u e ,  ö k i ,  
and  S a s a k i  a s  m em bers, and  S h i s h id o ,  S h ibusaw a and  Y o s h ii  
a s  a s s i s t a n t s .  On th e  2 0 th  o f  A u g u s t r e g u l a t i o n s  
f o r  d e b a te  w ere  i s s u e d ;  th e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  body  w ere  
t o  be made by  m a jo r i t y  v o te  and  s e n t  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
E m peror f o r  a p p ro v a l  u n d e r  t h e i r  j o i n t  s i g n a tu r e *  They 
th u s  to o k  on  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a L e g i s l a t i v e  A ssem bly  
on th e  l i n e s  a d v o c a te d  by  K id o , On th e  same d a y , K ido 
and  S a ig ö  a s k e d  th e  P r e s i d e n t  and  S e n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  
t o  c o n f e r  t o g e t h e r  on th e  pow ers o f  th e  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  
C om m ittee  s in c e  i t  was in te n d e d  to  d e l i b e r a t e  m a t t e r s  
o f  g o v ern m en t w hich  w ould  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
th e  I m p e r ia l  a u t h o r i t y  i t s e l f .  On th e  f o l lo w in g  d a y , 
th e  R e s i d e n t  and  S e n io r  C o u n c i l lo r s  c o n f e r r e d  t o g e t h e r  
and  i n  a L e t t e f  o f  C om m ission t o  th e  members o f  th e  
C o m m ittee , t h e y  c o n firm e d  t h a t  m a t t e r s  d i s c u s s e d  an d  
d e te rm in e d  by  th e  members an d  s e n t  f o r  I m p e r ia l  a p p ro v a l  
u n d e r  j o i n t  s i g n a t u r e  w ould b e  s p e e d i l y  r e p o r t e d  t o  
th e  th r o n e  and  p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t .  I f  I m p e r i a l  a p p ro v a l  
was n o t  g r a n t e d ,  th e  r e a s o n  w ould be  made c l e a r ;  i f
1 1 5 . HKBRTZ. KSM. D a jo k a n /N a ik a k u . 2 ,  p .2 4 8 .
1 16 , M e i j i  4- 7m 5 d , 7 d . i b i d ,  p .2 5 0 .
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the members regarded the reasons as unjustified, they 
could send a return report. The period of Imperial 
consideration for adoption or rejection was not to exceed 
three days; once the Imperial approval had been given 
a matter was to be executed without fail.
On the 24th of August, while this Committee was 
in session, a meeting was held in Kido's residence 
attended by Saigö, ökubo, öyama, Saigo Tsugumichi,
Inoue and Yamagata to discuss the abolition of the 
Han in secret. Sanjo and Iwakura were informed of their 
decision on the 27th of August, and:' the abolition of 
the Han was announced on the 29th.
After a general meeting of the President, Councillors, 
Heads and Vice-Heads of Executive Departments on the 
30th of August^119> the new structure of the government 
was announced on the 13th of September, 1871.
117. Iwakura Ko Jikki._2. p.914-6.
118. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.258-9
119. ibid, p.259.
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CHAPTER 2.
UNITY AND DIVISION. 1871-1875»
The new structure was announced on the 13th of 
September, 1 8 7 1 . The government was divided into 
three Offices of the Centre, Left and Right(Sei-In, Sa-In, 
U-In) representing the Council, the Legislature and 
the Executive. The Council consisted of one President 
(DajoDaijin) who assisted the Emperor, exercised general 
powers of decision on all matters of government, and 
supervised State Ceremonies, Foreign Relations, Treaties, 
Declarations of War and Peace, and the Army and Navy. 
Under him came the Senior Councillors(Nagon) who could 
perform the President's duties in his absence. Then 
the Junior Councillors(Sangi) who participated in the 
direction of the government and deliberated upon govern­
ment affairs, assisting the President and Senior Council­
lors and assenting to all matters of government. The 
number of Senior and Junior Councillors was left un- 
determined.
The Legislature(Sa-In) consisted of one Chairman 
(Gicho) who was either to be appointed from the Junior
1. Meiji 4- 7m P9d, HRZS. No.386
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Councillors as an additional post, or from the first 
class members of the Sa-In itself. The members(Giin) 
of the Sa-In were ranked in three classes, and were 
of undetermined number. All matters such as the 
establishment of new regulations for the official system 
(Seido Jorei), the supplement, alteration or revision 
of existing regulations, and the determination of matters 
not yet defined under the existing regulations were to 
be debated and determined by the Chairman and members 
of the Sa-In, either on the instructions of the Council 
(Sei-In) or on the proposals of the Sa-In itself. The 
conclusions of the Sa-In were reported to the Council. 
When necessary, executive officials could be summoned 
to attend its debates and to answer questions after 
application to the Council which ordered them to do so. 
The regulations for Assembly, and the opening and closing 
of the Sa-In were to be specially determined by the 
government.(Dajokan). The selection, promotion and 
dismissal of its members was determined by the Council 
(Sei-In).
The Executive(U-In) was a meeting of Heads or Vice- 
Heads of the Executive Departments to draft laws 
relating to their business and to deliberate upon 
measures of practical administration. Drafts of laws 
(Höan) concerning Department business were to be drawn
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up by Heads of Departments and submitted to the deliber­
ation of the others. In enquiries sent down from the 
Council, the Head of the Department chiefly concerned 
drew up a draft approving or rejecting the measure and 
submitted it to deliberation. If differences of opinion 
arose, these were recorded and reported to the Council,
If the Head of the Department chiefly concerned should 
decide after due consideration that a measure sent down 
to his Department for action should not be effected, he 
could return it after deliberation with the other Heads; 
and on the permission of the President and Councillors 
could, attend the Council to explain his reasons for 
doing so.
The Council(Sei-In) exercised a general supervision 
and control over all government affairs, with the 
President and Senior Councillors assisting the Emperor 
and the Junior Councillors participating in counsel.
The promotion and demotion of officials of the third 
grade and above, Heads and Vice-Heads of the Departments 
and the Chairman and senior members of the Legislature, 
(Chokuninkan), was performed by the Emperor with the 
assent, of the President and Councillors, All legislative, 
executive and judicial business so specified in the 
regulations was to be reported by the Legislature and 
Executive for determination in the Council. Matters
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concerning practical administration sent up to the 
Council by the Legislature were sent down to be considered 
by the Executive and returned to the Council for approval 
under its seal. Matters received by the Council from 
the Executive which concerned the Legislature were to 
be dealt with in the same way. It was the special right 
of the Council to determine upon the adoption or 
rejection, slow or speedy application of the proposals 
of the Legislature and Executive; and to determine the 
regulations for business, opening, closing, establishment 
or abolition of the Legislative Assembly and the Executive 
Departments. Matters concerning the regulations for 
the official system to be promulgated to the whole country 
and special Imperial Orders or regulations were to be 
issued by the Council of State(Dajökan); matters to be 
promulgated to the whole country which did not concern 
the regulations for the official system such as admini­
strative instructions could be directly issued by the 
Department concerned. The President of the Council 
signed and sealed all Imperial Rescripts. Imperial 
Rescripts, the orders and regulations of the Council, 
records of appointments and demotions, the scrutiny of 
confidential documents and the composition of draft 
laws(Hoan) were to be handled by the Confidential 
Secretaries of the Council(Sumitsu Shikan). Past orders
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useful as precedents and matters to be kept for refer­
ence after disposal were to be entrusted to the Ordinary 
Secretaries(Shikan) for compilation and filing.
Under the new system, the Council Secretariat 
consisted of 10 Confidential Secretaries(Sümitsu Shikan) 
and 21 Ordinary Secretaries. Three Bureaux concerned 
with Falace ceremonial were also attached to the Council, 
and a special section was established within the Council 
for secret investigations into the conduct of the central 
and local officials of the government •
On the 24th of September^^J it was stated that 
the Council of State(Dajokan) was the chief Department 
of the government(Honkan) of which the Executive Depart­
ments were branches(Bunkan). The officials of the 
Executive Departments and the Legislature were divided 
into 15 grades, but the President and Senior and Junior 
Councillors stood above the hierarchy of grades since 
they were of great importance as assistants to the 
Emperor. In September or October^  the final touches 
were added to the organisation of the Council Secretariat. 
The separate functions of the Confidential(Naishi) and 
Ordinary(Gaishi) Secretaries were defined, and two 
Bureaux were set up for records(Kiroku Kyoku) and for
2. The Kambuka. This section seems to have been set up 
in response to the suggestions of Kido(vid. Kido Köln 
Bunsho. 8. p.64-5). For its regulations, vid. HKBRTZ. 
KSM.2. Dajokan/Naikaku.l.p.150-4.
3. Meiji 4 8m lOd. HRZS. No.400.
4. HKBRTZ. KSM.2. Dajökan/Naikaku.1. p.156-7.
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s u p p l i e s ( Y o d o  Kyoku)
The new s y s te m  was t h e r e f o r e  a b r o a d  d i v i s i o n  o f  
t h e  governm en t  i n t o  C o u n c i l*  L e g i s l a t u r e  and  E x e c u t i v e .  
The f i n a l  a u t h o r i t y  was o f  c o u r s e  r e s e r v e d !  t o  t h e  Emperor  
and h i s  C o u n c i l ,  b u t  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  and  E x e c u t i v e  were d e f i n e d  and  i t  
7/as hoped  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s  would work i n  harmony 
and r e m a i n  w i t h i n  t h e i r  p r o p e r  b o u n d s .  On t h e  1 3 t h  o f  
S e p t e m b e r ^ '  a s e p a r a t e  o r d e r  gave  t h e  Heads o f  D e p a r t ­
m en ts  c o m p le te  power i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  d i r e c t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  
D e p a r tm e n t s  and c h a r g e d  th em  n o t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  t h e  
a f f a i r s  o f  o t h e r s .  M a t t e r s  t o  be  d e t e r m i n e d  a f t e r  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  and  m a t t e r s  which  c o u ld  be  
d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  i t s e l f  were  a s  f a r  a s  
p o s s i b l e  s t i p u l a t e d  i n  t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s .
I t  was a l s o  hoped  t h a t  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  D e p a r tm e n t s  would  
combine t o  draw up a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
U - I n .  The r e g u l a t i o n s  fo r  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  had  b e e n  
drawn up by  E to  S h im p e i  i n  c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  
I t a g a k i  and G o t o . ^ )  I t a g a k i  h a d  b e e n  w o r r i e d  a t  t h e  
e x t i n c t i o n  o f  t h e  S h u g i - I n  , and  was c o n c e rn e d  t o  k e e p  ' 
some s o r t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  A ssem bly  i n  e x i s t e n c e .  But 
E to  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  f o r  t h e  moment a n  o f f i c i a l l y  ;
5* M e i j i  4 7® 2 9 d .  HRZS. L . D a jo k a n .  N o .387 T a s s h i .
6 .  Matono.  E to  Nambyaku. 1 .  p . 6 0 9 - 1 1 .
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appointed. Assembly would be better than vainly advocating 
popular election with little hope of achieving it in 
practice. The three-fold division of the government 
into Council, Legislature and Executive was based on 
Eto's proposals; G-oto, Itagaki and Etö regarded the 
Legislature as providing a check on the predominately 
Satsuma and Choshu Executive. In the absence of hard 
and fast definitions, the success of the new system 
would have to depend on the ability of the leading 
men of the four great Han to work well together.
In spite of the original intention to limit the
number of Junior Councillors, Kido and Saigö were
joined by Itagaki of Tosa and ökuma of Hizen on the
29th of August, 1871. It seems that Kido insisted on
the new appointments in order to maintain the traditional
balance of the four Han in the Council, and possibly
(n)to check the predominance of S a t s u m a . O n  the same 
day, the three Senior Councillors Iwakura, Tokudaiji 
and ögimachi-Sanjö were dismissed; Iwakura being ap­
pointed Head of the Foreign Affairs Department. The 
Council thus consisted of Sanjo as President, over 
four Han samurai as Junior Councillors. The other 
leading men were all in high executive positions; ökubo 
as Head of the Finance Department, Öki as Head of the
7. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.466.
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Civil Affairs Department and soon to be appointed Head 
of the new Department of Education, Sasaki as Vice-Head 
of the new Department of Justice, and Goto as Vice-Head 
of the Department of Industry. Since no Head was 
appointed to the last two Departments, Sasaki and Goto 
were in full control of them.
The first signs of tension under the new system 
arose out of appointments to the Finance Department. 
Saigo and ökubo had agreed that reforms must be carried 
out in this Department, and ökubo himself became its 
Head on the 13th of August,just after leaving his post 
as Junior Councillor. As a first step in this reform,
t
Saigo sought to replace the "underlings"(^okuri) of the 
Ökuma regime by "men of character"(Goketsu). In 
particular, he sought to appoint Yuri Kimimasa, Tsuda 
Izuru and Yasuba Yasukazu to the Finance Department. 
These were all men of mature age who had distinguished 
themselves as Han administrators; but they were quite 
out of tune with the young officials of the Finance 
Department who regarded the problem of creating a 
national financial structure as fundamentally distinct 
from the problems of restoring solvency to a Han. It 
was found impossible to employ Yuri in the Finance 
Department owing to his previous failure in handling
8. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.425
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government f i n a n c e b u t  on the 13th of September 
when Inoue K&oru was appointed Vice-Head of the Finance 
Department, Tsuda Izuru was appointed Deputy Vice-Head 
and Ito Hirobumi demoted from this post to Head of the 
Tax Bureau* On the same day, Yasuba Yasukazu was ap­
pointed a Chief Secretary(Daijo) of the Finance Depart­
ment .
Thereafter, there was continual friction between 
Shibusawa, Mutsu, Ono and Yoshikawa of Inoue's following 
and Yasuba and Tani, the two Chief Secretaries installed 
by Ökubo. Shibusawa respected them as scholars, but 
found them lacking in any grasp of politics and economics, 
and felt that they had been introduced to the Department 
as spies to check the activities of Inoue. A sharp 
dispute arose in a Council meeting when ökubo as Head 
of the Finance Department proposed that the estimates 
for military expenditure should be fixed at. ¥8 million 
per annum; Shibusawa who attended the meeting as Chief 
Secretary of the Department regarded this as ludicrously 
high and challenged ökubo directly on the point. After 
this incident, Shibusawa planned to resign but was only 
restrained by the assurance of Inoue that Ökubo would 
soon be leaving the country on the Iwakura Mission, and 
that Inoue would direct the Department in his absence.
9. Ökubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 4. p.34-9.
10. Hyakkan Rireki. 2. p.95.
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Finally, at a farewell gathering for ökubo before his 
departure on the Iwakura Mission, Inoue got very drunk 
and openly abused him.
But while the departure of Ökubo was imminent,
Saigo in addition to his post as Junior Councillor was
appointed a special executive(Goyö-kakari) of the
(12)Finance Department on the 5th of December, 1871.
At this time, Saigo was determined to push through his 
plans for an Industrial Bank on the lines recommended 
by Yuri Kimimasa, but strongly opposed by ökuma and 
the officials of the Finance Department. J Early 
in the following year, Saigo called on Shibusawa 
informally to try to persuade him to adopt the policies 
of Ninnomiya Sontoku which had been carried out with 
some success in the Soma Han, but which the officials 
of the Finance Department regarded as useless as a 
national policy. Shibusawa refused Saigo's request, 
and took the opportunity to complain directly to him 
on the way in which the Council, over-rode the wishes 
of the Finance Department •
Tsuda Izuru resigned from the Department on the 
21st of March, 1872^^\ and Yasuba Yasukazu also left
11. Sawada. Segai Ko Jireki Ishin Zaisei Dan.2. p.238-49.
12. Hyakkan Rireki. 1. p.73* One authority gives Inoue's 
threat to resign as the reason for Saigo's assumption of 
this post. Vid. Dai Saigo Zenshü. 3. p.700.
13* Osatake. Bakumatsu Ishin no Jimbutsu. p.176-9.
14. Sawada. op.cit. 3* p.414-6.1$. Hyakkan Rireki. 1. p.281.
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the Department on June 3 0 t h , S a i g o  had pressed ökuma 
to appoint Tsuda to the Department and had been angered 
at his refusal; but when Tsuda revealed his lack of 
ability and resigned from the Department, Saigo candidly 
apologised to ökuma for his mistake. ( ' The attempt 
by Saigo and ökubo to reform the Finance Department 
therefore ended in failure, and demonstrated that the 
relations between the Council and the Executive in the 
new system would not necessarily be smooth.
On the 20th of November, 1871,Iwakura was appointed 
Under President(U-Daijin) and it was announced that 
he would lead an Embassy to Europe and America. Kido, 
ökubo, Ito and Yamaguchi were appointed Vice-Ambassadors, 
and several important executive officials were appointed 
to accompany them, including Sasaki, Higashikuze and 
Yamada. Before the Embassy left Japan on the 23rd of 
December, the Presidents, Councillors, Heads of Executive 
Departments and the Chairman of the Legislature drew 
up a compact of 12 A r t i c l e s t o  ensure the stability 
of the government during the absence of the Embassy.
They promised to keep each other informed of all import­
ant matters at regular intervals. Since it was intended 
to implement large-scale reforms on the return of the 
Embassy, any revision of the existing regulations was
16. Hyakkan Rireki. 2. p.96.
1?. Watanabe. Meiji Bunka Kenkyü. 4. p.20-1.
18. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.17.KS. Rinjikan. p.341-3.
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to be avoided as far as possible. If by any chance 
a revision became necessary, the Embassy was to be fully 
informed. However, with the recent abolition of the 
Han, orderly and effective measures were to be taken 
to provide a foundation for reform. If the position 
of Head of an Executive Department fell vacant, a new 
appointment was not to be made; the Councillors were to 
undertake its duties between them and not alter its 
scope(Kihan). No increase was to be made in the number 
of officials, whether permanent or temporary. Finally 
the regular meetings of the Executive(U-In) were sus­
pended; if a matter should arise for which such a meeting 
was necessary, the Council was to issue instructions and 
fix a day of meeting. This compact was signed by Sanjo, 
Iwakura, Saigo, Kido, Ökuma, Itagaki, Goto, Fukubane, 
Soejima, ökubo, Inoue, Yamagata, öki, Ito, Sasaki, 
Tokudaiji and Kuroda in their respective capacities as 
Councillors and Heads of the Legislature and Executive.
On the 2nd of November, 1871,Goto Shojirö was 
appointed the first Chairman of the Legislature(Sa-In 
Gicho), relinquishing his post as Vice-Head of the 
Industry Department to Ito Hirobumi. By the end of 
the year, 12 men had been appointed Members of the 
Legislature. Four of them were Daimyo, the rest were 
talented Han samurai including Eto Shimpei, Komuro Nobuo
71.
and Hosokawa Jun3i.r0 who were especially interested in 
Legislative Assemblies.
But the part which the Legislature was to play in
the government was still somewhat unclear. On the
fiq')18th of January, 1872) regulations were issued for 
its proceedure, and the members were divided into four 
sections to handle matters connected.with the Executive 
Departments. But on the following d a y ^ ^  the Council 
sent an enquiry to the Foreign Department and the Industry 
Department requesting them to present their written 
opinions on regulations for the business of the Legis­
lature within three days. The Industry Department 
suggested that the Legislature should debate and report 
to the Council on legal systems(Horei Seido), that 
it should be consulted on appointments, dismissals and 
transfers of its members, and that in matters connected 
with its debates its members should be able to visit 
the Executive Departments and go on tours of inspection 
to the local districts. The Foreign Department objected 
to these proposals, and to others that would extend the 
jurisdiction of the Legislature in judicial and executive
affairs. But in the revised regulations for the Legis-
(21)lature issued on the 5th of February; ' it was conceded
19. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.17.KS. Sa-In. p.4
20. ibid, p.6-7.
21. Meiji 4- 12m 27d. HRZS. No.686.
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that all legislative matters such as the establishment 
of regulations for the official system(Seido Jörei) 
and th& supplement, deletion or revision of existing 
regulations should be debated and determined in the 
Legislature and reported to the Council* All legal 
systems(Horitsu Seido) to be generally promulgated 
were also to be debated in the Legislature. Although 
the appointment of its members was made by the Council, 
the written opinions of the Legislature were to be taken 
into account. Although the regulations and opening 
and closing of the Legislature was determined by the 
Emperor, it was not to remain closed for more than 30 
days. If the regulations of the Legislature were 
supplemented or revised, this was to be performed on 
the decision of the Emperor after general deliberation 
(Shügi).
In fact, the Legislature could play little part in
the day to day business of the government. Its active
spirits therefore turned to the task of drawing up a
Constitution. In May or June, 1872,Miyajima Seiichiro
with the support of Ijichi Masaharu sent in a memorial
proposing that the Legislature should be set to work
(22)on a Constitution.v J He advocated that the Legislature 
should act as the National Assembly(Koku Giin) and
22. MJBKZS. 4. Kenseihen. p.345-6
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the Council as an Assembly of Elder Statesmen(Genroin).
The Executive afforced by the officials of the Fu and
Ken was to act for the moment as the Popularly Elected
Assembly(Minsen Giin) until the growth of enlightenment
among the people enabled them to be allowed to elect
their own representatives. Miyajima above all stressed
the need for a Constitution which would strike a just
mean between the absolutism of the past when the people
were ignorant of their rights and duties,and the dangers
of the present when foreign system^ were vainly copied
and the people cry out for liberty to the extent of
(21)republicanism. On June 25th, J the Legislature pre­
sented the Council with a far more radical proposal.
It declared that the co-operation of high and low in 
the government(Joge Doji) in the terms of the Imperial 
Oath had not been effected. As a result, local govern­
ment was not uniform, and the creation of a satisfactory 
financial and legal:system was impossible. In the 
western countries an Upper and Lower House of an Assembly 
was always set up besides the Executive; although the 
Legislature had been set up in Japan it does not widely 
consult the opinion of the people, and therefore a 
Lower House should be speedily set up with representatives 
from the whole country. The Legislature declared that
25•Kobayakawa. Meiji HoSei Shiron. 1. p.334
7 .^
if approval for this was granted, it would speedily 
draw up general regulations and rules of proceedure.
On June 27th, 1872^^ the Council asked the Legislature 
to investigate and report upon regulations for promoting 
the common deliberation(Shügi) of representatives from 
the Fu and Ken. In September or October, ' the 
Legislature presented its findings to Chairman Goto.
It suggested that the officials of the Fu and Ken should 
meet in Tokyo to form an Assembly of Local Officials 
(Chihökan Kaigi) as a preparation for the setting up of 
a National Assembly(Kokkai Giin) the following year. 
Suffrage was to be given to all males above 25 years 
of age subject to a property qualification, and one 
person elected by ballot from each of the 3 Fu and 
75 Ken. These advanced proposals were chiefly the 
work of Matsuoka of Tosa, which was still in the van 
in the movement for government by Assembly aidecb by 
Itagaki in the Council and Goto as Chairman of the 
Legislature.
But Goto did not present these proposals to the 
Council, probably because other questions had arisen 
that made it unlikely that Saigö would assent to them. 
While the Emperor was in Kagoshima in July 1872, Shimazu
24. Kobayakawa. Meiji Hosei Shiron. 1. p.335 
23. ibid. Suzuki. Chüo Koron. 61. p.308.
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had complained of the increasing westernisation of the 
government, and demanded that Saigo and ökubo should 
be dismissed. Qn the return of Saigo to the capital
with the Emperor, Itagaki told Miyajima that " the 
opportunity has been lost for opening a National Assembly. 
Saigo*s spirit is not the same as before the Imperial 
visit to Kagoshima; he looks anxious. The opening of 
a National Assembly will be difficult. " so j_t 
proved, for the question of the Assembly was over­
shadowed first by disputes within the Executive, and 
then by the question of Korea.
On the departure of Iwakura and the Vice-Ambassadors, 
the Council consisted of Sanjo as President, and Saigo, 
Itagaki and Okuma as Councillors. According to ökuma, 
Saigo and Itagaki liked to spend their afternoons in 
soldierly reminiscence, leaving him to transact most 
of the Council b u s i n e s s . S a i g o * s  relations with 
the Finance Department have already been described; he 
was more successful in his reform of the Palace, and 
secured that henceforth the Emperor's Attendants(Jiju) 
should be samurai of integrity rather than Court nobles 
who still despised the samurai as u p s t a r t s . i t a g a k i  
was principally concerned to establish some sort of
26. Dai Saigo Zenshü. 2. p.661.
27. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.553.
28. Idditti. The Life of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma. p.144-5.
29. Dai Saigo Zenshu. 3. p.692-4.
representative Assembly, but he failed to carry Saigo 
with him at a critical moment.
With the Executive Assembly(U-In) in abeyance, 
the Legislature(Sa-In) reduced to a passive role, and 
the Council severely reduced in numbers, the centre of 
gravity shifted towards the Executive Departments. In 
particular, the Finance Department was as powerful as 
ever and had emerged controlling communications and 
all other business except public works on the abolition 
of the Department of Civil Affairs on September 11th,
1871. Ökubo and Saigo had tried to check its influence 
and had failed to do so; but its influence was about to 
be challenged from a new and unexpected angle.
?he independence of the Judiciary had attracted 
some attention in 1868, but had been overshadowed by 
the more vital concern to secure a balance of Assembly, 
Council and Executive. But Eto Shimpei and his associates 
were as anxious to establish local courts as to establish 
local assemblies, and saw proper government in terms 
of a three-fold division of power between Executive,
(30
Assemblies and Courts on both a national and local scale. 
When it became clear that the Legislature was not des­
tined to play an active part in the conduct of affairs 
and that the prospect of popularly elected Assemblies
76.
30. For Eto»s scheme of government, vid. Matono. Eto 
Nambyaku. E. p.352-3 insert.
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was remote, Eto switched his attention to the Justice 
Department as a means to maintain the independence 
oJf the Judiciary against the preponderance of a Satsuma 
and Ghöshü Executive.
While Sasaki, the Vice-Head of the Justice Department 
was abroad with the Iwakurg Embassy, his Deputy Shishido 
acted as Head of the Department. But Kawano Togama 
and Shimamoto Shindö within the Department pressed 
ökuma and Inoue to have a new Head appointed, saying 
that the Department could not make progress under Sasaki 
and Shishido. As a result, Eto Shimpei left his 
post as Vice-Chairman of the Legislature and became the 
first full Head of the Justice Department on the 2nd of 
May, 1872. Shishido was transferred to be Vice-Head of 
the Department of Religion on June 27th, and was replaced 
by Fukuoka Kotei on the 15th of September. Thereafter, 
Eto, Fukuoka, Kawano and Shimamoto,who were all from 
Tosa or Hizen,embarked upon an ambitious programme of 
legal reform, and sought to expand the jurisdiction 
of the Department at the expense of the judicial business 
handled by the Finance Department and the local officials.
Eto's first opportunity came in August, 1872, when 
a scandal was raised over the misappropriation of War 
Department funds by Yamashiroya, a Choshü official
31. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.310.
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merchant with close connections with Yamagata. When 
Yamashiroya's luxurious style of living while travelling 
abroad aroused comment, investigations suggested that 
he had borrowed from War Department funds to engage in 
the export of silk. At this time Yamagata was the 
Commander of the Imperial Guards, and the Satsuma army 
men such as Kirino were quick to raise an outcry against 
Yamashiroya and to demand strong measures. Eto there­
upon asserted his powers of jurisdiction, and took the 
case up in the Justice Department. When Yamashiroya 
returned from abroad, he secretly altered the ledgers 
to,have repaid the borrowed money, in collusion with 
Yamagata. But Eto's suspicions were aroused and he 
secured an inspection of the War Department treasury 
at which the money was found to be missing. Yamashiroya 
took the blame and committed suicide; Yamagata resigned 
from the Command of the Imperial Guards and was restrained 
from suicide by Saigo who had hurriedly returned from 
the Imperial visit to west Japan to settle the matter.
In this action, Etö had both asserted the power of the 
Judiciary and set Satsuma and Chöshü at variance. Only 
the great personal influence of Saigo over the military 
leaders of both Han prevented a serious incident. (32)
Etö failed to abstract the " Matia Luz" case to
32. Denki Dai Nihon Shi. Seijikahen. p.3^
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the Justice Department from Kanagawa Ken in august 1872 
against the strong resistance of Soejima, the Head of 
the Foreign Department, and Öe Taku the Ken Governor 
In September, Courts of Justice(Saibansho) were set up 
in 11 Ken in the face of considerable opposition from 
local officials; in November, Courts were set up in 
Osaka and Kyoto Fu. Etö was soon embroiled with
the Kyoto Fu authorities over the arrest of Ono Zensuke,
who appealed to the Justice Department against his arrest
( _by local officials. '' Finally, Eto challenged Inoue 
and the Finance Department over the bankruptcy of Mitani 
Sankuro^^) and the appropriation of the Osarizawa copper 
mine.
But the great clash between Eto and Inoue which 
had marked repercussions on the Council came early in 
1873, and centred upon the control which the Finance 
Department exercised over the appropriations of all 
other government Departments. Between December 1871 
and December 1872, government expenditure had exceeded 
income by over ¥7 million at a time when over half the 
revenue of the government was from printed or borrowed 
currency. Inoue was therefore determined to enforce
33« Denki Dai Nihon Shi. Seijikahen. p.130-1.
34. Matono. Etö Nambyaku. 2. p.68ff. NaWe^.
35. Osatake. Meiji His*hi Gigoku Moroga&ari. p.81-2.
36. ibid. p.86.
37. Denki Dai Nihon Shi. Seijikahen. p.31-3.
38. Fujii, Moriya. Meiji Jidai Shi. 2. p.454ff.
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a policy of strict retrenchment, and to freeze or reduce 
the appropriations of all Departments with the exception 
of the Army Department. On July 4th, 1 8 7 ^ ^  San jo 
in a letter to ökuma wrote of the difficulties which 
the Education Department found in obtaining funds from 
the Finance Department to implement the new educational 
policies which had been approved by the Council. He 
urged ökuma to remonstrate with Inoue since the refusal 
of the Finance Department to submit to the Council was 
making things difficult.
At the end of 1872, Eto submitted an estimate for 
the Justice Department of just under ¥1 million to cover 
the cost of new Courts of Justice and the general ex­
pansion of the Judicial system. The previous budget 
of the Justice Department had been just over ¥500,000; 
far from acceeding to Eto’s demands, Inoue cut the 
Department down to ¥450,000. Inoue and Eto argued the 
point with great venom^^ and when the Council inclined 
to Inoue1s view Eto determined to resign. He sent an 
angry memorial to the Council on January !^4th, 1 873^^ 
and Fukuoka, the Vice-Head of the justice Department, 
and the Chief Secretaries presented a joint protest 
to the Council at the same time. The Justice Department
39. Okuma Shigenobu Kankei Bunsho. 1. p.469-70.
40. TßflÄf. Segai Ko Jireki Ishin Zaisei Dan. 3. p.335-7; 
■^t6. Kakuretaru Jijitsu Meiji Rimenshi. 1. p.50-8.
41. Ito. op. cit. 1. p.58-68.
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seemed on the verge of dissolution, and öki Takato the 
Head of the Education Department joined Eto in his 
protests* Sanjo was powerless to resolve the crisis, 
and ökuma had to return hurriedly from a posting to 
ösaka to save the situation* In spite of his close 
ties with Inoue and the Finance Department, ökuma drew 
up an optimistic report showing a surplus in govern­
ment funds sufficient to meet the demands of the Justice
and Education Departments. The Council thereupon
OP)ordered the Finance Department to pay out; '
But so much friction had arisen in this dispute
that a reconstruction of the Council became necessary
to hold the government together* Accordingly, on the
9th of April 1873» Goto, Eto and öki were appointed
(ila)Junior Councillors(Sangi) and on the dnd, of Mayv 
the Council regulations were revised.
As before, the Council was headed by a single 
President(DajöDaijin) who assisted the Emperor and 
exercised a general control of all matters of government. 
Next, provision was made for two Under-Presidents(Sa/U 
Daijin) who could carry out his duties in his absence. 
Then came the Junior Councillors(Sangi) who were not 
limited in number, and who: deliberated and determined 
upon government affairs as Members of the Inner Council.
4-2. Ito. Kakuretaru Jijitsu Meiji Rimenshi. p.68-71.4-3. HRZS. Dajokan Mugo Tasshi. p.762.
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(Naikaku no Gikan). In the regulations for the business 
of the Council, it was asserted that all Legislative 
business lay within the special jurisdiction of the 
Council; all such business was to debated and determined 
by the Members of the Inner Council(Naikaku Gikan); 
after considering advantages and disadvantages andi the 
relative urgency of application, matters to be put into 
administrative practice were to be reported to the throne 
and after being approved and sealed were to sent as 
instructions to the person chiefly responsible to be put 
into effect. Reports sent to the throne for decision 
were to be jointly signed by all the Members of the 
Inner Council. The establishment, abolition or amal­
gamation of Executive Departments and their Bureaux and 
sections; the adoption and rejection and relative 
urgency of executive business were all within the special 
jurisdiction of the Council. Although the appointment 
and dismissal of Chokunin officials was made on the 
decision of the Emperor, the Members of the Inner Council 
were unfailingly to be consulted; they were also to be 
consulted by the President in the appointment and dis­
missal of the Secretarial officials(Sonin). The Members 
of the Inner Council were to consider important legal 
appeals, or to supervise their hearing by attendance 
at Special Courts(Rinji Saibansho). Finally, matters
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to be handled exclusively by the Council! were detailed 
in 21 Articles, ensuring its control of the higher legal, 
financial, military and diplomatic affairs of the govern­
ment. The Inner Council was declared to be the Axis 
(Kijiku) of the administration, the place in which the 
Junior Councillors specially appointed by the Emperor 
deliberated and determined upon legislative matters and 
the adoption or rejection of executive affairs. The 
members of the Inner Council were empowered to make 
special tours of inspection to the localities. When 
they discussed matters of practical administration, the 
Head of the Department chiefly responsible was always 
to be consulted before the matter was sent up to the 
President. When members of the Inner Council were sick 
or absent, proposals under discussion were to be sent 
to their homes and their opinions elicited.
The immediate object of these new regulations was 
to ensure future Council control over the Executive 
and to prevent the recurrence of the recent disputes.
On the 18th of May5in an explanation of the new regu­
lations, Sanjo stated that the previous system had led 
to clashes of jurisdiction between the Departments, since 
each sought to extend its jurisdiction and to increase 
its scale. Finally, they had lost all sense of pro­
portion about the suitablity and relative urgency of
84.
practical undertakings. As a result, it had become 
necessary to embellish(Junshoku) the Council regulations 
and to standardise the jurisdiction of the Executive 
Departments. The relative urgency of undertakings had 
been determined in the light of the strength of the 
country and the condition of the people, and henceforth 
government business would be carried out in accordance 
with the estimates of income and expenditure.
In the light of the recent disputes, Council control 
of the Treasury and the Judiciary had naturally to be 
asserted. But the control of the Council over the Legis­
lature was also being tightened. In May,1873,regu­
lations were issued for the Confidential Secretariat 
(Naishikan) of the Council in which a Legislation Section 
(Höseika) was entrusted with all business connected with 
laws, ordinances and regulations. On the 25th of June, 
1873, the Shügi-In was finally abolished and revised 
regulations were issued for the new Legislature(Sa-In)* 
From these regulations, it is clear that the active 
function of drafting administrative legislation rested 
with the Legislation Section of the Council. The business 
of the Legislature was defined as the compilation of 
the oonstitution and the Civil Code ( Kokken Mimpo );
44. MJBKZS. 2. p.186.
45. HKBRTZ.1._KSM. 2. Dajokan/Naikaku.1. p.169-72.
HRZS. Dajokan No.28 Fukoku. HKBRTZ.1. m  KSM.17.
KS. Sa-In. p.9-11.
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the Legislature could draft legal proposals in response 
to the orders of the Council, and debated new laws and 
the revision of the existing regulations. But the 
drafting of administrative laws and regulations was 
carried out in the Legislation Section of the Council 
Secretariat. For the next two years, this definition 
was not strictly followed; on the 15th of November,1875 
officials of the Legislation Section were permitted to 
attend the Legislature as members, and on the 12th of 
February,1874, its business was transferred to the 
Legislature. But on the 14th of April, 1875,it was 
transferred back to the Council, and thereafter the
( '4 6 ')Council was never without its own Legislation section. ' 
The distinction between what may be termed Constitutional 
Legislation and the administrative orders and regulations 
of the Council which had the force of legislation was 
to be a vital one for the future constitutional develop­
ment of Japan. With the revision of the Council regul­
ations on the 2nd of May,]873,this distinction was 
beginning to be made.
When these new regulations were announced, it 
was clear that the members of the Inner Council were 
to act as the supreme legislative body and the position 
of the Legislature(Sa-In) became a matter of some doubt.
46. HKBRTZ. 1. KSM. 17. KS. Sa-ln. p.15-4
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On the 8th of May, Miyajima used this as an occasion to
reiterate his pleas for a National Assembly(Kokkai-In)
to be established in which local representatives should
(47')be summoned to be members# ’ J At this time, the 
governors of the Fu and Ken were in the capital to 
discuss local administration in an Assembly of Local 
Governors(Chihokan Kaigi) summoned by the Finance 
Department. Early in 1873, a proposal by Sugi, the 
Governor of Akita Ken, had been printed in the Official 
Bulletin suggesting that an Assembly(Kaigisho) of local 
governors and government officials should be held in 
the Finance Department to secure uniformity and efficiency 
in the conduct of local administration,^®'* Draft regu­
lations for this Assembly were prepared in the Finance 
Department in April, 1873*^^ This draft declared that 
the officials of the Finance Department and the local 
governors were to debate local business as a Legislature 
(RippoKan), but were to concern themselves only with 
Finance Department business to be effected in the local 
districts. Proposals determined upon by this Assembly 
were to be lodged in the regulations for local government 
and regarded as Laws(Horitsu).
The Council rejected these proposals as an invasion
4-7- MJBKZS. 4. p.350.
48. Shimbun Zasshi. No.73* January, 1873»
49. MJBKZS. 4. p.223ff. Especially clauses 18, 27
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of the Legislature by the Finance Department, However, 
the local governors were summoned to Tokyo to discuss 
local administration with the Finance Department, and 
returned to their districts after an address by Sanjö 
in which he explained the reasons for the recent re­
vision of the Council regulations and informed them 
that the matters determined in their Assembly would be 
reported to the throne for decision. He also declared 
that Assemblies of local officials concerned with the 
affairs of the people were of no little value for the 
administration; the form of such an Assembly would be 
determined and would be opened every year in the Legis­
lature^^
Miyajima wanted them to be kept in the capital for 
such an Assembly to be opened immediately in the Legis­
lature, and pressed his proposals on Saigö and Itagaki, 
Saigo agreed in principle, and a draft proposal for a 
National Assembly was presented to the Council, It 
envisaged a Grand Assembly(DaiKaigi) to be opened once 
a year by the Emperor, attended by the Presidents, 
Councillors and Heads of Executive Departments. Besides 
the regular members of the Legislature, the local 
governors and the secretarial officials of the Executive 
Departments would also sit as members. The agenda would
50. MJBKZS.A.p.553* For a vivid account of the Assembly, vid. Saiga. 5e Tenchi Denki. p.285-94-•
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include 12 items concerned with government finance, 
taxation, public works, conscription and military 
expenses which had been specifically reserved for Council 
decision in the new Council regulations, but on which 
local comment would be useful. But the Vice-President 
of the Legislature, Ijichi, was absent from duty on 
account of illness and the proposal was not taken up 
by the Council, Miyajima pressed his proposals on 
ökubo on his return from abroad, and Iwakura on his 
return on the 13th of September called a meeting of the 
Councillors in his residence to get' their opinion. But 
Saigo did not attend due to illness and the other 
Councillors were apathetic. At another meeting on the 
2nd of October, Kido also did not attend on a plea of 
illness(51)
The question of the Legislature and the National 
Assembly had to give way to more important issues that 
were pressing on the Council at this time. The ele­
vation of Goto, Eto and öki to the Council and the 
revised Council regulations were intended to strengthen 
Council control, and for the moment did so. On the 
7th of May, 1873,Inoue and his Chief Secretary Shibusawa 
presented a memorial calling attention to the grave 
state of government finance, stating that the yearly
51. MJBKZS• 4-, p.351-55
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income of the government from all sources was only
¥40 million against which yearly expenditure was
¥50 million with debts since the Restoration of a further
¥120 million.(^ 2 ) Subordinate officials of the Finance
Department secured the publication of this memorial in
a newspaper, and a great stir resulted. (55) Minima
was appointed Controller(Sösai) of Finance Department
business and quickly calmed opinion by a more optimistic
('54')account of government financed '
Inoue and Shibusawa were allowed to resign on the 
14th of May, and it seemed that the Finance Department 
had at last been mastered by the Council. Goto was 
appointed Contro.ller(Sosai ) of the business of the 
Legislature on July 14th, and Eto and Öki remained 
in virtual control of their previous posts since no 
Head was appointed to succeed them. Saigo was in 
undisputed control of the Armed Forces, having been 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Commander 
of the Imperial Guard on the 22nd of August,1872,and 
Field Marshal on the 10th of May, 1873. ^ 6 ) While the 
original concern to separate the Council from the 
Executive had clearly broken down, the hold of the Council 
over the Executive had clearly been strengthened.
5R. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.581-87.
55* Sawada. Segai Ko Jireki Ishin Zaisei Dan. 5* p.410-12.
54. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.589-94.
55. Hyakkan Rireki. 1. p.80.
56. ibid. p.73.
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But it was still unclear what part Iwakura, Ökubo, Kido 
and the other members of the Embassy would play on their 
return from overseas.
ökubo returned to Japan on the 24-th of May, 1875. 
During the Embassy he had found it impossible to ?/ork 
in harmony with Kido, and they had separated and returned 
to Japan by different routes. Struck by the industrial 
strength of Britain, his resolution seems to have falt­
ered for a moment; while on a railway journey to 
Birmingham he is reported to have said "old people like 
myself will be useless for the future and ought to retire 
as unsuited to the trend of the times" When rallied 
with the comparison of the extreme youth of those who 
carried on the government in Japan and the mature age 
of western statesmen, Ökubo replied that the Bakufu had 
been overthrown and the Emperor restored, but now that 
this was completed he was at a loss on what to do in
the future and regarded himself as unfitted for the
( 57)world of progress he had seen in the west.wr/
On his return to Japan, Ökubo did not immediately 
resume his duties as Head of the Finance Department 
but busied himself with plans for a new Home Department 
in which he could direct the internal development of 
Japan towards the standards he had seen achieved in
57. Tsuchiya. Keizaigaku Honshu. 4. No.9* p.82-3. Quoted from Matsubara. Okubo Toshimichi. p.125-6.
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Europe and America. During the Embassy, Ito had worked 
well with ökubo in spite of being a Ghöshü man and the 
special protege of Kido. Ito had also been temporarily 
estranged from Kido while in London after an incident 
which suggests that Kido's poor health was beginning to 
affect his emotional balance. (58) i^IUJIia who had also 
risen as a protege of Kido quickly transferred his 
allegiance to Ökubo on his return to Japan. He found 
ökubo much depressed on his return owing to his strained 
relations with Kido and his Daimyo Shimazu, and expressing 
a wish to retire in favour of younger men^ but ökuma
gave him encouragement and thereafter worked closely
rqq') _with him.^y' Before the departure of the Embassy, Ito
and ökuma had been opposed to Ökubo;, their willingness
to work in close association with him after his return
to Japan marks an important increase in Ökubo1s prestige
which was soon to make him the undisputed leader in the
Council.
Kido returned to Japan on the 27th of July,1873, 
but would not attend to official business on a plea of 
illness. Although his relationship with Ito remained 
close, he swiftly turned against Ökuma who had replaced 
his other protege Inoue in the Finance Department. Mutsu 
Munemitsu seems to have been particularly active in
58. Ito Ko Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Genkun Dan. p.18-20. 
59* Idditti. The Life of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma. p.401.
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denigrating Ckuma to Kido.^°)
Meanwhile, the question of Korea began to occupy 
the Council and swiftly led to a major crisis within the 
government. When the question of Korea was raised in 
the Council in June,1873*Itagaki proposed that a regiment 
of troops should be sent to Pusan to protect the lives 
of the Japanese residents, after which a proper Treaty 
should be negotiated. Saigö maintained that this would 
only arouse Korean fears. Since previous Japanese dip­
lomatic missions had been despised because of the low 
rank of the officials who composed them, he suggested 
that a high official should be sent as an Ambassador 
Plenipotentiary, who if assassinated would give Japan 
a just pretext for declaring war. Itagaki then agreed 
with Saigö against Sanjö who preferred the dispatch of 
troops, and Eto, Goto and ükuma also agreed to Saigö’s 
proposal. Saigö then proposed himself as Ambassador^-*-)
Sanjö continued to have misgivings about the appoint­
ment of Saigo as Ambassador. Kuroda was opposed to a 
Korean expedition since he was anxious to solve the 
Karafuto question first. Soejima, the Head of the Foreign 
Department, insisted on his return from China on the 
22nd of July that any Embassy to Korea must be staffed 
by Foreign Department officials.^62) However, Itagaki
60. Denki Dai Nihon Shi. Seijikahen. p.90.61. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.603-4.
62. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi fakayuki. p.293
93
and Saigö combined to press Sanjo with great vehemence, 
until on August 17th,oj a unanimous decision of the 
Council, Saigo was appointed Ambassador and the Imperial 
sanction obtained.^3) ganj5 could only now insist that 
under the terms of the agreement made just before the 
departure of the Iwakura Embassy, the approval of Iwakura 
must be obtained before Saigo embarked on his commission. 
Iwakura returned to Japan on the 13th of September, and 
at once worked with Sanjo to get KidoAand Ökubo appointed 
to the Council in an attempt to reverse the decision to 
send Saigo to Korea. Ito and Kuroda acted as their 
intermediaries, and after considerable hesitation Kido 
and ökubo finally agreed to support Sanjo and Iwakura 
against Saigo.
Ökubo was appointed Junior Councillor on the 12th 
of October; Soejima who now supported the dispatch of 
Saigo as Ambassador was appointed Junior Councillor on 
the following day. On the 14th of October,in spite 
of Saigo's objections that the matter had already been 
determined in the Council and sanctioned by the Emperor, 
the question was again raised in the Council. Sanjo 
was by now almost paralysed with anxiety^5) and 
fell to Iwakura to räise the first open objections to 
Saigo's commission. Iwakura argued that an Embassy
63. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.604-12.
64. ibid. p.616ff.
65. ibid. p. 629-33.
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should not be sent to Korea until some agreement had 
been reached with Russia, but Saigo brushed his objections 
aside supported by Itagaki. Ökubo then attacked Saigo's 
arguments, but he also argued for pöstponement rather 
than cancellation. The meeting was inconclusive, and 
Saigo absented himself when discussion was resumed on 
the following day; once more a complete deadlock ensued 
with Itagaki, Soejima, Goto and Eto for the Embassy, and 
Ökubo, ökuma and Öki against, Sanjö and Iwakura there­
upon conferred privately, and decided to adopt Saigo's 
proposal. When they announced their intention to send 
a memorial to this effect to the throne, Ökubo at once 
declared his intention to resign. On the 17th of
October,when the Imperial decision on the Embassy was 
expected, Sanjo, Saigo, Itagaki, Soejima, Goto and Eto 
attended the Council chamber, but ökubo, ökuma and öki 
were absent. Iwakura also did not attend on a plea of 
illness•  ^ ökubo, Kido, ökuma and öki all sent in 
their resignations.
Sanjo thereupon told Saigo that a decision would 
have to await a meeting of the whole Council, but Saigo 
warned him that if the matter was not decided by the 
following day, he would execute his commission on his 
own responsibility. Sanjo made a last attempt to get
66. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.641.67. ibid, p.643.
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Iwakura's approval, but Iwakura persisted in his plea 
of indisposition. On the morning of the 18th of October, 
which was the dead-line for the Imperial decision, Sanjo 
in a state of nervous collapse sent in his resignation 
and recommended that Iwakura should carry on the govern­
ment.^®^ On the 20th of October, the Emperor visited 
Sanjo and enquired after his illness, then called on 
Iwakura and ordered him to act as President. Encouraged 
by ökubo, Iwakura haughtily resisted an attempt by Saigo, 
Eto and the other members of their party to force him 
to put the matter to the Emperor on the 22nd of October;: 
Iwakura and Dkubo also took steps to gain the confidence 
of Tokudaiji who was in daily attendance on the Emperor 
as Chief Attendant(Jiju-Cho) in order to get an Imperial 
commission for Iwakura to act as President and to stop 
any attempt by Saigo and his following to approach the 
Emperor directly.^9)
Iwakura presented a memorial to the Emperor and 
spoke with him on the 23rd of October. On the 24th, 
he was informed that his memorial was accepted. Saigo 
had presented his resignation on the 23rd, and Etö, 
Itagaki, Goto and Soejima presented their resignations 
on the 24th. On the 25th of October, 1873?these resign­
ations were accepted, and those of Sanjo, Kido, ökubo,
68. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.646
69. ibid. p.650-57.
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ökuma and öki were refused.
The methods by which Iwakura and ökubo had thus 
contrived to reverse a previous decision of the Council 
gave their opponents much cause for complaint. By their 
actions they ensured that the government would have 
powerful outside enemies, but on the other hand the 
internal stability of the. government was greatly increased, 
On their resignation, Itagaki told Saigo of his intention 
to devote his energies to the establishment of popularly 
elected Assemblies; Saigo in reply said that he did not 
expect to achieve his own aims by argument, but would 
overthrow the government and then carry out a great 
r e f o r m . S a i g o  was followed in his resignation by 
many Satsuma men in the Imperial Guards and the Police 
Force, and their discontent also affected the Tosa
(71) _
troops. ' Henceforth, Saigo was the prospective leader 
of armed rebellion against the government plotted by 
the more conservative elements among the samurai.
Itagaki, on the other hand, became the leader of the 
more progressive samurai who stigmatised the government 
as a Satsuma and Chöshü clique and demanded the speedy 
erection of popularly elected Assemblies. It is m,ore 
difficult to define the aims of Eto and Soejima of 
Hizen, but they subsequently supported Itagaki. Eto’s
70. Kokka Gakkai Hen. Meiji Kensei Keizai Shiron. p.15. 
71* Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.353-57*
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support of Saigo has been intrepreted as a plan to
diminish Satsuma and especially Choshu.'influence in
(72)the government• v J  On the other hand, Mutsu Munemitsu
and a group of young Tosa men urged Kido to oppose
Saigo in order to reduce the power of the Satsuma
(7military group, Significantly, Mutsu resigned from
his post in the Finance Department on the 15th of Jan­
uary, 1874-, when he found that the precedence of Saigo 
of Satsuma was replaced by that of ökubo of the same 
Han.
Above all, the crisis over Korea made Ökubo the 
undisputed leader of the Council. San jo had proved 
quite incapable to exercise his functions as President, 
and Iwakura only took a strong line when he was assured 
of ökubo's support. Of the other members of the Council, 
Kido had not attended the Council meetings and remained 
inactive on a plea of illness; while ökuma and Öki 
despite inward misgivings had not dared to oppose 
Saigo until ökubo returned to the Council to lead them.
The lesson of previous crises in the Council was 
that a Council based on the accomodation of differing 
interests would always fail when confronted by some 
great issue. The leadership of ökubo and the general 
agreement on major policies among those who remained
72. Akiyama^. Meiji Rekishi no Rimen. p. 157-58.
75* Saiga. Oe Tenchi Dehki. p.54-1-43.
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in office after the Korea dispute brought a period of 
stability to the Council and to the government as a 
whole which was to assure the success of the new regime.
The new Council was agreed on a policy of internal
development to the temporary exclusion of diplomatic
(niL\and military adventures.vf ' Yamagata and Katsu in 
command of the Army and Navy both insisted that a period 
of organisation was necessary before Japan could fight 
a war on the continent. ^ f:?) Ito and ökuma hac£ always 
insisted on the priority of financial and industrial 
progress.
On the question of the Constitution and the Assembly, 
Kido and Ökubo were basically agreed in spite of some 
differences of mood and emphasis. Both insisted that 
constitutional progress must be gradual, since the 
people were still largely u n e n l i g h t e n e d . B 0th 
regarded a Constitution to define the rights and duties 
of ruler and subject as the great need, and the estab- 
lishment of an Assembly as secondary to it. ''' ökubo 
visualised an Assembly of nobles(Kazoku), Heads of 
Departments and specially selected representatives to 
discuss taxes, laws, and increases and decreases in the 
armed forces; Kido visualised the eventual establishment
74. Okubo Toshimichi Bunsho. 5» p.53ff*
75* Otsu. DNHKSS.l. p.632-3. Ike. The Beginnings of 
Political Democracy in Japan, p.51.
76. Kobayakawa. Meiji Hösei Shiron. 1. p.262.
77* Nihon Kensei Kiso Shiryo. p.98-164; p.106-^2.
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of a bicameral legislative system, but he insisted that 
for the present the government must exercise both 
executive and legislative powers, Kido was keenly 
aware of the need for strong leadership to carry out 
domestic reforms, and was satisfied for power to remain 
in the hands of the Council and the -Executive Departments, 
Both agreed that it was too early to establish a popularly 
elected Assembly; that the Legislature should be composed 
of men appointed by the Emperor; and that the local 
officials should act as the representatives of the 
people.
In the Executive Departments, the work of Yamagata 
was considerably smoothed by the resignation of Kirino 
Toshiaki^^ and on the resignation of Eto and Fukuoka 
the Justice Department was placed under the temperate 
öki and ceased to be a source of friction.(79)
One immediate effect of the resignations was to 
solve the problem of the division of functions between 
the Council and the Executive. For the Council as 
reconstituted after the resignation of the Korea Embassy 
group consisted of Sango as President, Iwakura as Vice- 
President and a team of Junior Councillors who all 
served in addition as Heads of Executive Departments.
On the 25th of October, 1873,0kuma and Öki were appointed
78. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.337-40.
79* Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.3H.
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Heads of the Finance and Justice Departments respectively, 
and Katsu Awa, Ito Hirobumi and Terashima Munenori were 
appointed Junior Councillors and Heads of the Departments 
of the Navy, Industry and Foreign Affairs. Ökubo became 
Head of the new Home Department on the 29th of November, 
and Kido the Head of the Education Department on the 
25th of January, 1874. This principle was extended 
on August 2nd, 1874,when Ijichi the Chairman of the 
Legislature, Yamagata the Head of the Army Department 
and Kuroda the Head of the Colonisation Office were all 
appointed Junior Councillors.
On the 25th of December, 1873,Shimazu Hisamitsu 
the ex-Daimyo of Satsuma was appointed Adviser to the 
Inner Council(Naikaku Komon). On the 27th of April,
1874,he joined Iwakura as Vice-President(Sa-Daijin). 
Shimazu was known to disapprove of the westernising 
policies of the new government, and his appointment to 
the Council in Tokyo was regarded as a vital precaution 
against the threat of armed rebellion by Saigo's followers 
in Satsuma. He therefore enjoyed the distinction of 
being the last Daimyo appointed to a Council position.
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CHAPTER 5«
THE PRIMACY OF ÖKUBO. 1874-1878«
The combination of posts as Heads of Executive 
Departments by the Junior Councillors made the old 
Executive(U-In) redundant; but the government could 
not afford to neglect the Legislature. On the 18th 
of January, 1874-,Yuri, Eto, Itagaki, Goto and Soejima 
presented a memorial declaring that the ruling power 
was not vested in the Emperor, nor in the people, but 
in the officials of the government alone. The people 
had a duty to pay taxes, and therefore had a right to 
be informed on government matters and to give their 
consent to them. A popularly elected Assembly should 
be speedily established.^^ The government replied that 
the backward state of the people and the need for pre­
liminary reforms made it too early to contemplate the 
establishment of such Assemblies; but it could not ignore 
this challenge and worked to set the Legislature in order.
On the 12th of February, 1874-.,new regulations were 
issued for the Legislature(Sa-In). It was stated that 
the Sa-In was the Legislative Office(Giseikan) of the
1. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.786-90.2. HRZS. Dajokan. p.400-3.
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government, which assisted the Council by debating its 
Enquiries (Suimon). V/hen regulations for the Official 
System(Seido Jorei) were established or existing regu­
lations revised or supplemented, the Legislature was 
to debate and determine upon them in response to the 
enquiries of the Council, and to report them for Imperial 
decision. Before Legal Systems(Horitsu Seido) were 
generally promulgated, they were to be sent to the 
Legislature by the Council for their merits and defects 
to be discussed. The Chairman of the Legislature could 
attend the Council to explain the decisions of the 
Legislature. The written reports of the Legislature 
were to be consulted when the Council appointed, dismissed 
or transferred its members. Members could be sent to 
the Executive Departments to investigate matters under 
debate, and on special occasions could make tours to 
the localities. Members of the Legislature attended 
the Assembly of Local Officials(Chihokan Kaigi) to 
expound the purport of draft proposals drawn up in the 
Legislature in response to the enquiries of the Council. 
Appeals by the people against government offices were 
to be sent down to the Legislature by the Council for 
adjudication. When the. Constitution(Kokken) or changes 
in the system of offices(Shokusei) were discussed in 
the Council, members of the Legislature could be
105
selected by special order to participate in the debate.
The members of the Legislature were divided into six 
Sections(Ka) to deal with Home, Foreign, Finance, Military,, 
Legal and Industrial Affairs. They were charged to 
compile good laws for the promotion of internal and 
external affairs, and to make useful responses to the 
enquiries of the Council.
The Legislature also took over some of the records 
and legal drafting work of the Council, for the regulat­
ions of the Official System(Seido Jorei) promulgated by 
the Council were to be collected1 and compiled by the 
Legislature for future reference. The two sections 
dealing with Finance(Zaimuka) and Laws(Höseika) were 
both transferred to the Legislature from the Council 
Secretariat.
On the 17th of February, 1874-*members of the Legis­
lature were specially chosen to debate 13 Articles of 
a proposed Constitution, J and on the 23rd of August, 
1874,the Legislature drew up new regulations for its 
Assemblies. Four kinds of matters were to be debated 
in the Legislature; enquiries from the Council, matters 
to be reported to the Council by the Chairman, matters 
proposed by the Sections within the Legislature, and 
the memorials of members or of the people at large.
3. MJBKZS. 4. p.359.
4. HKBRTZ.l. KSM.17. KS. Sa-In. p.20-26
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These matters could be debated either in a General 
Assembly of all the members, or in a Petty Assembly 
of several Sections in a matter which had aroused differ­
ences of opinion, or in a Joint Meeting of one or two 
Sections on some matter of special concern. The General 
Assembly discussed Constitutional Legislation, Foreign 
Relations, Taxation, Conscription and Military Matters; 
also important matters which had been found difficult 
to determine in the Sections and matters which the 
Chairman especially wished to be put before it.
By October, 1874)^' the Legislature consisted 
of one Chairman, one Vice-Chairman and one member of 
Chokunin rank; 29 members of secretarial rank and 6 
secretaries(Sonin); and 71 Clerks. Its Chairman was 
Ijichi of Satsuma who was in addition a Junior Councillor, 
with Sasaki Takayuki of Tosa as Vice-Chairman. Although 
its agenda was closely controlled by the Council, it 
was an important body as the training ground for the 
future Upper House of the Assembly, and it showed that 
the concept of the Legislature was still alive at a 
time when the Council and the -Executive had come together 
for the more efficient direction of affairs.
On the 2nd of May, 1874,regulations were also issued
5. Kaninroku
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for the Assembly of Local Officials(Chihökan Kaigi)^^ 
which clearly indicated that it was to act as the fore­
runner of a future popularly elected Assembly. In the 
preface to these regulations, the Emperor re-iterated 
his intention to summon the representatives of the whole 
people to determine Legislation(Rippö) by common opinion 
and deliberation(Kogi Yoron). The regulations themselves 
were not issued as simple instructions, but under the 
imposing title of the Constitutional Law of the Assembly 
(Giin Kempö). The Assembly of Local Officials was to 
be opened once a year, with the Emperor himself perform­
ing the opening and closing ceremonies attended by the 
President and Vice-Presidents. Enquiries were to be 
sent down to the Assembly by the Emperor in the form 
of draft proposals(Gian) or by sending a committee to 
explain their purport. All draft proposals were put 
to the Assembly by its Chairman, who reported the decision 
to the throne. The final decisions on their resolutions 
were made by the Emperor himself. Enquiries concerning 
local administration and taxation were in particular to 
be put before the Assembly, and its decision reported to 
the Emperor who himself decided whether to put them into 
effect or not. If approved by the Assembly, the memor­
ials of its members could bfe sent to the throne; again
6. HRZS. Dajokan No.58 Tasshi
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the Emperor himself decided to adopt or reject them.
The Chairman of the Assembly was to be elected from 
among the members, but until a suitable method had been 
determined the Chairman was for the moment to be appointed 
by the Emperor. Detailed regulations then followed for 
the General Assembly and Assembly Committees. The 
Chairman was assisted by Secretaries(Kanji) in drawing 
up the agenda; all proposals were to receive three 
readings. Although the memhers were Governors of Fu 
and Ken, they were enjoined to act as the representatives 
of the whole people.
On June 22nd,1874,the local Governors were summoned 
to Tokyo. On July 4th, Ijichi the Chairman of the Legis­
lature was appointed to act as executive(Goyö-kakari) 
of the Assembly. On July 7th, Ito was appointed Chair­
man of the Assembly of Local Officials which was due to 
be opened on the 10th of September. The establishment 
of this Assembly was not only calculated to temper out­
side opposition, for among the Local Governors themselves 
a small but able group were pressing for such an Assembly 
to be set up. In May,1874,Nakajima Nobuyuki, the Govern­
or of Kanagawa Ken and his associates in a memorial to 
the President of the Council criticised the multiplicity 
of regulations since the division of local business 
between the Finance Department and the newly created
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Home Department, and looked forward to the setting up 
of an Assembly of Local Officials as soon as possible 
in which the powers of the Council would be defined and
fixed rules determined for the administration of Fu and
(7) -Ken. Nakajima also pressed Ito at this time to estab-
(o \lish a "true Assembly” However, differences of opinion 
arose within the government on the jurisdiction of this 
Assembly, and when a crisis arose in the Council over 
diplomatic relations with China the Assembly of Local 
Officials was indefinitely postponed.
While the memorial of Itagaki and his followers 
for a popularly elected Assembly kept the question of 
the Legislature before the eyes of the government, the 
unrest of the samurai demanding an overseas war led 
Ökubo to sanction the Taiwan Expedition. Iwakura had 
been attacked and wounded on January 14th by a party 
of ronin dedicated to war with Korea, and Eto Shimpei 
who had been allowed to leave Tokyo to calm the dis­
contented samurai of Saga ended up leading them in 
rebellion against the government in February^^ 
Fortunately, Saigö refused to join the rising; ökubo 
in person led the forces which suppressed it by March, 
and Eto was captured and beheaded in April. But unrest 
had reached a point which seemed to demand some overseas
7. Japan Weekly Mail. 8th of August, 1874.p.639-40.
Quoted, McLaren. Japanese Government Documents.p.513*
8. Otsu. DHHKSS. 1. p.866.
9. Akiyama. Meiji Rekishi no Rimen.p.176-78.For explan.
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outlet. Since Satsuma discontent was most to be feared, 
Taiwan was the obvious choice.
When news reached Japan in mid-1872 that a party 
of Ryukyu sailors had been murdered by the Taiwan abor­
igines, it was Dyama Tsunayoshi of Kagoshima Ken who 
first demanded action from the government• At the 
same time, Kabayama Sukenori then a Major in command of 
the Kagoshima branch of the Western Garrison visited 
Kirino Toshiaki, the Major-General in command of the 
Western Garrison in Kumamoto to press for action. They 
set out for the capital together to report to Saigo and 
Yamagata; Saigo was the first to agree with Kabayama, 
and Soejima and Itagaki also approved. Against other 
members of the government who argued that the Ryukyus 
were under joint Chinese and Japanese authority and 
that a punitive expedition against the Taiwan aborigines 
was not the responsibility of Japan, Saigo insisted that 
the Ryükyüs were Japanese by virtue of the authority 
that the Shimazu House had exercised there. In December 
1872, Sanjo called a meeting of the Councillors, Heads 
and Vice-Heads of Departments in his residence to discuss 
the matter. Kirino, Saigo, Soejima and Itagaki were in 
favour of a punitive expedition; Inoue was opposed for 
financial reasons, and Ükuma suggested that negotiations
10. ötsu. DMHKSS. 1. p.685ff
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should first be opened with China to establish its diplo­
matic position. Soejima had been sent to China for this 
purpose in March,1873; but the problem of Taiwan had 
been soon over-shadowed by the problem of Korea.
However, Taiwan remained the obvious outlet for 
Satsuma discontent, and an expedition headed by Saigo 
Tsugumichi which included 800 Satsuma men picked by 
his elder brother Saigo Takamori began to set out from 
Nagasaki on the 26th of April, 1874-• The expedition was 
clearly an attempt to conciliate Satsuma; its immediate 
effect was to alienate Choshu. Kido had opposed it from 
the start, appealing to Okubo's own arguments against 
the Korean expedition. When the expedition was dispatched 
Kido resigned from his posts as Junior Councillor and 
Head of the Education Department on the 13th of May, and 
returned home to Yamaguchi on the 27th. Three Choshü 
Major-Generals, Yamada Akiyoshi,Miura Goro and Torio 
Koyata also tendered their r e s i g n a t i o n s a n d  Miura 
had refused to supply arms to the Satsuma irregulars 
in the expedition on the grounds that it was against
his duty as an officer of the Imperial Array to supply 
HP) -arms to a Han.v J Ito also considered following Kido 
in his retreat, but was dissuaded from doing so by 
Kido and Iwakura to avoid creating a complete split
11. Ornachi. Hakushaku Goto Shojiro. p.478.
12. Kanju Shogun Kaikoroku. p.99-102t
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- - f-mbetween Satsuma and Choshu in the Council. '
To increase Ökubo’s difficulties, Shimazu Hisamitsu
who had been appointed Vice-President(Sa-Daijin) on the
P7th of April presented Sanjo with a memorial on the
23rd of May and asked him to confer with Iwakura upon it.
The memorial demanded a return to the old ceremonial
dress and to the old taxation and military systems;
ökubo was to be dismissed if he raised objections, and
Shimazu himself would resign if these proposals were 
(14)not accepted. ' Shimazu also outlined changes within 
the government, by which Ökuma and Yoshida would be 
immediately dismissed, Soejima,Saito and Maebara re­
appointed as Junior Councillors and Saigö and Itagaki 
restored; to office.1' ' ; On the 24th of May, Shimazu 
announced to Iwakura that he would not attend the Council 
until ökuma had been dismissed. Ökubo attempted to 
dissuade him, but when he failed to do so he presented 
his own petition of resignation on the 25th of May.^1^) 
Iwakura.persuaded Shimazu to give up his demands for a 
return to the old ceremonial dress and for the dismissal 
of ökubo, but he still insisted on the dismissal of 
Ökuma. Iwakura then attempted to persuade Ökuma to 
resign through the agency of öki Takato, but Ökuma
13* Ito Kö Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Genkun Dan.p.20-21.
14. Ctsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.879.
15. ibid, p.880-81.
16. ibid, p.882.
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stoutly refused to do so. Ökuma also seems to have
i'17'\attempted to challenge Shimazu directly on his viewsv J 
and when he heard that Shimazu was accusing him of 
arousing public criticism by his infamous conduct, ökuma 
angrily demanded an immediate e n q u i r y . Sanjö and 
Iwakura replied that his conduct was not to be reproached, 
but that his dismissal was still under discussion, ökuma 
fiercely challenged them again on this point in October, 
and San jo and Iwakura finally agreed to drop the matter. 
Meanwhile, since his proposals had not been adopted , 
Shimazu announced: his intention to return to Kagoshima 
and would not attend the Council on a plea of illness.
But he was persuaded with great difficulty by the personal 
plea of the Emperor to resume his duties on the 16th of 
August. (^ -9)
In November,187^jwhile Ökubo was in Pekin negotiat­
ing a settlement with China over the Taiwan expedition 
the first moves were made to restore the strength and 
unity of the Council. While Japan was on the verge of 
war with China, it was highly desirable to regain the 
support of Kido, Saigo and Itagaki for the government.
Ito urged Ökubo on the necessity to get Kido back into 
office, and was ordered to go to Choshü to persuade 
Kido to return to the capital; but Kido refused to do
17. Ökuma Shigenobu Kankei Bunsho. p.385-6.
18. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.883-4.
19* ibid, p.884-6.
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so on a plea of illness even on receipt of an Imperial 
message stressing the perilous situation with China.
Kido continued to blame the government for squandering 
its precious finances on a useless expedition, singling 
out for special criticism Baigö fsugumichi who had in­
sisted on leading the expedition against Ökubo’s last
minute attempt to postpone it, and ökuma who had been
(21}largely responsible for its planning. J “hen news
of the settlement with China reached Kido, he noted in
his diary that the indemnity received from China amounted
(22)to scarcely a tenth of the cost of the expedition; J
Ökubo returned from China on the 27th of November, 
1874 and again expressed his anxiety to get Kido back 
into office. He suggested that he should go to visit 
Kido in Yamaguchi, but Ito suggested that this would 
display the weakness of the government and proposed 
ösaka as the meeting place.
Meanwhile, Inoue Kaoru who was in close touch with 
both Kido and Ito had met Komuro and Furuzawa, two 
followers of Itagaki, in the course of his travels on 
business and planned with them to persuade Itagaki to 
return to the government also.(^)
Accordingly, in January 1875,ökubo, Kido and
20. Hiratsuka. Ito Hirobumi Hiroku. p.24.
21. Okuma Shigenobu Kankei Bunsho. 3* p.13-15, 132-33#
22. Kido Koin Nikki. 3# p.113#
23# Otsu. LNHKSS. 1. p.851.
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Itagaki met in ösaka for informal discussions. A pre­
liminary meeting between Okuho and Kido proved fruitless, 
but Kido reached a private understanding with Itagaki 
to work together for the setting up of popularly elected 
A s s e m b l i e s E v e n  so, Itagaki still had doubts about 
the willingness of Kido to back his proposals. The 
situation was saved by Ito who drew up a four point 
programme on which they could all agree.
The four points were as follows
1. As a preparation for the opening of an Imperial 
Assembly(Teikoku Gikai), an Institute of Elder Statesmen 
(Genro-In) should be set up to strengthen the Legislature.
2. A Supreme Court(Daishin-In) should be set up in order 
to strengthen the basis of the courts with a view to 
the independence of the Judiciary(Shihoken).
3. The Assembly of Local Officials should be promoted 
to create understanding between high and low, and as
a step towards establishing a basis for Constitutional 
Government(Kensei).
4. In order to strengthen the system of government by 
the superior decision of the Emperor and to clarify 
Executive responsibility, the Council(Naikaku) and the 
Executive Departments were to be separated. The leading
24. Ötsu. DKHKSS.l. p.856-8. One account states that Kido 
told Ito that Itagaki's plan was to open a popularly 
elected Assembly at all costs, even if half the members
were, chosen by the government. Vid. Akiyama. Meiifi Rekishi ho Rimen. p.213.
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Statesmen(Genkun) should apply themselves to the duty 
of directly advising the Emperor(Hohitsu), and the men 
of the second stream to the responsibilities of the 
Executive,
Having agreed on these four points, ökubo, Kido 
and Itagaki returned to the capital together. An ap­
proach was made to Saigo to join the government, but 
he firmly refused, (^5) an(x Soeji^a and Goto also refused 
to join. On the 8th of March,1875,Kido was appointed 
Junior Councillor(Sangi); Itagaki at first refused to
accept a position as Junior Councillor, perhaps because
-  (27)of Saigo’s refusal to join the government, but he
was finally prevailed upon to do so on the 12th of March.
On the 17th of March,1875>0kubo, Kido, Itagaki and
Ito were appointed members of a Committee to Investigate
the Structure of the Government(Seitai Torishirabe Iin).
On the 28th of March,they reported their draft proposals
to the t h r o n e . T h e y  proposed that a Council(Sei-In)
and an Executive(U-In) should be set up within the Great
Council of State(Dajokan). The Emperor was to control
all state affairs in the Council, assisted by the
President and Vice-Presidents(San Daijin). The President
25. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.858.
26. Hirota. Naikaku Kötetsu Gojunen Shi. p.159* Soejima 
was opposed, Goto was busy in commerce, and Saigc re­
garded his services as unnecessary.
27. Otnu. op.cit. p.859-60.
28. Otsu. ibid, p.860-1.
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(Dajö-Daijin) was to act as Head of the Executive(U-In) 
in which the Vice-Presidents, Junior Councillors and 
Heads of Executive Departments debated and determined 
upon all executive matters. One of the Vice-Presidents 
or Junior Councillors was to be appointed Head of the 
Legislature(Sa-In) and should select members to handle 
all business concerned with legal Systems(Hösei). It 
was stated that since the joint establishment without 
preponderance(Hencho) of the three powers of the Legis­
lature, Executive and Judiciary was the strong-point 
of European systems of government, the government in 
Japan should take this as a model. An Upper House(Jo-In) 
shotild be set up with members selected from the Nobles 
(Kizoku), men who had rendered distinguished cervices 
to the state and men of scholarship to act as a Legis­
lature (Hippo-In) * The Lower House(Ka-In) was to consist 
of the Assfembly of Local Officials to act as the fore­
runner of a popularly elected Assembly.
On the 14th of April, 1875,an Imperial Rescript 
announced the establishment of the Genro-In to widen 
the basis of the Legislature, the establishment of 
the Daishin-In to strengthen the jurisdiction of the 
Courts and the summoning of the Local Officials to 
communicate the feelings of the people and to plan 
measures for the public good. These measures were taken
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in fulfilment of the Imperial Oath and in preparation 
for the gradual establishment of Government by a National 
Constitution(Kokka Rikken no Seitai)*^^ On the same 
day, the Legislature(Sa-In) and the Executive(U-In) 
were abolished and the Genro-In and Daishin-In were 
established.
Also issued on the 14-th of April, 1875j were revised 
regulations for the Council. The Council consisted 
of a single President(Dajo-Daijin) who directly advised 
the Emperor and presented him with decisions for the 
adoption or rejection of Legislative and Executive 
matters. Under him were two Vice-Presidents(Sa/U Laijin) 
who were in addition to act as the Heads(Chökan) of 
the Genro-In and the Laishin-In. They were to deliber­
ate and determine upon all affairs, and could act for
the President in his absence. Then came an undetermined 
number of Junior Councillors(Sangi) who participated 
in the discussion of affairs.
The rules for the conduct of business in the Council 
(Sei-In) declared it to be the place in which supreme 
control was exercised over all affairs of state; the 
Emperor determining all matters with the direct assist­
ance of the President, the deliberation and decision of 
the Vice-Presidents and the participation of the Junior
29. Ötsu. DNHKBS. 1. p.861-62.
30. HRZS. Lajökan No.39 Fukoku.
31. HRZS. Dajökan Hugo Tasshi. p.854-ff.
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Councillors. Council business was to be divided into 
Legislative and Executive, and Legislative business 
submitted to the Assembly of the Genrö-In. All documents 
sent up for Imperial decision were to be jointly signed 
by the Junior Councillors and then signed by the Pres­
idents. All regulations for the Official System(Seido 
Jorei) and Imperial Instructions(Chokushi) or Special 
Orders were to be issued by the President in response 
to the orders of the Emperor.
Regulations for the Dajshin-In were issue* on 
the 24th of May, 1875*^^ Two days previously, Tamano, 
a second class Judge of the Justice Department,was 
ordered to act as its Head since Iwakura was in retreat. 
It was in no way an independent body as had been planned 
since its Head and members were officials of the Justice 
Department. Its reports to the throne for the supplement 
and revision of the law were transmitted through the 
Head of the Justice Department, and the records of its 
decisions were also forwarded to the Justice Department 
for publication.(53)
On the 5th of May, 1875,the Governors of Fu and Ken 
were required to present themselves in the capital by 
the 2nd of June for an Assembly of Local Officials to 
sit for 20 days. ' On the same day, they were informed
32. HRZS. Dajökan No.91 Fukoku.
33* ibid. Clauses 10,11.34. HRZS. Dajokan No.70 Tasshi.
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that the Imperial enquiries would concern public works, 
local police, local popular Assemblies and methods of 
poor relief.' Cn the 19th of May, methods for the
establishment and maintenance of primary schools was 
added to the agenda.(56)
It had also been provided on the 5th of May for 
one or two men from among the district heads(Ku/Ko Cho) 
or men concerned with the establishment of local Assemb­
lies in each Fu and Ken to listen to the proceedings of 
the Assembly. J The regulations of the Assembly were 
basically those of the previous year; but in response 
to objections from the Genrö-In the regulations were 
modified to ensure that the decisions of the Assembly 
would be submitted to the Genro-In before the Emperor 
gave his final decision upon them.
Kido was appointed Chairman of the Assembly of 
Local Officials on the 2nd of June,1875* The one 
controversial item on the agenda was the establishment 
of local popularly elected Assemblies; Kanda Kohei who 
was known to advocate the speedy establishment of such 
Assemblies was elected Chief Secretary(Kanji Cho) of
the Assembly, and Kido planned with ökubo to get him
(7 q)transferred to another post, but without success.
35* HRZS. Dajdkan Wo.71 Tasshi.
36. HRZS. Dajökan No.84 Tasshi.
37* HRZS. Lajökan No.7^ Tasshi.
38. HRZS. Dajökan No.102 Tasshi.
39. Kido Koin Bunsho. 6. p.149-50.
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But when the question was debated on the 8th of July, it 
was resolved by 39 votes to 21 that local Assemblies 
should consist of the semi-official district heads and 
not be popularly e l e c t e d . T h e  question of popularly 
elected Assemblies was in any case removed, from the 
national to the local level. The Assembly of Local 
Officials was closed by the Emperor on the 17th of July, 
after proceedings of some disorder which must have sorely 
tried the patience of Kido, its Chairman and its chief
(H-l)protagonists '
The Geflrö-In was clearly intended to act in two 
capacities; as a Legislature closely attached to the 
Council and as the nucleus of a future Upper House in 
a National Assembly. On the 25th of April,1875, it was 
decreed that the Chairman and members of the Genro-In
(LlO )should be officials of the first grade, ' thus giving 
them a rank equal to Heads of Executive Departments.
On the same day, regulations for the business of the
- (A3) -Genro-Inv ^J declared that the Genro-In was the Office
for the Discussion of Laws(Gihokan), debating and deter­
mining the establishment of new laws and the revision of 
existing laws and receiving memorials(Kempaku). Its; 
Chairman and members were officially selected, but one
40. Kobayakawa. Meiji Hösei Shiron. 1. p.292.
41. Shioya. Kaikoroku.p.31A-16; but especially p.315 for 
the negligence of its members and the contemptuous 
behaviour of Oyama of Kagoshima Ken towards Kido.42. HRZS. Dajökan No.67 Eukoku.43. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.17.KS.Genrö-In.p.34-5.
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Vice-Chairman was to be elected from among the members. 
The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members were to be 
limited to persons who haye performed distinguished 
services for the country or persons learned in government
(ZLZOand law.v ' Members were to be over 30 years of age, 
with the exception of persons who had served as Chokunin 
officials for over two years. All draft proposals(Gian) 
to be debated in the Genro-In were to be received from 
the Emperor; even proposals drafted within the Genro-In 
could not be directly put to its Assembly(Clause 7)# 
Although the Genro-In was empowered to enquire into 
contradictions in laws or regulations already enacted 
and could report to the Emperor upon them, it could not 
propose the promotion or demotion of officials. The 
President, Vice-Presidents and Junior Councillors could 
attend the debates of the Genrö-In at any time whether 
they had given previous notice or not, and could express 
their opinion although they could not vote for the 
decision. The Heads and Vice-Heads of Executive Depart­
ments could also attend the Genro-In in relation to the 
business under their charge and could argue the advant­
ages or disadvantages of measures, but could not vote 
for the decision.
The appointments made to the Genro-In on the 25th
44. On the 2nd of July,1875 Imperial Princes and Nobles (Kazoku— Kuge and Daimyo) were also included. Vid.HKBRTZ.L.KSM.17.KS.Genrö-In.p.34-5.
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of April aroused considerable controversy among the 
leading members of the government. Twelve members 
were appointed, six of whom were in government posts 
at the tine of their appointment(Yamaguchi, Torio, Miura, 
Tsuda, Kawano and Katö) and six of whom were ex-officials 
who had left the government in varying shades of dis­
content ( Goto, Yuri, Fukuoka, Yoshii, Mutsu and Matsuoka). 
Of those in government posts, Yamaguchi was reputed to 
have been transferred from the Foreign Department because 
he was unpopular and had become an embarrassment to 
the Head of the Department Torio and Miura had
offered their resignations over the Taiwan expedition; 
Tsuda was a relic of Saigo's attempt to introduce men
of character to the government; nawano was under severe 
( 4 6 ')criticisin'^ ' and Shimazu had an especial dislike of 
- (ixn'\Kato. J Of the others, Kido and Itagaki had insisted 
on the appointment of Goto and Mutsu against considerable 
opposition in conservative quarters, Goto*s business 
activities and Mutsu’s notorious discontent having de­
prived them in conservative eyes of the high integrity 
necessary in high officials of an Imperial government • 
Katsu Awa, the Head of the Navy Department and a special 
friend of Saigo was also offered a post as member of the
45. Tsuda. Meio'i Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.346.46. ibid.
47. ibid. P.343.
48. ibid, p.341-43; 349-50.
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Genrö-In; he declined,but does not seem to have resumed 
his duties as Head of the Navy Department and formally 
resigned on the 28th of November, 1875*^^
The strict control exercised by the Council over 
the Genrö-In and the delicate position of most of its 
members suggest that it was regarded as a depository 
for men of undoubted capacity who could not be usefully 
or politically employed in Council or Executive posts. 
Employment in the Genrö-In kept them out of active 
opposition and consoled them with high rank and salaries.
On the 28th of April,1875,Goto was elected Vice- 
Chairman of the Genrö-In and was soon attempting to 
define and expand its powers. Shortly after the issue 
of the first regulations on the 25th of April, a con­
ference was held in which Itö and Itagaki took part 
to define Clauses 1 and 7 of these regulations more 
e x a c t l y . C l a u s e  1 had stated that the Genrö-In 
debated and determined all new laws; this was now con­
ceded with the reservation that the legal regulations 
by which lav/s were put into effect were excepted. This 
distinction between laws and legal regulations was 
maintained throughout the Meiji period and enabled the 
Council to maintain a sure hold of the Legislature.
By Clause 7 of the regulations, all draft proposals
49. Hyakkan Rireki . 1. p.148.
50. Osatake. Nihon Kenseishi Taikö. 2. p.394-5*
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debated by the Genro-In had to be received from the 
Emperor even if the proposal originated in the Genro-In 
itself. As a result of this conference, this point was 
strongly re-affirmed; the Genro-In was forbidden to 
establish laws wantonly and hence was to report all 
matters it intended to draft as legislation to the 
throne.
Goto next objected that under the regulations of 
the previous year, the resolutions of the Assembly of 
Local Officials were to be reported" directly to the 
Emperor for decision; in the meantime the Genro-In 
had been established to debate and determine all 
legislative matters and that such an Assembly would 
encroach upon it® jurisdiction. He therefore requested 
that before being reported to the throne, the resolutions 
of the Assembly of Local Officials should be submitted 
to the Genrö-In and sent for Imperial decision after 
its debate and decision. Ito, who seems to have been 
the Council spokesman on such matters, replied that 
the regulations of the previous year had not stated that 
the Local Officials would debate Laws(Horitsu), but 
merely the advantages and disadvantages of administrative 
regulations concerning local government. This being so, 
its powers did not conflict with the jurisdiction of 
the Genro-In. (^1) However, on the 14th of June,1875?
51. Osatake. Nihon Kenseishi Taiko. 2. p.426-7
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the regulations of the Asseu^bly of Local Officials were
(52)revised to meet Goto's objections.
On the 31st of May,1875»Goto as Vice-Chairman sent 
a request to the throne that the numbers of the Genro-In 
should be substantially increased. He pointexl out that 
with only 11 members, two or three of whom would be 
absent from illness or other causes, its numbers were 
noj» even sufficient to form a committee., let alone to 
fulfil the Imperial Oath to establish an Assembly widely 
convoked and to determine all matters by public deliber­
ation. Similar institutions in Foreign countries had 
far greater numbers; for example, the English House of 
Lords with 479 members. Although there were wide vari­
ations in the number of members of similar institutions
(55)hbroad, there were none with so few as 11 members.
Three days before the Emperor opened the Genro-In 
on the 5th of July,1875^ further 10 members were ap­
pointed. Five of them were appointed from government 
positions( Yanagiwara, Sano, Kuroda Kiyotsuna, Nagatani, 
ögyu) and! five from men who were not in office at the 
time(Arisugawa, Mibu, Akizuki, Sasaki, Saito). The 
regulations were specially amended to include Imperial 
Princes and Nobles(Kizoku) as m e m b e r s J and those 
newly appointed included one Imperial Prince, three Court
52. HRZS. Dajökan No.102 Tasshi.
53. HKJ3RTZ.1. KSM.17. KS. Genrö-In. p.43-45.
54. ibid, p.34-5.
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Nobles and two ex~Daimyo. Later, on the 22nd of July 
Fukubane was appointed from an official post and Inoue 
was appointed from outside the government on the 27th of 
December,1875*
On the 31st of July, the Genro-In submitted a 
report to the throne for the clarification of the vague 
powers of inspection it had been allowed in Clause 8 
of the regulations* This report proposed that members 
of the Genro-In should be empowered to enquire into the 
unlawful acts of government officials on the permission 
of its standing committee. Appeals from the people 
against the unlawful acts of government officials could 
also be heard in the Genro-In if sponsored by a member.
If the majority of the members found that a case existed, 
a committee was to be appointed to investigate. The 
government officials concerned could be summoned to the 
Genro-In, or secretaries of the Genro-In sent to the 
localities to make investigations. When the investig­
ations had: been completed they were^to be recorded and 
sealed by the investigating committee, and after being 
promulgated to the members were to be presented to the 
throne by the Chairman.(55)
However, on the resignation of Itagaki on the 25th 
of October, the Genro-In lost a staunch defender of its
55. HKBRTZ. 1. KSM. 17. KB. Genrö-In. p.58-9
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powers in the Council. The revised regulations
issued for the Genro-In on the 28th of December, 1 875^^  
make no mention of its powers of inspection. Clause 5 
of these regulations drew a distinction between draft 
proposals to be debated and determined by the Genro-In 
and those which were simply to pass its scrutiny(Kenshi); 
the Council(Naikaku) was to make this distinction. Clause 
6 further provided that urgent matters were to be pro­
mulgated by the Council and afterwards submitted to the 
scrutiny of the Genro-In. Thereafter, the Council was 
able to by-pass it at will on the grounds of urgency.
If neither the Assembly of Local Officials nor the 
Genro-In could function as an effective Legislature, 
the true source of the Legislature may be found in the 
Legal Section(Hoseika) of the Council Secretariat. On 
the 3rd of July,1875, this section was raised to a Bureau 
(Kyoku)^^ and Ito was appointed its first Head in 
addition to his posts as Junior Councillor and Head of 
the Industry Department. On the 22nd of September,1875, 
the staff of this Bureau was defined as one Head, ten 
Law Officers(Hoseikan) and ten clerks. ^ ^ O n  the same 
day, Hosokawa Junjiro, Inoue Ki, Furusawa Shigeru, Özaki 
Saburo, Sakurai Toshiaki, Murata Tamotsu and Yamazaki
56. Omachi. Hakushaku Goto Shöjirö. p.485 ascribes the 
cancellation of the powers of impeachment of the Genro-ln 
to the resignation of Itagaki.
57. HRZS. Dajökan No.217 Tasshi.58. HRZS. DaJokan Bangai Tasshi.p.861.59* HRZS. Dajökan No.168 Tasshi.
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Naotane were appointed Officers of this Bureau, followed 
by Mstano Taku on the 30th of September.
The drafting of legislation was in fact a specialised 
bureaucratic technique which was never successfully deler- 
gated to an Assembly. It was Ito's skill as a legislator 
that was in time to raise him to Council President, and 
Hosokawa Junjiro and Inoue Ki were also to build out­
standing careers as brilliant specialists in drafting 
legislation. Of the others, Murata and özaki were later 
men of distinction, and Furusawa, Matano, Yamasaki and 
Sakurai had useful careers as Chief Secretaries in after 
years.
In September,18735 regulations were issued for the 
conduct of business in the Legislation Bureau(Hoseikyoku). 
It was to draft and revise legislation under the orders 
of the Council. Proposals for drafts(Kian) presented to 
the Council by the Genro-In or the Executive Departments 
were sent to this Bureau for discussion, and matters 
requiring revision were re-drafted by it. When the 
draft proposals or revisions made by the Bureau were 
discussed in the Genro-In. the Head or Officers of the 
Bureau on the orders of the Council could be sent as 
a committee to give explanations. Officials of the 
Executive Departments, Fu or Ken could be summoned to
60. The careers of these men may be traced in the Eyakkan 
Rireki, the Meiji Hökan and the Jin^ ji Köshinroku.
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conference with the Bureau on matters that concerned them. 
Legal Regulations of the Council of State for general 
notification were sent to the Bureau to he passed on to 
the n e w s p a p e r s . F u r t h e r  regulations were issued 
on the 18th of October for Petty Meetings within the 
Bureau to be composed of five or more Officers under the 
Chairmanship of one of their number under the orders of 
the Head of the Bureau. Petty Meetings were to be held 
from one to three in the afternoon to deal with the 
specialised branches into which the enquiries of the 
Council and other government offices were divided. ^ 2)
In sum, the reorganisation of the 14th of April,
1875,did little to diminish the preponderance of the 
Council-Executive on which the successful conduct of 
the government was now firmly based. The establishment 
of the Daishinin, the Genro-In and the Assembly of Local 
Officials could only be taken as an earnest of the 
government’s intention at some future date to set up 
an independent Judiciary and Upper and Lower Houses of 
a Legislative Assembly. But before powers could be 
safely delegated, they had to be defined.
Meanwhile, as in previous attempts tc build a strong 
Council by accomodating different interests, bitter 
disputes quickly arose. When ökubo returned from Osaka
61. HKBRTZ.3. KSM. Dajokan/Naikaku.2. p.269-70.
62. ibid, p.170-71.
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and told Iwakura of Kido*s proposals for the establish­
ment of a Constitution, Iwakura protested that the tim,e 
was not yet ripe. When Ckubo gave him a non-comraittal 
answer, Iwakura determined to resign. Iwakura seems
also to have been offended at the proposed! appointments 
to the Genro-In and began to go into a discontented 
retirement. He presented his petition of resignation
on the 20th of April on the pretext of his continued 
shame for his responsibi1ity for the Taiwan expedition 
of the previous year, saying that he had only been dis­
suaded from resigning then by the pleas of Shimazu, his 
fellow Vice-President. In spite of the objections of 
Sanjo and ökubo, he again petitioned the Emperor for 
permission to resign on the following day, saying that 
if the Emperor punished him by dismissal for his part 
in the Taiwan expedition justice would be done and a 
good example set for official discipline. The
Emperor summoned Iwakura to the Falace on the 23rd of 
April to refuse his request, but Iwakura refused to 
attend the Council for the next five months until he
abruptly resumed his duties when the Korean problem
(65) arose/ y '
Shimazu had shared Iwakura*s objections to many of 
the appointments to the Genrö-In , of which in the scheme
63. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.876.
64. Tsuda, Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.340.65* (5tsu. op,cit. 1. p.877-9.
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of things he was supposed to be Chairman. But when he 
proposed to assume his office in xlugust,1875 his appoint­
ment was blocked by the objections of Kido, Goto and 
Mutsu. Thereafter, Shimazu was in great discontent and 
looking for an occasion to resign.v J
It was not long before friction arose between the 
Junior Councillors also. Between ökubo and &ido there 
still remained a marked difference of temperament which 
made it hard for them to work together. Kido and Itagaki 
had pledged, themselves to co-operate before re-entering 
the government, but Kido did not think that the model 
of English constitutional practice advocated by Itagaki 
could be usefully applied to Japan^^ and his followers 
and those of Itagaki opposed each other in the Genro-In 
and the Assembly of Local Officials on the question of 
gradual or rapid progress towards popularly electsd 
A s s e m b l i e s . I n  addition, Itagaki soon found that 
his re-entry to the government placed him in an equivocal 
position as a political party leader, for on the 28th of 
May revisions were made in the Press Laws to provide 
harsher penalties for criticising the government, and 
his followers were the first to suffer.
Itagaki*s attempt to widen the powers of the Genro- 
In having failed, he then turned his attention to
66. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.354—5•
67. Segai Inoue Ko Ben. 2. p.634.
68. Otau. DNHKSS. 1. p.896.
131
Article 4 in the Osaka Agreement which had stated that 
the Council and the Executive Departments were to he 
separated. Ironically, this was not originally a pro­
posal of Itagaki, and It5 records that he was at first 
opposed to it.^9) when the Daishinin and Genro-In 
were set up in April,1873>proposals were made for the 
Council to consist of the President, Vice-Presidents 
and Junior Councillors to advise the Emperor and to 
supervise the business of government over an Executive 
(Gyosei-In) of Heads of Executive Departments who con­
ferred together on executive business* But it was ob­
jected that the lines of division between Legislative 
and Executive were still unclear and that a confusion 
of business would result; such a division should not 
therefore be made until the regulations of the Executive 
Departments had been investigated and revised.
So the matter was postponed, until in October 1875, 
Itagaki began to insist that the division should be made. 
Sanjo conferred, with Iwakura and Shimazu and they both 
agreed with him that since the question of Korea had 
arisen, the matter should again be postponed for the time
(71}being.vr J However, Itagaki presented a memorial to the 
Emperor on the 12th of October, on which Sanjo also sent
69« Itö Ko Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Genkundan. p.26.
70. Otsu. DHHKSS. 1. p.897.
71. ibid, p.899-901.
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(72)in a memorial stating his objections# v r
Meanwhile, Shimazu who had long disliked Iwakura 
as a man of stratagems had also begun to nurse a special 
dislike for Sanjo. According to Sasaki, Shimazu and 
his followers began to slander Sanjo as ' making improper 
use of his influence as President in favour of Kido, who 
was alleged to have assisted Sanjo when in financial 
difficulties. When Kido and Itagaki fell out, Itagaki 
and his followers threw in their lot with Shimazu in 
an attempt to break the power of Kido and Sanjo in the 
Council/73'
While the issue of the separation of the Council 
and the Executive was still pending a decision, Shimazu 
suddenly petitioned the Emperor in support of Itagaki.
He demanded the dismissal of Sanjo as lacking in the 
ability to control the officials, dilatory in business 
and influenced by personal interest in making appoint­
ments and dismissals. Junior Councillors combining posts 
as ^eads of Executive Departments had promoted useless 
public works regardless of the extravagant expense and 
the weakness of the people. The proposal of Itagaki 
ought to be accepted, since the present government did 
not depend upon responsible Presidents but on the Junior 
Councillors who formed cliques to the confusion and 
obstruction of business. The question of Korea should
72. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.901-3.
73. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.355-58.
133
be postponed until a thorough reform of the government 
had been carried out by preventing the tenure of addition­
al posts, by a reduction in official numbers and by
(Oh.)restoring unity to the counsels of the government• v J
Iwakura*s position at this juncture was unclear;
Sasaki called on him on the 14th of October, and fo\ind
him in general agreement with Shimazu but unable to
persuade him to abandon his proposals for the restoration
of the old military system and dress and the prohibition
of the import of foreign goods. He told Sasaki that
-Shimazu was extremely bitter towards Sanjo and Kido.
Iwakura refused to express an opinion on the contro­
versy on the grounds of illness. Kido and Ökubo called 
on him to use his influence to secure a compromise be­
tween Sanjo and Shimazu, but to no avail. Arisugay/a,
Date and Nakayama in anxiety at the situation also called 
on Iwakura, but he again refused to discuss the matter, 
saying that the decision must rest with the Emperor 
himself. The Emperor thereupon came to his bedside to 
consult him, but Iwakura continued to maintain that the 
Emperor himself must decide. On the 22nd of September, 
the Emperor summoned Shimazu and informed him that 
Sanjo was a pillar of the nation and that the attack 
upon him could not be accepted. Shimazu replied that
74. Otsu. DNHKSS. 1. p.904-5.
75* Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.362-3*
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in that case he must present his own resignation* In
spite of the Emperor*s plea to remain in office while
the question of Korea was still pending, Shimazu insisted
on resignation and Itagaki also presented a petition of
resignation* Meanwhile, ^anjo demanded that the charges
made against him by Shimazu should be investigated*
Finally, Iwakura advised the Emperor that the resignation
of Shimazu and Itagaki and the plea of Sanjö should be
determined by the Emperor after a conference of the
Junior Councillors* Accordingly, a Council meeting was
held before the Emperor on the 25th of October which
resolved that the resignations of Shimazu and Itagaki
ought to be accepted* On the 27th of October, this
was duly performed by Imperial decree*
In relation to Korea, it was agreed to dispatch a
strongly armed Embassy to negotiate a Treaty* Kido was
due to be Ajnbassador but could not undertake the post
due to illness and for a moment it seemed that another
clash would occur between Satsuma and Choshü over the
rival claims of Kuroda and Inoue to be Ajnbassador in
his place* However, by the agency of Ito, Kido and
Inoue were prevailed upon to give way to Kuroda and
( n n \Inoue was appointed Vice-Ambassador* v ' ( J
On the 28th of March,1876, Kido resigned his post
76. Otsu. DHHKSS* 1. p.905-9.
77* Ito Ko Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Genkun Dan. p.26-8.
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as Junior Councillor on a plea of illness, and was 
appointed to a retired position as Council Adviser 
(Naikaku Komon). On the same day, Goto resigned his 
post as Vice-Chairman of the Genro-In to devote himself 
to his business interests# Thus the attempt to broaden 
the membership of the Council after the Osaka agreement 
proved short-lived, and Okubo was left once more in 
undisputed direction of the Council# The system by which 
the Junior Councillors combined posts as Heads of the 
Executive Departments continued, as before.
In 1876, no changes were made in the regulations of 
the Council itself but important regulations were issued 
for the handling of Council business in the Council 
Secretariat.
On the 14th of February,1876, regulations were issued 
for the No.5 Section(Ka) in the Council Secretariat.^®^ 
This section was concerned with scrutinising and report­
ing upon a wide range of financial matters, including 
the financial returns of the Executive Departments and 
was the means whereby the Council kept a check upon 
government finance. This section was to become a full 
Bureau in January, 1877* and was the fore-runner of the 
Bureau of Audit(Kaikei Kensa-In).
On the 8th of March,1876,regulations were issued for
78. HKBRTZ. 1. KSM. 2. Dajokan/Naikaku. 1. p.183-6.
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the Council Committee( Naikaku Iin) that proposed 
government measures to the Genro-In.vJJ At least three 
days before draft proposals were debated in the Genro-In 
the Council was informed. On the first reading of a 
proposal, the Council Committee attended the Genro-In 
and explained the object of the proposal immediately 
after it had been read out by the Secretaries, In the 
second reading, the Council Committee took part in the 
debate to uphold the proposal. In the third reading, 
they upheld the original draft against amendments.
Closely connected with these regulations and prob­
ably issued on the same day were new regulations for 
the General Assembly(So Kaigi) of the legislation Bureau 
(Hoseikyoky) in the Council Secretariat .^ihis was an 
Assembly of all the Officers of the Bureau held once a 
week under the chairmanship of the Head of the -bureau. 
Officials from the Executive Departments could attend 
this Assembly when appropriate to provide explanations. 
Legislative proposals were debated in this Assembly and 
determined by majority vote.
Attached to these regulations were rules for the 
handling of official documents in the Legislation Bureau 
( H o s e i k y o k u ) T h e  Officers(Hoseikan) were divided
79. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.3. Dajokan/Naikaku.2. p.271-2.80. ibid. T).2?2-3.
81. ibid. -0.273-4.
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into three Charges(Kakari) concerned with the Civil Code 
(Mimpo), the Criminal Code(Keiho) and Administrative 
Regulations(Gyosei Kisoku). The Officers of each of 
these three Charges scrutinised the relevant documents 
and within five days drafted an Opinion(Köan) which 
was circulated to the other Charges. They approved it 
and affixed their seals, returning it to the original 
Charge. It was then sent to the Chief Secretäry(Shuji) 
who approved it and presented it to the Bureau Head 
(Kyokucho)• On receiving his approval, it was reported 
to the Council. Official documents received by the 
Bureau were to be reported to the Council after follow­
ing the above proceedure within ten days of receipt. 
These regulations concerned only day to day enquiries 
on legal and administrative matters; the drafting of 
Legislation or special matters under the orders of the 
Head of the Bureau were specifically excepted.
It is clear from these regulations that the Legis­
lative arm of the government lay chiefly in the Legis­
lation Bureau of the Council Secretariat. It was here 
that government legislation was drafted and it was from 
here that the Council Committee which introduced legis­
lation to the Genre-In was drawn. The special relation­
ship of the Legislation Bureau and the Council was 
emphasised when on the 1st of April,1876,the Bureau
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asked to be placed under the direct Jurisdiction of the 
Council, since its business was too confidential to be
(82. }sent through the Council Secretariat in the normal way, '
In the course of 1876, 15 new appointments were 
made to the post of Officer(Hoseikan) in the Legislation 
Bureau; 13 of them were appointed in addition to posts 
as Secretaries in the Foreign, Home, Finance, Army, Navy, 
Justice, Education, Religion and Industry Departments.
In this joint capacity they formed the link between the 
Council and Executive Departments in the business of 
drafting administrative legislation.
In response to an order to determine its numbers, 
the Genro-In suggested on January 14th,1876,that it 
should consist of one Chairman, two Chief Secretaries 
(Kanji) and 28 Members divided almost evenly into three 
classes. This was approved by the Council a few days 
late£.x J ' Mutsu and Kawano had been appointed Chief 
Secretaries on the 28th of November,1875; on the resig­
nation of Goto from Vice-Chairman on the 28th of March, 
18763the Genro-In was without a Chairman until the 
appointment of Arisugawa on the 18th of May,1867• In 
the course of 1876, 6 new Members were appointed includ- 
ing Nakajima and Fukuoka feuwa posts as Ken Governors and 
Eosokawa from the Legislation Bureau.
82. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.3. Dajökan/Naikaku 2. p.274-5
83. EEBRTZ.1.KSM.17.KS. Genro-In. p.69-70.
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On the 6th of September, the Emperor informed the 
Chairman Arisugawa that it was his wish for a Constitution 
to be drawn up. The Genro-ln was to engage in the study 
of foreign constitutions and to prepare a draft of a 
Constitution that the Emperor might adopt at a later 
date.^^ As a result, a committee was formed in the 
Genro-In under Arisugawa consisting of Yanagiwara, 
Fukubane, Nakajima, Hosokawa and Kanda to make investig­
ations for a National Constitution. Here for the moment 
the question of the Constitution rested; and with it 
the question of a National Assembly. The Assembly of 
Local Officials was not summoned in 1876 despite previous 
regulations which envisaged yearly sessions.
On the 11th of January,1877 the Bureaux(Ryo) within 
the Executive Departments were abolished and new ones 
erected under the title Kyoku by which the Bureaux 
within the Council Secretariat had been designated since 
1875*^^ The distinction between the titles of Department 
and Bureau Secretaries and Clerks was also abolished in 
favour of a single title for Secretaries(Shokikan) and 
for Clerks(Zoku). This system was extended to the 
Council Secretariat on the 18th of January,1877, when 
the title Sei-In was abolished and all its officials 
classified as Secretaries and Clerks under the new
84. HRZS. Shochoku.
85* HBZS. Dajökan No.10 Tasshi.
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names.
The Legislation Bureau was not specifically abol­
ished, but its Officers(Hoseikan) were included in the 
titles which were abolished at this time. A new Exam­
inations Bureau(ChösaKyoku) was set up in the Oouncil 
Secretariat; its regulations issued in January,1877, 
indicate that it was a development of the previous No.5 
Section. It was to handle and scrutinise all enquir­
ies and reports to the Council concerning financial 
business and compiled statistical tables. The financial 
accounts and monthly financial reports of the Executive 
Departments and other government offices were received 
by the Bureau which compiled clear statistical tables 
from them for presentation to the Council. Enquiries 
and reports concerning these matters were presented 
to the Council by this Bureau for decision accompanied 
by its Opinion(Koan). On the 6th of February,18??, 
Hijikata Hisamoto was appointed Head of this Bureau.
However, before the reforms of the Council Secret­
ariat were complete, the Satsuma rebellion arose and 
kept the principal Councillors on campaign until its 
suppression in September.
On the news that Saigö had joined the rebellion, 
ökubo insisted, that he should go and meet Saigo; but
86. HRZS. Dajökan No.10 Tasshi.
8?. HKBRTZ.I.KSM.2. Dajokan/Naikaku 2. p.2?8-9.
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when Ito and others refused to allow this for fear of his 
safety, he shut himself up at home and would not attend:, 
to business. The decision of oaigo to Join the rebels 
was a bitter blow to Ökubo, but he soon made up his mind 
that the conflict was inevitable and returned to business 
with his customary r e s o l v e . O n  the 9th of February, 
1877, an extraordinary meeting of the Genro-In had. 
resolved that if Saigo raised a rebellion against the 
government, troops should be speedily dispatched to 
suppress it; Sasaki, Mutsu, Kawano and Yanagiwara called 
on Iwakura to inform his of this resolution.
Various discontented persons inside and outside the 
government tried to exploit the difficulties of ökubo 
and his allies in putting down the rebellion. Kido and 
Mutsu were the most insistent on strong measures against 
Satsuma; Mutsu pressed Kido to demand that Itagaki and 
Goto should Join the Council and busied: himself with 
plans to levy troops from his old Han of Kishü. He got 
the consent of Iwakura to raise troops and went to Ösaka 
on the 12th of April to put his plans to ökubo and Ito. 
They disagreed on the grounds that the ex-Daimyo of 
Kishü had already promised to raise troops, and that a 
decision could not be taken until Torio returned from 
a survey of the front. Torio was a Choshü man but had
88. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.132-33.
89. Tsuda. Meiji SeiJo to omi Takayuki. p.388.
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worked for Kishü after the Restoration and knew Mutsu 
well. They were good friends in spite of differences 
of opinion, and Torio knew that it would he too danger­
ous to entrust Mutsu with raising droops since he was 
in constant complaint against the dominance of the 
government by the Satsuma and Choshü followers of ökubo. 
Torio therefore proposed that the ex-Daimyo of Kishü 
should levy the Han troops; but Mutsu persuaded Kido 
to agree to a plan to include Goto and Itagaki of Tosa 
and himself and Tsuda of &ishu in the Council under Kido 
as Chief Councillor, ousting ökubo and Satsuma and setting 
up a new Council of Choshü, Tosa and %shu. (90)
Kido by this time was in the last stages of the 
chronic illness from which he died on the 26th of May, 
1877; but he too was in constant complaint against the 
dominance of ökubo and regarded the rebellion as a good
opportunity to correct the "unfairness and injustice”
( 9 1 ')of the government.vJ '
On the outbreak of the rebellion, Goto considered 
that "the two tigers(i.e.ökubo and Saigo) should be set 
to fight, and the opportunity taken to overthrow the 
Han clique(Hambatsu)? On the 17th of February, the 
day on which the decision to send troops against the 
rebels was taken, Goto arrived in Kyoto to confer with
90. Saiga. Oe Tenchi Denki. p.455-60.
91. Kanju Shogun Kaikoroku. p.120-21.
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Kido and Sanjo. He returned to Tokyo on the 19th of
March, where Iwakura anxiously asked him if Itagaki would
refrain from joining Saigo on condition that a popularly
(92)elected assembly were set up.
Itagaki in fact had no intention of joining Saigo
in armed rebellion, but he took the opportunity; to
embarrass the government by military preparations in
Tosa, ostensibly to resist the passage of the rebel
- - (93)armies across the straits from Kyushu. w  ' in June, 
his follower Kataoka Keukichi addressed a vigorous 
memorial to the Emperor in Kyoto charging the government 
with obstructing the Imperial oath to establish repre­
sentative assemblies and a constitutional form of govern­
ment; instead a small oligarchy from the four great Han 
had concentrated all power in their own hands, leading
to confused administration, mismanaged finances and
(94)general oppression.w  '
Throughout the campaign, Tosa was in a state of 
considerable unrest, but by close government supervision 
the situation was kept under control. The plot of öe 
Taku and the Tosa hot-heads to seize ösaka, kill the 
leading men of the government and make terms with Saigo 
was quickly detected.(95)
92. Omachi. Hakushaku Goto Shbjirö. p.496-7.
93. Japan Weekly Mail. May 19th, 1877. p.37-38.
94. ibid. July 7th,1877.
95* For a full account of this plot, vid. Saiga. Oe 
Tenchi Denki. p.460-69*
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The rebellion was finally put down in September,1877• 
With the deaths of Kido and Saigo, the primacy of Ökubo 
was finally beyond dispute* In recognition of this fact, 
a group of Palace Advisers began a movement to bring him 
into closer personal contact with the Emperor. Since 
the abortive attempt of Iwakura to raise ökubo, Kido and 
Itagaki above the other Councillors as Advisers to the 
Emperor in August 1869*^^ it had continued to be felt 
that the princix^al statesmen should leave active posts 
such as the direction of the Executive Departments and 
assist the Emperor in the general direction of affairs. 
The precedence of Ökubo over the other Councillors now 
made it feasible to attempt this again.
The movement began when Takasaki as Head of the 
Imperial Attendants(JijubanCho) approached Tokudaiji, 
the Head of the Palace Department, to advocate the need 
to draw the Council and the Court into a closer relation­
ship. Takasaki spoke to Sanjö, Iwakura and Kido on the 
question and to ökubo himself, who agreed with him but 
took no action. At the time of the Satsuma rebellion 
the claim of Saigo to be a loyal servant of the Emperor 
underlined the need to clarify responsibility for advis­
ing the Emperor, and Takasaki called on Ökubo in Kyoto 
to raise the matter again. Ökubo apologised for his
96. Yid.supr. p.41
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failure to act on the matter and referred him to Ito. 
Takasaki was at first offended at having to deal with 
Ito, whom he considered would not understand his point 
of view ( a fact that in itself demonstrates the lack 
of understanding between Court and Council at this time) 
but ökubo while conceding that Ito was a "man of talent" 
(Zaishi ) ^ ^  stoutly defended him as a man of great under­
standing with whom he conferred on all matters of national 
policy* When Takasaki met Ito for the first time he was 
agreeably surprised at his understanding of the matter. 
Both ökubo and Ito agreed that the Council should be 
drawn closer to the Imperial Palace and that the Emperor 
should attend Council meetings. They also gave their 
consent to the establishment of a new post of Imperial 
Instructor(Jiho) to give guidance to the Emperor.(98)
The first appointments to this new office were 
made on the 29th of August, 1877} when Tokudaiji, Yoshii 
and Hijikata assumed the post. On the 5th of March,1878^ 
Sasaki was also appointed Instructor in addition to his 
post as a member of the Genro-In. Sasaki was particularly 
active in attempting to get ökubo closer to the Emperor, 
either by assuming a Presidential position as Daijin or
at least by combining his post as Head of the Home Depart-
(99)ment with that of Head of the Palace Department.
97. To conservative members of the government, this was 
a term of mild abuse, as the antithesis to the Jimbutsu 
or "man of character"
98. Ito K6 Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Genkun Dan. p.53-9.
99. Tsuda. Mei ji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.403.
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When further consultations were held, ökubo refused 
to accept a Presidential post on the grounds that he was 
unfitted to do so; on the other hand he foresaw difficult­
ies if he combined posts as Head of the Home and Palace 
Departments, If he assumed the post of Head of the Palace 
Department, he therefore intended Ito to succeed him as 
Head of the Home Department, Finally, when Yoshii, 
Takasaki and Sasaki called on Ito to discuss the matter 
on the 14th of May,1878,a message arrived for Ito from 
ökubo asking him to meet him immediately. Ito took this 
as an indication that ökubo had made up his mind on the 
matter, but as he hurried to meet him he heard the news 
that ökubo had been assassinated.(^0)
100. Ito Ko Inoue Haku Yamagata Haku Gehkun Dan. p.60-61
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CHAPTER 4.
THE RISE OF ITÖ. 1878-1884.
On the death of ökubo, Ito immediately succeeded 
him as Home Minister, A little later on the 24th of 
May,1878 Kawamura Sumiyoshi of Satsuma was appointed 
Junior Councillor and Head of the Navy Department to 
fill the post left vacant since the resignation of Katsu 
in November,1875; and Saigo Tsugumichi of Satsuma was 
appointed Junior Councillor and Head of the Education 
Department which had again been kept vacant since the 
resignation of Kido in May,1874. Inoue Kaoru of Choshü 
who was overseas at the time of ökubo's death was recalled 
and appointed Junior Councillor and Head of the Industry 
Departments on the 29th of July,1878. The Council then 
consisted of Sanjo as President, Iwakura as Vice-President 
and ökuma, Itö, öki, Terashima, Yamagata, Saigö, Kuroda, 
Kawamura and Inoue as Junior Councillors and Heads of 
Executive Departments.
In the Council, all functioned much as before. The 
Legislation Bureau in the Council Secretariat had been 
re-established by December,1877, under Ito as Head over 
nine Chief Secretaries(Dai Shokikan), including Inoue Ki,
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four Chief Secretaries from the Justice, Education, 
Finance and Home Departments and two serving officers 
from the Army and Navy In the regulations issued for 
the Bureau sometime in 1878, its members were divided, 
as before into three sections broadly concerned with 
the Civil Code, the Criminal Code and Administrative 
Regulations,
The Genro-In worked in quiet co-operation with the 
Council in debating the draft proposals for legislation 
submitted to it. Its numbers steadily increased; in 
1877, three new members were appointed,- in 1878, nine new 
members,of whom five combined their posts as members of 
the Genro-In with posts as Vice-Heads of the Home, Army, 
Justice, Education, Industry and Palace Departments:1 23.
Thus the Junior Councillors acted as Heads of Exec­
utive Departments, a number of Vice-Heads of Departments 
were members of the Genro-In and a number of Department 
Chief Secretaries were members of the Legislation Bureau 
in the Council Secretariat. In this way, the Council, 
Executive and Legislature were closely bound together.
On the 26th of February,1878,the Governors of Fu 
and Ken had been summoned to the capital tc attend an
Assembly of Local Officials to be opened on the 1st of 
(
April. On the 15th of March,1878,the regulations
1. Kaninroku. December 1877*
2. HKBRTZ.l. Dajökan/Naikaku.2. p.277-8. 1878, no date.
3. HRZS. Dajokan Mugo Tasshi.
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(h)for the Assembly were revised, J The Assembly was äs a 
general rule to be held once a year at a time determined 
by the government. The Heqds of Executive Departments 
or their representatives could attend its sessions and 
give explanations or argue for or against proposals, but 
could not vote in the decision. The Emperor attended its 
opening and closing ceremonies. Its members could compose 
memorials, which were submitted as draft proposals to 
the Chairman who introduced them to the Assembly and 
reported them to the throne for decision when passed by 
the Assembly. Draft proposals(Gian) were to receive 
three readings, and provisions were made for amendments
I
in Petty Assembly(ShöKaigi). Ito was appointed Chairman 
of the Assembly on the 5th of March,1878; and from the 
10th of April to the 3rd of May the Assembly debated 
the Law for the Formation of Urban and Sural Districts, 
Regulations for the Fu and Ken and Land Tax Reform.
On the 22nd of July,1878,regulations were issued for 
Fu and Ken Assemblies to debate matters financed by 
local taxes. The Chairman of these Assemblies was to 
be elected by the members from among their number, hut 
the appointment was subject to the approval of the
(5)Governor, who also introduced all proposals for debate. ' 
On the same day, regulations were issued for the
4. HRZS. Dajökan No.9 Tasshi. 
5* HRZS. Dajökan No.18 Fukoku
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raising of local taxes for police, education, hospital
and public works expenditure. Local Governors were
required to submit reports on expenditure from local
taxes to the ^ome and Finance Departments and to the
(G )Fu or Ken Assembly.' '
While the Genro-In continued its studies for a 
Constitution and acted as the fore-runner of a future 
Upper House of a National Assembly, the establishment 
of Fu and Ken Assemblies approving local expenditure 
under the direction of their Governors was clearly the 
first step towards the creation of a popularly elected 
Lower House. All this was in keeping with ökubo’s 
plans for gradual progress towards constitutional govern­
ment.
On the death of Ökubo, the question of advising the 
Emperor remained unsolved. The direction of affairs 
rested primarily with ökuma, Itö and Inoue; but they 
were comparatively young and in spite of their undoubted 
talents they were not greatly respected in the country 
at large. They were certainly not of the calibre of 
Kido, Saigo and ökubo whose recent deaths had left them 
in command of affairs.
The Instructors(Jiho) continued their movement to 
establish a Council which would be in close personal
6. HRZS. Dajökan No.19 Fukoku.
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attendance on the Emperor* Hijikata approached Sanjo 
and Sasaki approached Iwakura to press this point, and
(n\the Junior Councillors were also canvassed* ' '  J
Sanjo, however, pointed out to Sasaki that a seat 
had been provided for the Emperor to attend the Council 
daily to hear the Presidents and Junior Councillors 
debate business. For the Instructors to attend the. 
Emperor on such occasions would be a confusion of Palace 
and Government which could not be allowed. Ito also 
met Sasaki, Yoshii, Hijikata and Takasaki to inform them 
that it was the unanimous decision of the Council that 
the Instructors should not hear confidential matters of 
the administration. Although in ancient China the 
attendants of the Emperor took part in the administration, 
in modern Japan the Palace and Council were distinct.
Hence the Head of the Palace Department was not a Junior 
Councillor as were the Heads of the other Executive 
Deportments, and the Instructors should devote themselves 
chiefly to the education of the Emperor. The Instructors 
agreed that evils had been known to arise from the power 
of Palace officials over the administration, but urged 
that there were few such dangers at the present time.
On the contrary, the danger at present was of two or 
three Councillors playing with power. In order to
7• Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi lakayuki. p#409-11.
152
establish a truly Imperial government, it was essential 
to preserve unity between the Palace and the Council.
The Presidents and the Junior Councillors were chiefly 
concerned with assisting the Emperor in the business of 
government, and were busy with the affairs of the Exec­
utive Departments. There was a real need for personal 
assistance to the Emperor by two or three men of character 
versed in confidential matters both of the Palace and 
of the Administration.^®^
The active figures in this movement were Hijikata, 
who was appointed Vice-Head of the Palace Department 
on the 24th of December,1878,in addition to his post 
as Instructor; Motoda who was: appointed Instructor on 
the same day; and Sasaki and Yoshii who held posts as 
Instructors in addition to membership of the Genro-In.
They continued to press for their aims, until on the 
13th of October,1879?the office of Instructor was 
abolished.
When the office of Instructor(Jiho) was abolished, 
an order was issued that henceforth the Presidents and 
Junior Councillors would undertake the responsibility of 
advising the Emperor in person from time to time. One 
of the Presidents was to attend the Palace daily, and 
one Junior Councillor was also to attend the Palace at
8. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.411-13.
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fixed intervals. Junior Councillors and Heads of Exec­
utive Departments were to appear before the Emperor to
(Q)present official documents for Imperial decision. ''
These provisions were very vague, and the matter 
was far from settled. On the abolition of the office 
of Instructor, Sasaki was appointed an executive(Goyo 
kakari) of the Palace Department, and Toshii, Hijikata 
and Motoda remained in Palace posts. They retained the 
confidence of the Emperor and continued to give advice 
freely on government matters. Their influence was 
particularly strong whenever disputes arose within the 
Council.
Under the unchallenged supremacy of Ckubo, the 
Council of theoretically equal Heads of Executive Depart­
ments had worked well. But on his death a struggle 
for primacy was perhaps inevitable until one of the 
men of the second stream could gain a comparable ascend­
ancy over the rest. Ito had succeeded Gkubo as Head 
of the Home Department, but ökuma was his senior as a 
Councillor and wielded comparable power as Head of the 
Finance Department. The rivalry between ökuma and Ito 
had already been foreshadowed before Ckubo’s death when 
in April,1878 the Emperor proposed to visit ökuma’s 
residence. At this the other Junior Councillors, and
9. Röyama. "Dajökan Seido to Naikaku Seido!.’ Kokka Gaku 
Ronshü. p.566.
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Ito in particular, protested to Iwakura and ökubo on the 
grounds that only Kido and Ökubo had been honoured with 
such a visit previously, ökubo agreed that if the 
Emperor visited ökuma*s residence he should also visit 
the residences of the other Junior Councillors; iwakura 
declared that the visit had been undertaken quite casually 
as part of the general policy to bring the Emperor and 
Junior Councillors into closer contact, and took pains 
to console Ito and to apologise to ökubo. Since the 
visit could not very well be cancelled, the Emperor 
visited ökuma's residence on the 8th of April,1878,as 
proposed.
This was a small incident, but it revealed that any 
increase in the power or status of ökuma would be regard­
ed by the other Junior Councillors with some jealousy.
On the death of ökubo, Ito and ökuma reinforced by Inoue 
were in general agreement on policy and had all worked 
well together in the past. But signs of tension between 
Ito and ökuma soon became apparent,
The first dispute arose when Ito, backed by a major­
ity of the Junior Councillors, proposed that the Council 
and the Executive Departments should be separated, ökuma 
and öki of Hizen resisted the proposal, but Ökuma finally 
agreed on condition that Sano Tsunetami should succeed
10. Watanabe. Meiji Ishin to Gendai Nihon, p.236. Iwakura 
Tomomi Kankei Bunsho. 7* p.87-90.
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him as Head, of the Finance Department,
Accordingly, on the 28th of February 1880, Ito 
resigned his additional post as Head of the Home Depart­
ment to Matsukata and Ökuma resigned the Finance Depart­
ment to Sano; Saigo, Kawamura, Ski, Terashima and Yamada 
resigned their additional posts as Heads of the Army,
Navy, Justice, Education and Industry Departments, 
Exceptions were made for Yamagata who remained Head of 
the General Staff Office, Inoue who remained; Head of the 
Foreign Department since Treaty revision was under 
negotiation and a change of Head was thought inopportune, 
and Kuroda who remained. Head of the Colonisation Depart­
ment. Oki, too, was immediately appointed to an addition­
al post as Chairman of the Genrö-In.
Occasion was also taken to appoint Arisugawa to the 
post of Vice-President(SaDaiJin) left vacant since the 
resignation of Shimazu in 1875. The new Council thus 
c onsisted of Sanjo as President, Arisugawa and Iwakura 
as Vice-Presidents; Ito, Inoue, Yamagata and Yamada of 
Chöshü; Kuroda, Saigo, Kawamura and Terashima of Satsuma; 
Ckuma and Oki of Hizen all as Junior Councillors.
The creation of a Council distinct from the Executive 
Departments demanded a major re-organisation of the 
Council Secretariat. On the 3rd of March,1880,the 
Legislation Bureau(HöseiKyoku) and the Examinations
156
B u re a u (C hosaK yoku) w ere a b o l i s h e d ,  and  s i x  S e c t io n s (B u )  
s e t  up  w i t h i n  th e  C o u n c il  S e c r e t a r i a t  t o  d e a l  w ith  L e g is ­
l a t i o n ,  F in a n c e ,  Mi l i t a r y ,  Home, J u d i c i a l  and F o re ig n  
A f f a i r s .  On th e  5 th  o f  M arch , a new B oard  o f  A u d it
(K a ik e iK e n s a ln )  was e s t a b l i s h e d .  I t s  t i t l e  I n  m arked  i t  
a s  d e s t i n e d  t o  be  an  in d e p e n d e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  th e  
a u d i t  o f  g overnm en t f i n a n c e ; i t  com bined  th e  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  p r e v io u s  E x a m in a tio n s  B ureau(C hosaK yoku) and  o f  
th e  I n s p e c t i o n  B ureau(K ensaK yoku) o f  th e  F in a n c e  D e p a r t ­
m en t, w h ich  was a b o l i s h e d  on  th e  same day  and i t s  b u s in e s s  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  th e  new B u r e a u . T h e r e a f t e r ,  th e  
e s t im a te s ( Y o s a n )  o f  th e  y e a r l y  incom e: and e x p e n d i tu r e  
o f  th e  go v ern m en t w ere d raw n up i n  th e  A c co u n ts  B u reau  
(S e isa n K y o k u ) o f  th e  F in a n c e  D e p a r tm e n t, and th e  f i n a l  
a c c o u n ts (K e s s a n )  d raw n up i n  th e  B oard  o f  A u d i t .
On th e  3 0 th  o f  A p r i l ,  1 8 8 0 ,t h e  J u n i o r  C o u n c i l lo r s  
w ere  a l l o t e d  among th e  s i x  S e c t io n s  i n t o  w h ich  C o u n c il  
b u s in e s s  was now d iv id e d ;  ö k i  and  Yamada t o  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  
Okurna, T e ra sh im a  and I t o  t o  F in a n c e ,  Y am agata , S a ig ö  
and Kawamura t o  M i l i t a r y  A f f a i r s ,  I t o ,  K uroda and  S a ig o  
to  Home A f f a i r s ,  T e ra sh im a  and  Yamada t o  J u d i c i a l  A f f a i r s  
and  ökum a, In o u e  and  Kawamura to  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s .  On 
th e  same d a y , i n s t r u c t i o n s  w ere i s s u e d  f o r  th e  c o n d u c t 
o f  b u s in e s s  i n  th e  s i x  S e c t i o n s . ^ 1 5  ^ The J u n io r
11 . HRZS. D a jö k an  N o .17 T a s s h i .
12 . HRZS. D a jo k an  N o .18 T a s s h i .
13* HKBRTZ.l.KSM.3 * D a jö k a n /N a ik a k u .2 .p .2 8 0 -8 1 .
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Councillors in charge of each Section controlled its 
officials and exercised a general supervision of its 
business. When the Junior Councillors of each Section 
wished for Laws and Regulations to be established, abol­
ished or revised in the Council(Naikaku) they were to 
send their proposals to the Legislation Section for 
consideration. If the matter concerned another Section, 
the Legislation Section was to confer with it. When the 
Council proposed! to issue orders or instructions, they 
were to be sent to the Section concerned for consideration 
Matters sent up to the Council by government offices were 
considered in the Section concerned and reported for 
decision with the opinion of the Section attached. Even 
if a matter was well within the jurisdiction of a Section, 
conference was to be held with any other Section whose 
business might be affected by it; if two Sections failed 
to agree, the matter was sent up for decision with the 
opinion of each party attached. Each section in relation 
to the business within its charge could order government 
offices to make reports in writing or confer with it 
verbally, and could dispatch officials of the Section 
to the localities. When draft of Laws(Hoan) were put 
before the Genrö-In, the Junior Councillors of the Section 
concerned or the Secretaries of the Section or Executive 
Department concerned were to be appointed to the Council 
Committee(Naikaku Iin) to attend the Assembly and give
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explanations•
Legislation and Financial Accounting occupied the 
greatest share of business. At the end of 1880, the 
Legislation section consisted of 8 Chief Secretaries,
12 Lesser Secretaries and 35 clerks; the Finance Section 
6 Chief Secretaries, 4 Lesser Secretaries and 25 clerks. 
The other four Sections were on a much smaller scale.
The Board of Audit consisted of one Head, 5 Auditors 
and 70 Clerks.
It is difficult to determine what the point of this 
new system was. In essence, it was a return to the 
clumsy system of pre-1874 in which the Councillors 
divided up the business of the Council among themselves, 
with several men jointly responsible for the running 
of each section. One authority alleges that it was 
aimed at diminishing the influence of ökuma, but failed 
to do so since ökuma was succeeded as Head, of the Finance 
Department by Sano Tsunetami who, as ökuma well knew 
in insisting on his appointment to succeed him, was not 
well versed in finance and had to rely largely on ökuma's 
directions.(^5)
The first dispute to vex the new Council arose from 
a proposal of ökuma to finance the redemption of the 
paper currency by a foreign loan of ¥50 million.^16^
14. Kaninroku. December 1880.
15. Oguri. Ryükei Yano Fumio Kun Den. p.158-9•16. Tsuda. Mei]ji Sei jo to omi Takayuki. p.463ff.
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On the 23rd of May,1880 the Heads of Executive Depart­
ments were summoned to the Council chamber to be consult­
ed on the question by the President and Vice-Presidents. 
Enomoto, Oyama and Tanaka of the Navy, Army and Justice 
Departments agreed with Ökuma's proposal; but Kawano, 
Matsukata, Sano and Yamao of the Education, Home, Pinance, 
and Industry Departments were opposed. On the 26th of 
May, Kawano recorded his objections in writing and 
suggested that a committee be set up to investigate the 
reserves of the Finance Department.
Iwakura was strongly opposed to the loan, which he 
regarded as equivalent to selling Kyushu or Shikoku to 
a foreign power, and conferred with Hijikata and ^otoda 
to report his objections to the Emperor. On the 29th of 
May, Sasaki called on Ijichi Masaharu of Satsuma who 
was serving as an executive(Goyo kakari) of the Palace 
Department to say that since many Satsuma men were in 
favour of the loan he was anxious to hear Ijichi's 
opinion because difficulties would arise if he agreed 
with them. Sasaki advocated rigid economy to restore the 
finances of the government, and feared that a loan would 
be wasted like the samurai pensions in frivolity. Ijichi 
agreed with him wholeheartedly.
On the 31st of May, Sasaki spoke with Hayashi 
Tomoyuki of Choshü who was a special intimate of Iwakura.
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Hayashi told him that although the President and Vice- 
Presidents opposed the loan, many of the Satsuma Junior 
Councillors agreed with Ökuma. Although the Chöshü 
men were opposed, they were afraid of provoking a split 
in the Council and Ito and Inoue were therefore keeping 
silent. Sasaki urged Hayashi to inform Itö of his own 
opposition to the loan. Motoda then arrived to tell 
Sasaki that in response to an Imperial enquiry, Saigö 
and Kawamura agreed to ökuma’s proposal while Ito and 
Inoue opposed it.
On the 2nd of June, Hayashi reported to Sasaki that
Itö was anxious about the disagreement with Ökuma since
Chöshü and Satsuma were ranged against each other on the
issue. Ito feared that if he continued to oppose the
loan strongly a war might ensue, since the Navy was
entirely behind Satsuma and its influence in the ftrmy 
(17 )was strong.v On the same day, Motoda called on Sasaki
to report that Soejima( who at this time was an executive 
in the Palace Department) was also opposed to the loan; 
Terashima was for the loan but considered ¥50 million 
too much; öki, Itö, Yamagata, Yamada and Inoue in the 
Council and Matsukata, Sano, Kawano and Yamao in the 
Departments opposed the loan against Ökuma in the Council 
and Öyama, Enomoto and Tanaka in the Departments. The
17. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.468.
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matter was finally decided on the 11th of June, when an 
Imperial rescript announced that a loan would not he 
raised, and that economy was to he practised.
This dispute provides an interesting revelation of 
the way in which the ex-instructors of the Emperor like 
Hijikata, Motoda and Sasaki husily engaged in formulating 
and estimating opinion in the Palace and the Council 
whenever- a controversial issue arose. The increasing 
maturity of the Emperor and the lack of any firm 
definition of his constitutional x^osition enabled them 
to play an active part in this and in subsequent crises.
The reasons for Satsuma support of ukuma are not 
plain, hut Okuma’s connections with prominent Satsuma 
commercial houses?were well known, whereas he seemed to 
have no dealings with the Choshu business interests. 
Matsukata suggested that the loan was probably proposed 
to ökuma by Shibusawa, Godai, Masuda or Fukuzawa with 
whom he conferred on all financial matters; Godai
and Masuda were the two most prominent Satsuma business­
men of the time. It is an interesting conjecture that 
(jkuma secretly supplied ¥30,000 to assist Kawaji, the 
Satsuma Chief of the Metropolitan Police, in the invest­
igations that led to the arrest of Fujita Denjirö and 
Nakano Goichi of the Choshu Fujita-gumi on the 15th of
18. Oguri. Ryükei Yano Fumio Kun Den. p.162-3.
19. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi '^akayuki. p.4-77 •
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September, 1880. Nakano was a close friend of Inoue,
and Yamagata had been closely connected with the Fujita- 
gumi since it grew suddenly in riches from military 
contracts during the Satsuma rebellion,
Iramediately after the decision to abandon the plan 
to raise a foreign loan, Ito received an Imperial order 
to investigate the funds of the Finance Department.
On investigations with Sano, he found that the sum of 
over ¥20 million in specie previously held in reserve 
by the Finance Department had been secretly sold to 
a certain Englishman in exchange for silver coin on the 
sole decision of ökuma. The reserve fund of the Finance 
Department at the time of inspection consisted! of ¥4 
million in silver and other coins and ¥4 million in gold 
coins, a total of only ¥8 million. Ito informed Yoshii 
of this, and Saigo and Kawamura were also informed and 
shared! their anxiety. When Yoshii told Matsukata, who 
had been Vice-Head of the Finance Department from 
November,1875,until February,1880, Matsukata declared 
that he had no knowledge of the exchange. Ito had at 
first refused to carry out the inspection, but had been 
forced to make it by Imperial orders, and now found 
himself in a most difficult position. Sasaki, Yoshii
20. Ito. Kakuretaru Jijitsu Meiji Rimen Shi. 1. p.577.
21. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.476ff/
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and Motoda discussed the matter on the 8th of July; when 
Yoshii mentioned that Inoue was demanding a thorough 
reform of the Finance Department, and that Soejima had 
recommended his appointment as Head of the Department 
to the Emperor, Sasaki objected that despite his talents 
Inoue was a man with a bad reputation in financial matters 
and should not be promoted to this position, Yoshii 
agreed and suggested that Ito should be appointed General 
Director of Finance and Matsukata Head of the Department. 
Both had great confidence in Matsukata as a man of integ­
rity to handle the finances in the coming programme of 
strict economy. Inoue himself had recommended the employ­
ment of Shibusawa as a finance official to Yoshii. It 
was also noted that Masuda and other merchants were 
turning away from Ökuma towards Shibusawa, leaving only 
Iwasaki Yataro in close relations with him. On the 
22nd of July, Sasaki with Yoshii and Motoda called on 
Arisugawa to give their opinions, and on the 23rd of July 
Hijikata reported them to the Emperor.
Ito reported his differences with Ökuma to the 
Emperor, but finally got Ökuma to agree to supply the 
deficiency of ¥10 million in government finance by 
increased sake taxes and cuts in Department appropriations 
and subsidies for local expenses. Ökuma and Itö then
22. Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.479.
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co-operated in arranging the finances, and the crisis
C27))was thus solved.
Throughout the two crises over the foreign loan and 
the Finance Department reserve fund, Ito acted with the 
greatest circumspection. By character, he was always 
nervous of violent disagreements and anxious for com­
promise. The year ended with seeming unanimity between 
him and Okurna, but signs of a coming storm were already 
in the air.
The year 1881 began with a series of important new 
developments in the Council Secretariat. On the 14th 
of February,1881, an Adjudications Bureau(ShinriKyoku) 
was established for deciding disputes between Lodal 
Governors and Local Assemblies. Cases were to be
heard by a commission of two members of the Genro-In, 
two judges of the Supreme Court(Daishin-In) and two 
or more Secretaries of the Council Secretariat under 
the chairmanship of a Junior Councillor.
On the 28th of April,1881,new regulations were issued 
for the Board of Audit(KaikeiKensaln) (^5) fouling  
the Law of Finance(KaikeiHo) promulgated on the same 
day. The Law of Finance provided that the receipts
and expenditures of all government offices should be
23. Tsuda. Meiji Seijb to omi Takayuki. p.486-7.
24. HRZS. Dajokan No.6 Tasshi.
25. HRZS. Dajokan No.35 Tasshi.
26. HRZS. ^ajbkan No. 33 Tasshi.
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handled and recorded in the Finance Department, and 
ratified by the Council after passing the inspection of 
the Board of Audit, The Finance Department was to keep 
a daily record of receipts and disbursements from the 
National Treasury and to report them to the Board of 
Audit on the following day.
On the 30th of May,1881,a Board of Statistics(Tökei- 
In) was set up in the Council Secretariat to provide the 
Council with detailed statistical information on matters 
of government. The Head of this Board was to be
a Junior Councillor.
ökuma played a prominent part in the establishment 
of these new bodies, and his followers occupied key 
positions within them. Ono Asuza held a prominent posit­
ion in the Board of Audit as an Auditor 1st Class; Yano 
Fumio was appointed Chief Secretary of the Board of 
Statistics on the 21st of June,1881,over Ushiba Takuzö, 
Inukai Ki and Ozaki Yukio who were all of ökuma's follow­
ing. Ökuma himself was Director(Sosai) of the Board of 
Statistics and through his friends and followers con­
trolled the Finance, Agriculture and Commerce, and 
Justice Departments and had great influence in the 
Foreign Department.
27. Articles 7, 28.
28. HRZS. Dajökan No.49 Tasshi.
29. Ozaki. Kindai Kaiketsu Roku. p.27-28.
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At this time, the government was committed to two 
great policies on which its future was held to depend; 
the drafting of a Constitution, and the sale of non- 
strategic government enterprises to cut expenditure and 
redeem the paper currency. It was on these two points 
that the issue between Itö and Okurna was finally deter­
mined.
In December,1879 the Genrö-In completed the final 
draft of the Constitution on which it had been working 
in response to the orders of the Emperor since September, 
1876. The Constitution it proposed drew heavily upon 
the English model. But Ito objected in particular to 
Section 8 Article 1 of the draft, which would require 
the government to obtain the approval of the Lower House 
of representatives for the yearly Estimates.(30)
Iwakura also had objections, and sent a memorial to Sanjo 
declaring that the draft Constitution contained elements 
not in accordance with the national tradition(Kokutai).
He urged that an Imperial order should be given to all 
the Junior Councillors to present their views, and 
after Imperial consideration a Constitution drawn up
(x i') _in accordance with the national tradition.w  ' Sanjo 
agreed, and at the same time Yamagata presented a 
memorial advocating an Assembly of members chosen by
30. Osatake. Nihon Kenseishi Taiko. 2. p.666.
31. Iwakura Ko Jikki. 3- p.652ff.
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the Emperor from the members of the Fu and Ken Assemblies, 
with the power of final decision on measures(GiketsuKen)
(-I p)reserved to the government. J In February,1880,all 
the Junior Councillors were ordered to submit their 
opinions on the question.
The Constitution had become a burning issue in the 
face of growing political party opposition against the 
government. On the 16th of April,1880,some 114 repre­
sentatives of 27 political associations in 2 Fu and 
22 Ken met in Osaka to launch a united movement for the 
prompt opening of a National A s s e m b l y . T h e  govern­
ment responded with a Public Meetings Law ordering 
political associations to notify the local police three 
days in advance before holding meetings and to obtain 
police permission to do so. Notification was to include 
details of the proposed agenda, the names of speakers, 
the name of the Head of the association. Before a 
political association could be formed, similar details 
were to be given to the police and their permission 
obtained. Permission to form an association or hold a
meeting could be refused at will by the police if the
( 34^public peace was likely to be disturbed.w  '
While the government and the political parties
32. Kobayakawa. Meiji Hösei Shiron. 1. p.315*
33. Otsu. DNHKSS.2.p.287ff.
34. HRZS. Dajbkan No.12 Fukoku.
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prepared for battle, the Junior Councillors continued 
to send in memorials on the Constitution. Kuroda, Yamada 
and öki all urged that a period of legal definition was 
necessary before a Constitution and Assembly could be 
established, and were little in sympathy with the popular 
rights movement. Inoue and Ito made few concrete suggest­
ions beyond the establishment of an Upper House of about 
100 members chosen by the Emperor from the nobility, the 
samurai and men of distinguished services and scholarship 
to ratify the Laws. All were agreed that a period of 
legal definition must precede a Constitution, and that 
the Constitution must precede an Assembly. All were 
opposed to rapid progress and too heavy a reliance upon 
European models.
Ito had submitted his memorial on the 14th of 
December,1880; but Ökuma alone of all the Junior Council­
lors had not presented a memorial when in March,1881* 
Arisugawa was sent to urge him to do s o . ^ ^  Ökuma told 
Arisugawa that he wished to deliver his opinions to the 
Emperor verbally before the assembled Junior Councillors. 
But this was not allowed, so he gave his written opinion 
to Arisugawa and asked him not to show it to the other 
Junior Councillors before presenting it to the Lmperor.
In striking contrast to the memorials of the other Junior
35. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.420
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Councillors, Ökuma advocated that the principal officers 
of state should be appointed by the Emperor from the 
leaders of the political parties in a National Assembly 
on the English model; that a separation be made between 
party officials and permanent civil servants; that 
Councillors, Heads of Executive Departments and ^eads 
of Bureaux should be party officials, with three Presid­
ents (Dai jin) acting as permanent neutral officials to 
advise the Emperor. He finally proposed that a National 
Assembly be opened early in 1883, after elections held 
at the end of 1882.^56^
Arisugawa was astonished by his proposals and at 
once showed his memorial to Sanjo and Iwakura. When 
Iwakura queried Ökuma on the early establishment of a 
National Assembly, he replied that it was as well to 
keep ahead of the times. Iwakura then asked him if 
Ito shared his views, and Ökuma replied that there 
were only small differences between them.^^y
Sanjo and Iwakura then decided to show the memorial 
to Ito. Ito angrily declared that when he had shown his 
own memorial to Ökuma previously, Ökuma had said that 
he agreed with its principles. Having now seen ökuma's 
memorial, he could not help being offended with Ökuma. 
Ito sent a letter of resignation to Iwakura on the 2nd
36. Ötsu. DNHKSS.2.p.421-31.
37. ibid, p.432.
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of July,1881; but Iwakura managed to effect a recon­
ciliation between him and Ökuma. The memorial was with- 
drawn, and Ito resumed his duties on July 8th. J ' But 
Ito was shortly to seize his opportunity to cast his 
weight against Ökuma in the question of the sale of the 
Colonisation Department assets.
In 1880, the government had a reserve fund of only 
¥8 million in specie against ¥160 million of paper notes 
which changed hands at half their face value in silver. 
The issue of large sums of paper currency during the
Satsuma rebellion had caused an inflationary movement
♦
all the more embarrassing to the government since the 
land tax had recently been reformed and taxes were now 
paid in money instead of grain. When ökuma’s proposal 
to finance the redemption of the paper currency by a 
loan of ¥50 million from abroad was rejected, the govern­
ment was committed to a policy of strict retrenchment and 
deflation in which the sale of its non-strategic enter­
prises played a major part. On November 5th,1880, the 
government ordered the Executive Departments to sell all 
government enterprises under their jurisdiction to 
private buyers, with the exception of railways, tele­
graphs, dockyards and arsenals.
The sale which attracted most attention was that
58. Otsu. DNHKSS• 2. p.432-3
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of the enterprises of the Colonisation Department, which 
had received some ¥1-4- million since the Restoration for 
the development of Hokkaido. On the 21st of July,1881, 
Kuroda as Junior Councillor and ^ead of the Colonisation 
Department forwarded a petition of four Secretaries of 
the Department, who asked to be allowed to form a company 
to take over the enterprises of the Department if they 
were to be sold. In forwarding the petition, Kuroda 
urged that it should be accepted, since its authors had 
spent 10 years in loyal service to the Department and 
being well acqainted with the conditions of Hokkaido 
would not abandon works that had been undertaken at great 
expense. Although as government officials they had 
insufficient funds, they were yet superior to those who 
though monied were ignorant of the conditions of Hokkaido 
and likely to sustain great losses. In conjunction with 
Godai Tomoatsu of Satsuma and Nakano Goichi of Choshu , 
they proposed to undertake the Colonisation Department 
enterprises in Hokkaido in a company called the Kansai 
Boeki Shosha for the sum of ¥300,000 repayable without 
interest over 30 years.
But immediately protests were raised within the 
government. Sano Tsunetami, the Head of the Finance 
Department, proposed that the sale should be postponed
39. Otsu. DWHKSS. 2. p.4-35-4-1
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for ten years; Arisugawa as Vice-President in the Council,
Sasaki, Kawada and Nakamura in the Genrö-In and Torio,
Miura, Tani and Soga in the Army were also strongly
opposed to the sale.^^ Kuroda was infuriated at the
opposition to the sale, and pressed Sanjo for a decision
with great vehemence. The sale was finally approved on
the 2nd of August, hut soon the newspapers got wind of
the clash of opinion within the government and began to
('41')criticise the sale severely. J
Okurna earlier in the year had refused Godai Tomoatsu 
a loan of ¥500,000 , and had thus incurred the enmity 
of this powerful representative of Satsuma commercial 
influence and a major partner in the company which wished 
to purchase the Colonisation Department enterprises•
Okurna also opposed the sale, and Kuroda seems to have 
singled him out as the leader of the opposition. In an 
attempt to mitigate the antipathy between them, they 
were both ordered to attend the Emperor on his tour to 
the Northern provinces on the 29th of July,1881.(^3)
While Kuroda and Okurna were both absent from the 
capital, protests against the sale continued to be made 
both within the government and outside. Opposition from 
within the government centred on a group of men who
40. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.441ff.
41. Shimbun Shusei Meiji Hennenshi. 4. p.423ff.
42. Oguri. Ryukei Yano Fumio Kun Nen. p.163-4.
43. Hirota. Naikaku Kötetsu Gojünen Shi. p.214.
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were equally opposed to the predominance of Satsuma and 
Chöshü in the government, and to the demands of the 
political parties for the speedy erection of an Assembly. 
They therefore began to press for the suspension of the 
Colonisation Department sale on the one hand, and for 
the dismissal of Okuma and his followers from the govern­
ment on the other.
Sasaki and Hijikata, ex-instructors of the Emperor, 
were still opposed to the dominance of the government 
by the Junior Councillors. They regarded the sale as 
an example of the way in which the Emperor’s government 
could be exposed to popular odium by the arbitrary de­
cision of the Council in response to the personal interest 
of one of its members. They were joined in opposition 
by a group of Army Major Generals who had for some time 
been highly critical both of the policies of Yamagata 
and of the virtual monopoly of the highest Army posts 
by Satsuma and Choshu men of his following.
Tani Kanjo disliked the formation of the Army on 
the Prussian model by Yamagata. In March,1881 he 
threatened to resign when the Governor of Nagasaki, who 
was a Choshu man, was not dismissed in spite of his 
admitted negligence in handling the remains of the 
soldiers who had died in the Taiwan expedition.
44. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.493-98.
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In May,1881 Tani complained to Sanjo, Iwakura and
Arisugawa about unfairness in the retention of commissions
after the Satsuma rebellion, and again in August about
( 4 5 ' )unfairness in the allotment of the new kun rank. '  '
Miura Gorö, although a Choshü man, had nursed a marked
dislike for Yamagata whom he regarded as responsible for
failing to ensure that the Choshü troops under his
command received their pensions after the Restoration 
(46 )campaign. J Miura had been a close friend of Kido, 
and had shared his complaints against the dominance of 
the government by a handful of Satsuma and Choshü men.
In 1881, Miura like Tani was demanding a reform in the 
system of Army promotions to check the monopoly of 
Satsuma and Choshü in the key positions. Torj_0
Koyata of Choshü was another follower of Kido who was 
in ill-accord with the Yamagata regime in the Army.
Both Torio and Miura had tendered their resignations at 
the time of the Taiwan expedition in support of Kido, 
and had returned to the government with him in 1875 sis 
members of the Genro-In.
On the other hand, these three Major Generals had 
little sympathy with the political party opposition to 
the government. Although a Tosa man, Tani had a long-
45. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.499-501
46. Kanju Shogun Kaikoroku. p.92.
47. ibid. p.175, p.185.
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-('48')Standing feud with Itagaki and Goto^ J and he advocated
(iiQ)gradual rather than rapid constitutional progress.
Miura and Torio as followers of Kido thought likewise.
On the 12th of September,1881,Tani, Miura, Torio 
and Soga, another Major General in sympathy with them, 
jointly signed a memorial to the Emperor and presented 
it to Arisugawa.(50) declared that if the Legis­
lative, Executive and Judicial powers were all combined 
in the Council, the government would be an Imperial 
government in name only and the suspicions of the people 
justly aroused. They therefore advocated that the Legis­
lative power should be given to the Genrö-In which should 
discuss laws in the presence of the Emperor, who would 
ratify its decisions and send them to the Council to be 
effected. They also requested that an Assembly for the 
Establishment of the Constitution(Kokken Soritsu Gikai) 
should be opened in the Genro-In; by special order, 
several members of the Assemblies of each Fu and Ken 
should be summoned to participate in this Assembly in 
order to determine the Constitution, establishing a 
lasting foundation for the country and regaining the 
confidence of the people. The memorial ended by saying 
that the sale of the Colonisation Department assets, 
although a small matter, had caused great discontent
48. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjo Den. p.328-9.
49. ibid, p.505.50. ibid, p.502-4.
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among the people; it should be speedily reconsidered and
a just and impartial settlement made.
At the same time, a copy was sent to Sanjo, and
Tani spoke to him of the impropriety of government by
- - ('si')a Satsuma and Ghoshu clique.w  ' On the other hand,
Tani refused the overtures of Itagaki and his followers
to co-operate with them in denouncing the government.
While the memorial of the four Major Generals was
still being pondered, Kaneko Kentarö, a Secretary of the
Genro-In,visited Sasaki on the 24th of September to ask
('52')him his opinion of the Colonisation Department sale. 
Sasaki told him that he was opposed to it, and very 
anxious about the present situation. Kaneko thereupon 
told Sasaki that he had recently become associated with 
a group consisting of Iwasaki Kojiro, the Chief of the 
Banking Bureau in the Finance Department, Miyoshi Taizö, 
a Chief Secretary of the Justice Department, Shimada 
Saburö and Tanaka Kozo, Secretaries of the Education 
Department and three or four others. B.e claimed that 
Ishibashi Shigetomo and Nakajima Seiyü, two Secretaries 
of the Finance Department and members of Okuma’s follow­
ing, had told him that an opportunity had arisen to break 
the monopoly of Satsuma and Choshü in the government and 
to form a new alliance of Hizen and Saga men. But since
51. Hirao. Shishaku Tani Kanjö Den. p.504.
52. Tsuda. Meiji Sei jö to omi lakayuki. p.510-13.
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Saga had too little influence, it was planned to unite 
their sympathisers in all districts. An alliance was 
to be made with Itagaki to gain the support of Tosa, and 
Yano Fumio and Ono Asuza were to gain adherents in Kyushu. 
Iwasaki Yataro of Mitsubishi was to provide funds, and 
Fukuzawa Yukichi to provide newspaper support with the 
Hochi Shimbun. Kaneko said that he and his associates 
had been asked for support, but had refused. They pre­
ferred to remain neutral, and held that both the sale 
of the Colonisation Department assets and the actions of 
Ökuma were improper, but that if anything the greater 
evil was on the side of ökuma.
On the same day, Fujita Ichiro called to tell Sasaki 
that Soejima had joined ökuma in reviling Kuroda, and 
that Kawano also seemed to be friendly with Okurna.
On the 25th of Septemher, Tani called on Sasaki to 
say that he had heard from Miyoshi and Iwasaki that 
Kaneko had called on him the previous day and that they 
had agreed to send a memorial to Arisugawa; Tani wished 
to sign it too. Kaneko called again on the 26th of 
September to report that Kawano had finally joined Ökuma, 
and spoke of a proposed alliance between Ökuma and 
Itagaki on the mediation of Fukuzawa. On the same day, 
Sasaki met Itö and Yamada, who were no doubt informed of 
these allegations. While Sasaki and Tani were opposed to
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the sale of the Colonisation Department assets, the 
allegation that Okuma was attempting to make political 
capital out of the sale and proposed to form an alliance 
with the political party opposition thus seems to have 
originated from Kaneko and a group of fellow secretaries. 
Thereafter the suspension of the sale became linked with 
the dismissal of Okuma in the programme which Sasaki and 
Tani advocated.
On the 28th of September,1881,Sasaki attended a 
meeting in Tani1s residence which resolved that the sale 
of the Colonisation Department assets was a mistake; but 
that it would also be a mistake to open an Assembly under 
pressure from the popular rights m o v e m e n t . A  joint 
memorial to this effect addressed to Arisugawa was signed 
by the 16 persons present, including Tani as an Army 
Major General, Sasaki as Vice-Chairman of the Genro-In. 
Kawada, Nakamura and Yasuba as members of the Genro-In, 
and a group of Genro-In and Department secretaries headed 
by Kaneko. Higashikuze as member of the Genro-In , 
Hijikata as Vice-^ead of the Home Department and Yamada 
Nobumichi as a Ken Governor were due to attend the 
meeting but could not do so owing to official business. 
Their memorial advocated that the structure of the govern­
ment should be revised and plans for the establishment
53* Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.514.
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of constitutional government drawn up. It is noticeable
that none of the participants in the memorial were men
of Satsuraa, Choshü or Hizen.
On the following day, Sasaki spoke with Hijikata
on the formation of a Neutral Party(ChüritsuTo); and
on the 1st of October Sasaki met with his followers in
the Genrö-In, deciding to explain the object of their
party to the President and Vice-Presidents as soon as
possible after the return of the Emperor from his tour
and to demand a speedy reform of the Council. Kaneko
called on Sasaki once more to retail a rather far-fetched
story of the plans of Fukuzawa and Iwasaki to subsidise
('crZl')members in a future Assembly.w  y
Meanwhile, important moves were being plotted in
the Council. When Ito first saw Okurna’s memorial on
the Constitution, he seems to have believed that it had
been composed by Fukuzawa. In fact, it was composed by
Yano Furnio who had been a pupil of Fukuzawa. Ökuma
denied any special connection with Fukuzawa, and
Fukuzawa’s letters show that he was equally in touch with 
- fSS')Inoue and Ito at this time. Fukuzawa himself has
left an account of a meeting with Ito and Inoue in 
Okurna’s residence in late December,1880, at which they 
all agreed on plans for a future Assembly.(56) yano
54. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.515-6.
55. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.138-43.
56. ’Ötsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.553-5.
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Fumio who was resting in Öita Ken at the time of the 
decision to sell the assets of the Colonisation Depart­
ment was astonished when he returned to the capital to 
be told by Sano that it was being said in the Council 
that he had gone to Kyushu to stir up popular excitement 
in aid of Ökuma's plans to overthrow the government. He 
notes that in Sasaki's diary a conversation with Ito is 
recorded on the 29th of August, in which allegations 
were made that Ökuma intended to link up with the popular 
rights movement in alliance with Fukuzawa and Mitsubishi, 
and that he, Yano, had gone to Kyushu to spy out con­
ditions. '
Yano suggests that Ökuma was telling the truth when 
he told Iwakura that his intentions for the Constitution 
were basically the same as Itö's ; but that Itö was 
embarrassed by the premature leakage of their plans and 
felt bound to repudiate Ökuma.(^8)
Whatever Ito's motives may have been, his actions 
in this crisis were directed towards the suspension of 
the Colonisation Department sale, and _to the expulsion 
of Ökuma from the government. Whether he genuinely 
believed that Okuma was plotting to overthrow the govern­
ment in alliance with Itagaki, Fukuzawa and Iwasaki, or 
whether he sacrificed Okumaa to appease Kuroda and preserve
57. Oguri. Hyukei Yano Fumio &un Den. p.178-9.
58. ibid. p.185-4.
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the Satsuma and Chöshü alliance is open to conjecture.
On the 6th of September,1881 Sanjö reported to 
Iwakura,who was recuperating from illness in Kyoto, that 
Itö, Inoue, Yamagata, Yamada and Saigo were pressing 
charges against Ökuma. He urged Iwakura to return to
(59')the capital to avert a possible split in the Council.
On the 18th of September, Yamada in disguise called on 
Iwakura to repeat the charges against ökuma. Iwakura 
promised to return to the capital the day before the 
Emperor returned from tour, which was expected to be 
on the 10th of October. Iwakura would then make up his 
mind after conferring with Itö directly. On the 1st 
of October, Kawamura called on Iwakura to urge him to 
return to the capital since his support was necessary 
in the urgent task of drawing up a Constitution and 
forecasting a date for the opening of a National Assembly. 
He told Iwakura that he, Saigö and Oyarna were working 
on Kuroda for a settlement of the Colonisation Department 
problem; although Kuroda had not given them a clear 
answer, a peaceful settlement was in sight. Iwakura 
renewed his promise to return to the capital, and insisted 
that since Imperial orders had been given for the sale 
it should not be cancelled; instead Kuroda should be 
prevailed upon to withdraw his original petition.
59. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p. 448-4-52
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Iwakura left Kyoto for the capital with Kawamura on the 
4th of October,
On the 7th of October, Ito called on Iwakura after 
his arrival in the capital and showed him the draft of 
an Imperial edict announcing preparations for the estab­
lishment of a National Assembly, and draft regulations 
for the Council, the Genro-In and a new body to. be termed 
the Saneji-In. He asked Iwakura to have them speedily 
submitted to the Council, and reporting on ökuma1s recent 
conduct he demanded his dismissal from office, Saigö 
also called on Iwakura to support Ito's proposals,
Meanwhile, Kuroda had at last agreed to the suspen­
sion of the Colonisation Department sale in response to 
the persuasion of Saigö, Kawamura and Kabayama of his 
own Han.(^1) on the 9th of October, Sanjö, Itö, Saigö 
and Yamada met in Iwakura’s residence. It was agreed! 
that when the Emperor returned to the capital the Pres­
idents and Vice-Presidents should obtain Imperial orders 
for the dismissal of ökuma, an edict promising the 
establishment of a National Assembly, the promulgation 
of revised regulations for the Council and the Genro-In , 
and a swift decision on the Colonisation Department sale 
to pacify the people.
On the 11th of October, the evening of the return
60. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.4^2.
61. ibid, p.455-56.
62. ibid, p.456-58.
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of the Emperor to the capital, a Council meeting was 
held before him at which the Presidents, Vice-Presidents 
and Junior Councillors were all present with the sole 
exception of Ökuma. The Junior Councillors presented 
a joint proposal to the throne, advocating the appoint­
ment of mature nobles(Kizoku rosei) to the Genro-In and 
the placing of the Army and Navy under the direct command 
of the Emperor in order to establish a firm foundation 
for Imperial constitutional government. The Upper and 
Lower Houses of an Assembly were like two wheels; the 
Genro-In as the Upper House was to act as a balance to 
the Lower House, preventing the evil of precipitate 
change, preserving the permanence of the Constitution 
and assisting the Imperial House. Imperial princes over 
the age of 18 years were to be appointed to the Genro-In, 
and a Peerage established from which the most able mem­
bers would be appointed to the Genro-In by the Emperor 
for a fixed period of service. The samurai, as the 
educated class of the country, were also qualified! to 
be selected for service in the Genro-In and to be ranked 
with the nobles. Several samurai were to be elected 
in each Pu and Ken by public election to serve in the 
Genro-In for a period somewhat shorter than the nobles 
The Emperor accepted this proposal, and on the
63. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.458-462
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12th of October and Imperial edict was issued to announce 
the Emperor's intention to summon representatives of the 
people to a National Assembly to be opened in 1890. On 
the same day, the Colonisation Department was informed 
that the order to sell its assets was revoked.
During the Council meeting, the Junior Councillors 
had insisted on the dismissal of ökuma; but Arisugawa 
and Iwakura avoided the issue by insisting that the 
meeting was only to discuss the two questions of the 
Imperial edict and the Colonisation Department sale.
It was left to Ito and Saigo to call upon Ckuma to 
persuade him to resign.^5)
Faced by the united opposition of his fellow Junior 
Councillors, Okuma had little alternative. His resignation 
on the 12th of October,1881,was immediately followed by 
that of his followers. Yano, Ushiba, Inugai, Ozaki, 
Nakamigawa, Ono, Mutaguchi, Komatsubara, Nakano, Tanaka 
and Morishita all resigned from their posts as Secretaries 
in the Board of Statistics, the Board of Audit, and 
the Agriculture and Commerce, Foreign, Education and 
Finance Departments. On the 20th of October, Kawano 
Togama resigned his post as Head of the Agriculture and 
Commerce Department, and on the 8th of November,Maejima 
Mitsu resigned from his post as Postmaster General.
64. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.462-64.
65. ibid, p.486-7.
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The last word on the Colonisation Department sale came 
from Iwasaki, who called on Sasaki to complain that he 
had been unjustly suspected by the government and police­
men sent to spy on him* He denied any special connection 
with ökuma and accused Godai of inciting the Satsuma 
men against him* He had no designs upon the assets of 
the Colonisation Department, but rather approved of the 
sale since the persons concerned would be bound to fail 
and Mitsubishi would profit in the e n d ^ ^
On the resignation of Ökuma and his followers, a 
major reconstitution of the Council took place. On the 
21st of October,1881,a return was made to the old system 
of Junior Councillors acting in addition as Heads of the 
Executive Departments. The Council therefore consisted 
of Sanjo as President, Arisugawa and Iwakura as Vice- 
Presidents. Itö combined his post as Junior Councillor 
with a new post as Head of the Sanji-In. Yamagata with 
his post as Head of the General Staff Office. Inoue, 
Yamada, Matsukata, Oyarna, Kawamura, Fukuoka, Sasaki,
Oki, Saigo and Kuroda acted as Junior Councillors and 
Heads of the Foreign, Home, Finance, Army, Navy, Edu­
cation, Industry, Justice, Agriculture and Commerce, 
and Colonisation Departments. While the majority of 
posts were held by Satsuma and Choshü, Hizen was
66. Tsuda. Meiji Sei Jo to omi ‘Pakayuki. p. 54-8-9.
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represented by Öki, and Tosa by Sasaki and Fukuoka.
On the same day, the six Sections were abolished 
in the Council S e c r e t a r i a t a n d  a new institution 
called the San,ji-In was established. The San,ji-In
was to consist of a Chairman(Gicho), a Vice-Chairman 
(Fuku-Gicho), and an unspecified number of Members(Gikan) 
and Assistant Members(GikanHo). In addition, provision 
was made for an unspecified number of Outside Assistant 
Members(Ingai GikanHo) appointed as an additional post 
from the Secretaries of the Executive Departments. A 
number of the Assistant Members were to act as the 
Secretaries of the new body.
The regulations of the San,ji-In stated that it was 
to draft and scrutinise legal regulations(Höritsu Kisoku) 
under the orders of the Counci1(Naikaku). The Chairman 
ordered six of the members to act as Heads of the Sections 
(Bu) into which its business was divided. The assistant 
members were attached to these six Sections, in which 
they drew up draft proposals(Gian) and attended the 
deliberations of the San,ji-In to explain their purport.
The outside assistant members were appointed from among 
the Secretaries of the Executive Departments, and 
attended deliberations from time to time in connection 
with the affairs of their cheif posts.
67* HRZS. Dajbkan No.88 Tasshi.
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The business of the San.ji-In was defined under five 
headings. It drafted legal regulations either on its 
own proposals or in response to the orders of the Council, 
and presented its drafts to the Council with covering 
explanations. It examined drafts of legal regulations 
sent up from the Executive Departments for approval, and 
forwarded them to the Council with its opinions and 
amendments. It examined draft laws(Hoan) debated and 
determined in the Genro-In, and could either send an 
opinion to the Council and request it to order the Genro- 
In to reconsider the draft, or on the orders of the 
Council could send a committee to discuss the matter with 
the Genro-In. It gave its opinion on various documents 
sent to it by the Council that had been sent up for 
approval from the Executive Departments, government 
offices and the Fu and Ken. Finally, it examined the 
Annual Reports and other reports of the Executive Depart­
ments .
In addition, the Sanji-In adjudicated disputes of 
jurisdiction between the Executive and Judiciary, and 
disputes between local officials and local Assemblies 
over the laws or limits of jurisdiction. It also 
clarified doubtful points of law in response to the 
enquiries of the Executive Departments, government offices 
and the Fu and Ken. Members of the Sanji-In could be
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summoned before the Council to give their opinions upon 
specific questions, or ordered to attend the meetings 
of the Genrö-In as the Council Committee(Naikaku Iin) 
to explain draft proposals(Gian)• The business of the 
Sanji-In was divided into six Sections concerned with 
Foreign, Home, Military, Financial, Judicial and Legis­
lative Affairs on the lines of the previous division 
of business in the Council Secretariat,
It 6 was appointed Chairman of the new body, Tanaka 
Fujimaro the Vice-Chairman. Ten members were appointed 
who were all of Chokunin rank and thus equivalent to 
Heads and Vice-Heads of Executive Departments. Fukubane 
was appointed from the Genro-In, Yamaguchi from Head of 
the Board of Audit and member of the Genrö-In, Tsuruda 
from the Genro-In, Inoue Ki from Cheif Secretary of the 
Council of State, Yamao from Head of the Industry Depart­
ment, Mizumoto, Watanabe Noboru, Yasuba and Nakamura all 
from the Genro-In, Tanaka in addition to his commission 
as Lieutenant General and Hachisuka from a post as an 
executive of the Finance Department. By December, 1881^9  ^
18 assistant members had been appointed, with a clerical 
staff of 41 clerks.
On the erection of the San.ji-In to handle the Legis­
lative business of the Council, the other branches of
69. Kaninroku
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Council business were handled by the Council Secretariat 
(Dagokan), the Board of Audit(KaikeiKensaln) and the 
Board of Statistics(Tokeiln). On the 21st of October,
1881 Iwamura of Tosa was appointed Head of the Board 
of Audit from his post as member of the G-enro-In , and 
on the 21st of April,1882 Torio Koyata was appointed 
Head of the Board of Statistics, In December,1881 the 
Council Secretariat consisted of 3 Chief Secretaries, 4 
Lesser Secretaries and 48 Clerks; the Board of Audit of 
13 Auditors and Secretaries and 87 sub-Auditors and 
clerks; the Board of Statistics of 4 Secretaries and 
23 Clerks. (70)
On the 25th of October,1881 two Bureaux were set 
up in the Council Secretariat.^1  ^ The No.l Bureau(Daiichi 
Kyoku) examined documents concerning Foreign, Finance, 
Agriculture and Commerce, and Industry business; the 
No,2 Bureau(Daini Kyoku) examined documents concerned 
with Home, Education, Military and Judicial business.
The proceedure for handling business in these Bureaux 
was indicated on the 28th of October, 1881 They
received official documents from the Council Secretaries 
Bureau(Naikaku Shokikan Kyoku), attached their opinions 
(Koan) to them and sent them pp to the Council under
70, Kaninroku.
71, HKBRTZ.l. KSM.3. Dajokan/Naikaku.2. p.300.
72, ibid, p.300-1.
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the title of the Bureau for the scrutiny of the Presidents 
and Junior Councillors. The Presidents and Junior Council­
lors indicated whether these documents should be for­
warded to the San,ji-In, the Genro-In or the Board of 
Audit, or sent as enquiries(Kamon) to government offices. 
If so, they were returned to the Council Secretaries
Bureau for disposal. In December,1881 both these Bureaux
(73)were staffed by 3 Secretaries and 10 clerks.w
The return to the system whereby the Junior Council­
lors held additional posts as Heads of Executive Depart­
ments illustrates that the line between Council and 
Executive functions had still to be properly defined. One 
of the reasons for the previous attempt at division had 
been to avoid a state of affairs in which Councillors 
would not comment on the affairs of Departments headed
by fellow Councillors as if declining to poke their noses
(74)into another's business. J But the division in fact 
either resulted in the Head of the Department being over­
shadowed by a powerful Councillor as in the case of Sano 
and Ökuma, or led to acrimonious disputes within the 
Department which the Head lacked sufficient influence 
to resolve. Thus Kawano as Head of the Agriculture and
Commerce Department had been involved in disputes with
(73)his Vice-Head Shinagawa;'^' and Enomoto had resigned 
73* Kaninroku.
74. Yamazaki. Naikaku Seido no Kenkyü. p.64.
75. Hirota. Naikaku Kotetsu Gojunen Shi. p.222.
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from Head of the Navy Department after disputes over 
Naval Policy. ' The need was rather for the Junior 
Councillors to exchange Executive Departments more freely 
than for a division of functions, since the Departments 
still required a strong Head to keep them under control.
The erection of the Sanfji-In under the Chairmanship 
of Ito assisted by a team of talented high-officials from 
the Departments and the Genrö-In reinforced the principle 
of strong Council control over the Legislature. This 
body also exercised the Council prerogative of determining 
the respective boundaries of the Executive and Judiciary. 
The Council still determined what legal drafts should 
be submitted to the Genro-In; meanwhile the powers of 
Heads of Executive Departments to draft and issue legal 
regulations was still rather vague. In the regulations 
for the conduct of business in the Executive Departments 
issued on the 10th of November, 18 8 1 ^ ^  it was re-iterated 
that when Heads of Departments drafted legal regulations 
(Horitsu Kisoku) for the business in their charge or when 
they proposed abolitions or revisions of the existing 
regulations, the Head was to report the draft(An) to the 
throne and await the Imperial decision. When legal 
regulations were promulgated, the Head of the Department 
concerned was to countersign them and bore the
76. Vid. Japan Weekly Mail, April 9th,30th 1881.
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responsibility for putting them into effect. When such 
legal regulations concerned the business of two or more 
Departments, the Heads concerned jointly countersigned 
them. Heads of Departments were empowered to issue 
instructions and admonitions to the officials under their 
charge. On the same day, the division of business
between and within the Departments was ordered to be as 
before. Yamagata had sent in a memorial pointing out
the need for definition in the scope of the Departments, 
but had suggested that for the momen t the current regu­
lations should be maintained until future investigations 
were complete.
The division of legislation into clear categories 
of laws issued by the Council, laws issued with the 
consent of the Genro-In and legal regulations issued by 
the Executive Departments had still to be made before 
the Council, National Assembly and Executive Departments 
could function as distinct entities under a written 
Constitution.
On the 1st of November,1881 Sasaki spoke with 
Mabsukata about the mutual reserve of the Junior Council­
lors in Council meetings, which he hoped to reform by 
getting them to discuss matters freely and openly. Pre­
viously the Junior Councillors had each pressed their
78. HRZS. Dajbkan No.94 Tasshi, clauses 3,4,5* 79* HRZS. Dajokan No.§5 Tasshi.
80. HKBRTZ.1. KSM.l. KSS. p.69*
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own opinions on the President and Vice-Presidents, but 
Sasaki hoped that henceforth matters would be freely 
discussed among the Junior Councillors and then sent to 
the Presidents for report to the Emperor. Matsukata 
agreed^, but warned Sasaki that Kuroda had a suspicious 
nature£^*0 Qn the 4th of November, Sasaki met Ito and 
Matsukata to discuss government finance; Sasaki urged 
that each Department should submit its estimates at the 
end of each year to be fully debated in the Council to 
ensure a fair division of government funds and to cut 
down waste. The tensions which had existed within
the Council chamber since the Restoration were clearly 
still much alive.
Since the cancellation of the Colonisation Department 
sale, Kuroda in discontent had refused to attend to 
business. Iwakura, Sanjo and the Satsuma Councillors 
remonstrated with him, but he would still not respond.
Ito suggested that Kuroda should be offered the post 
of Head of a new Communications- Department on the coming 
abolition of the Colonisation Department. But when 
he learned that Kuroda would be unlikely to accept, Ito 
then proposed that he himself should transfer to the 
Genro-In, that Yamada should succeed him as Chairman of 
the Sanzi-In and that Kuroda should be appointed Head
81. Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.555.
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of the Home Department. But it was objected, that if 
Kuroda was appointed to this post, a split would develop 
within the Department. Kawamura then suggested that a 
General Staff Office should be set up in the Navy of 
which he himself should be Head, and that Kuroda should 
be appointed Head of the Navy Department. But Saigo 
and Yamagata opposed this on the grounds that there was 
no such body in Foreign countries. Ito then suggested 
that the abolition of the Colonisation Department could 
be postponed, but Yamagata threatened to resign if this 
was done. Finally, after getting the agreement of the 
Satsuma Councillors to follow the ruling of the Council, 
it was resolved that Kuroda should be allowed to resign. 
Accordingly, on the 11th of January,1882 Kuroda left his 
posts as Junior Councillor and Head of the Colonisation 
Department, and was appointed to the retired post of 
Council Adviser(Naikaku Komon).^^
It is an interesting parallel that Kido had held 
this post from his resignation in 1876 until his death 
the following year. On the death of Ökubo, Kuroda was 
the senior Satsuma Councillor and might have expected 
to succeed him as the leader of the Council. But Ito’s 
recent triumph over Ökuma was also a triumph over Kuroda, 
for he had been forced to agree to the suspension of the
83* Tsuda. Meiji SeiJo to omi Takayuki. p.557-60.
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Colonisation Department sale. Just as Kido’s illnesses 
and petulance drew his Choshu followers towards ökubo, 
so the drunkeness of Kuroda turned his Satsuma followers 
increasingly towards Ito, whose fairness and conciliation 
made it easy for them to do so. And just as Kido found 
it impossible to work with Ökubo in such a situation, so 
Kuroda could not reconcile himself to being out-shone 
by Ito. With the dismissal of Ökuma and the retirement 
of Kuroda, Ito's star was perceptibly rising. It was 
soon to reach its zenith as his talent as a drafter of 
legislation marked him out as the man to direct Japan 
into the new era of constitutional government.
In a conversation with Sasaki on the 16th of November 
1881 Ito insisted that the creation of a peerage system, 
was a necessary step in the process of transforming the 
Genro-In into the Upper House of a National Assembly. Ito 
was particularly insistent that samurai and commoners of 
merit should be ennobled. When Sasaki spoke of this 
to Sanjo and Iwakura, they were very anxious that the 
present nobles would resent titles being given to samurai 
and commoners, and felt that since most of the men of 
metit who could expect to be elevated were from Satsuma, 
Choshu, Tosa and Hizen, the samurai of the country as a 
whole would share their resentment. In order to pacify 
the samurai, the Council therefore determined on the 12th
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of December,1881 to spend ¥800,000 per annum for the next 
seven years on schemes for the relief of needy samurai
The next step was to determine who should draft the 
Constitution. On the 6th of July,1881,Iwakura in a letter 
to Sapjö and Arisugawa suggested three methods by which 
the Constitution could be drawn up. A committee
could be set up to draft a Constitution openly; or a 
Bureau could be set up in the Imperial Palace under one 
of the Presidents to draft a Constitution secretly; or 
three or four men from among the Presidents and the Junior 
Councillors could be secretly appointed by the Emperor 
to draft a Constitution to be put before the Council when 
complete.
On the 23rd of January,1882,Inoue invited Sasaki, 
Fukuoka and Öki, the three Junior Councillors who were 
not from Satsuma or Choshu, to his residence and asked 
their support for the dispatch of Ito to Europe for 
one year to study constitutions. On Ito’s return, all 
matters concerning the Constitution would then be deter­
mined. Inoue told them that Iwakura had already agreed 
to this, and that Sanjö, Arisugawa, Yamagata, Saigö and 
Öyama also approved. Inoue also mentioned that Ito had 
recently been suffering from nervous exhaustion and had 
to drink heavily to be able to sleep at night, and so
84. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.560-66.
85. Iwakura Kö Jikki. 3. p.715.
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the trip to Europe might benefit his health. Öki suggest­
ed that Arisugawa should be sent with him; Sasaki agreed 
but pointed out the need to avoid a repetition of the 
Iwakura Embassy troubles. '
On the 5th of February,1882} Sasaki and Öki called 
on Iwakura to urge that the Constitution should be based 
upon the Imperial Household, and not simply upon the 
model of Germany. In the Constitution, the Executive 
and Legislature should be clearly separated. It should 
also be an opportunity to sweep away government by the 
Satsuma and Choshü clique; if Satsuma and Choshü still 
held the governing power after the opening of the Assembly 
it would cause great damage to the country. Iwakura 
agreed, and suggested that the problem might be solved 
if an Advisory Bureau(KomonKyoku) were set up in the 
Palace Department to which the Satsuma and Choshü Junior 
Councillors could be appointed as an honorific post while 
retaining their Councillor rank. However, Iwakura said 
that the expense of this would amount to about ¥300,000 
which would be difficult to obtain in the present state 
of government finance
On the 11th of February, Sasaki called on Itö to 
discuss the Council. Ito agreed that the influence of 
Satsuma and Choshü ought to be cut down, but thought it
86. Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi I'akayuki. p.567-69.
87. ibid, p.569-70.
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hard to effect. Sasaki urged that the influence of the 
Genrö-In should be increased to prevent the preponderance 
(Hencho) of the Council. Ito replied that on his return 
to Japan on the following year, he would create a new 
peerage system and reform the Genro-In^8^
On the basis of a report to the Emperor by the 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents on the 24th of February, 
1882,it was resolved to send Ito overseas to study 
constitutions; the other Junior Councillors were enjoined 
to labour in their respective charges for the improvement 
of the administration in mutual understanding and re­
solve. On the 25th of February, on receipt of Imp­
erial orders to visit Europe, Ito resigned his additional 
post as Chairman of the Sanji-In. On the 27th, Yamagata 
replaced him in this post. Ito left Japan on the 14th 
of March,1882; he was accompanied by Ito Miyoji who had 
worked under him in the San,ji-In. Hirata Tösuke of the 
Finance Department put up by Yamagata, Kawajima of Satsuma 
from the same Department, Yamazaki the Chief Secretary of 
the Council Secretariat, Miyoshi of the Justice Depart­
ment put up by Inoue, Yoshida of Tosa from the Foreign 
Department, and Saionji of the Palace Department.^°)
These men were all Secretaries of talent, and among them
88. Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.570.
89. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.738-742.
90. Osatake. Nihon Kenseishi Taiko. 2. p.671.
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most Departments and most interests were represented. 
Meanwhile, the numbers of the Genro-In members 
were increasing steadily; from 29 in 1880, to 35 in 1881, 
to 40 in 1882. But as has been seen, the Council rejected 
the Genro-In draft Constitution, anch the Bureau for the 
Investigation of the Constitution(Kokken Torishirabe 
Kyoku) within the Genro-In was closed on the 23rd of 
March,1881. The new Sanji-In had also eaten into the 
Jurisdiction of the Genro-In as the organ for the consid­
eration of legislation. Opinion in the Genro-In was
(91)naturally disturbed at these developments. ' During 
Ito's absence, it became necessary for the Council to 
issue a notification to the Genro-In on the subject of 
its legislative powers. On the 28th of June,1883,the 
Genro-In was informed that although all Laws(Höritsu) 
must necessarily be submitted to its debate and decision, 
yet some matters promulgated by the government were not 
submitted to the Genro-In since all promulgations(Fukoku) 
were not necessarily laws(Horitsu). Such matters were 
not submitted to the Genro-In because although they were 
of great importance and were promulgated to the people, 
their character was annexed to the jurisdiction of the 
Executive(Gyosei no Kdn) rather than to the Legislature 
(Rippo). Henceforth, promulgations(Fukoku) concerned
91. Osatake. Nihon Kenseishi Taiko. 2. p.666-67.
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with war and peace, treaties, the establishment and 
abolition of Executive Departments and the granting of 
ranks and titles(Kunshaku) which are within the scope 
of the Executive were not to be submitted to the Genrö- 
la.(92)
On the same day, Yamagata as Chairman of the Sanji- 
In sent a note to the Vice-Chairman of the Genro-In 
providing for his reference an investigation made in 
1879 hy the Council Secretariat on the subject of class- 
ifying the promulgations of the g o v e r n m e n t T h e  
Council Secretariat noted that laws concerning the govern­
ment and the people such as taxation and conscription 
laws, legal codes, laws concerning the rights, private 
affairs and occupations of the people, the national debt 
and boundaries are in the constitutions of all countries 
sanctioned by the Legislature. But declarations of war 
and peace, treaties, the establishment and abolition of 
government offices, the grant of honours and other matters 
are reserved to the jurisdiction of Executive officials 
and are not submitted to the Legislature.
Ito returned from Europe on the 4th of August,1883.
He did not resume his post as Chairman of the Sanji-In. 
but was appointed Head of the Official System Investig­
ations Bureau(Seido Torishirabe Kyoku) on the 17th of
92. HKBRTZ.1.KSM.17.KS. Genro-In. p.87-8.
93. ibid, p.88-9.
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March,1884, This was a new Bureau set up in the Palace 
Department, of which Ito was next appointed Head on the 
21st of March, But Ito retained his control over the 
drafting of the most important branches of government 
legislation. For on the 24th of March, instructions 
were issued that drafts for the establishment or revision 
of laws(Horitsu) sent up to the Council for approval 
by the Executive Departments should be inspected by the 
Junior Councillors chiefly concerned and sent for exam­
ination in the Official System Investigation Bureau. They 
were then to be submitted to the debate and decision of 
the Santji-In, and after general discussion in the Council 
they were put before thee: Emperor for approval. They were 
next submitted to the Genro-In% and after being discussed 
for a second time in the Council, they were sent up to 
the throne for permission to be put into effect. On the 
same day, the. San,ji-In was informed that all documents 
concerning legal regulations(Horitsu Kisoku) and changes 
in the official system(Shokusei; Seido) were to be for­
warded to the Official System Investigations Bureau in 
the Palace Department•(^4)
The new Bureau was thus specifically concerned with 
legal regulations relating to the official system. In it, 
Ito assisted chiefly by Inoue Ki and Ito Miyoji drew up
94. HKBRTZ.l.KSM.3* Dajokan/Naikaku.2. p.301-2
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the plans for the new Council system of 1885, and the 
draft of the Constitution of 1889*
While there was still little sign of independent 
legislative activity by the Genro-In, the Sanfji-In 
attached to the Council continued to grow. In October, 
1884 it consisted of one Chairman, 1? members(Gikan),
52 assistant members(Gikan Ho), 26 outside assistant 
members(Ingai Gikan Ho), 9 Secretaries and 77 clerks.
The next step towards the creation of an Upper House 
was the Peerage Law of the 7th of July,1884. Fives 
grades of nobility were created, and appointments made 
for 11 Princes(Koshaku), 24 Marquises(Koshaku), 76 Counts 
(Hakushaku), 3^4 Viscounts(Shishaku) and 74- Barons 
(Danshaku). In accordance with Ito's plans, the new 
system broke the old distinction between the Court nobles 
and Daimyo(Kazoku) and the samurai and commoners who had 
held important positions in the government. The descend­
ants of Kido and Ökubo were granted the rank of Marquis; 
present and past Junior Councillors were in general given 
the rank of Count; distinguished soldiers, sailors and 
executives ranking as Viscounts. These titles were to 
be hereditary in the direct male line, and bonds were 
given from the property of the Imperial Household to 
samurai and commoners with insufficient property to
95* Kaninroku. October 2nd, 1884.
maintain their position* In the case of Counts, the 
sum was ¥35,000 on which they received interest on the 
directions of the Head of the Palace Department.
The Court nobles who had shared in the restored 
fortunes of the Emperor, and the Daimyo who had been 
generously pensioned on the abolition of the Han in 1871 
were thus joined by the government samurai; together 
they formed a conservative bloc closely attached to the 
government by ties of interest from which to create the 
Upper House of a future National Assembly.
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CHAPTER 5«
COUNCIL AND CONSTITUTION. 1885-1890*
Having raised the government samurai to the peerage, 
Ito next faced the delicate task of raising a Junior 
Councillor to the Presidency as an essential step towards 
replacing the old Council of State by a modern Cabinet 
system. Iwakura had died on the 20th of July,1883, thus 
leaving Sanjo as President and Arisugawa as the sole 
Vice-President. It was clear that they would eventually 
have to be superseded, but there was considerable re­
luctance among the Junior Councillors for the unenviable 
task of doing so. Even ökubo had refused a Presidential 
post •
Ito approached the problem by suggesting that Kuroda 
should be appointed to the post of Vice-President(Udaijin) 
left vacant after the death of Iwakura. Since his resig­
nation in 1882, Kuroda had remained in the retired post 
of Council Adviser(Naikaku Komon) and had kept aloof 
from government affairs. If Ito could persuade him to 
accept a post as Vice-President, Satsuma would be con­
ciliated and the way opened for a Junior Councillor to 
assume the Presidency of the future Cabinet.
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In November,1885 Itö therefore conferred with Sanjo 
to get Kuroda to accept the post, and in an interview 
with the Emperor also recommended that Kuroda be appointed. 
The Emperor replied that if the appointment of a Vice- 
President was necessary, Ito himself should assume the 
post. The Emperor feared that if Kuroda was made Vice- 
President while the real power remained with Ito, a 
situation might arise like that of the time when Shimazu 
was appointed Vice-President. The Emperor doubted if 
Kuroda had the wisdom and popularity to assume the post, 
but declared that he would appoint Kuroda if Sanjo and 
Ito pressed him, to do so.^^
Ito got Sanjo to persuade Kuroda to accept the post, 
which Kuroda did in a letter to Sanjö on the 20th of 
November,1885* But the following day, Kuroda suddenly 
refused the appointment as if aware that he w^s being 
picked as Ito's watch-dog, and perhaps because he was 
av/are of opposition to him in influential Court circles. 
When Kuroda's refusal became known, a Council meeting 
was held on the 24th of November. The general view was 
that Ito should be appointed Vice-President, but Ito 
himself would not accept. When Sanjo reported this to 
the Emperor, the Emperor suggested that the question of 
a Vice-President should be put aside, and that the
i. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.165-66
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(p)reform of the Council should proceed.v '
On the 3rd of December,1885,Sanjo spoke to Sasaki 
of his opposition to the appointment of Kuroda which he 
declared had earned him the dislike of Ito and the 
majority of the Satsuma Junior Councillors. He told 
Sasaki that he intended to retire from his post as 
President in the coming reform of the Council. Sasaki 
spoke of the low moral standing of the Junior Councillors 
in the eyes of the nation, and felt that a man promoted 
to a Presidential post from among the samurai would have 
no moral influence, especially Kuroda whose drunkeness 
disgusted the whole realm. Sanjö also told Sasaki that 
Ito had attempted to put up öki as Vice-President before 
turning to Kuroda, which they regarded as an attempt by 
the Choshu Junior Councillors to open the way for their 
assumption of power by the use of these men as a front. 
Sasaki then called on Ito, who spoke of his concern at 
appearing to demote San$o who although feeble had great 
moral influence and a distinguished family name and 
official re£ord^^
By this time, Ito's plans for the reform of the 
Council ware complete. When the question was raised of 
who should be the President(Naikaku Sori Dai jin) of the 
new Council, Sanjo declined of his own accord and
2. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.167-68.
3* Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.63P-35*
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suggested Ito. The Emperor approved, Ito then called 
a meeting of the Junior Councillors and Kuroda to discuss 
the new system in Sanyo’s residence. All the Junior 
Councillors attended, but Kuroda refused and in a drunken 
state abused Ito's messenger. On the 8th of December, 
Inoue called on Kuroda to remonstrate with him, but was 
drunkenly abused and threatened with a pistol. Finally, 
Sanjö attempted to get Kuroda to attend, but Kuroda per­
sisted in his refusal to do so and Itö decided to form 
a Cabinet without Kuroda*s assistance. But still anxious 
about the effect of excluding Kuroda on the Satsuma men, 
Ito proposed Kuroda as Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce. The Emperor agreed to this proposal on the 
12th of December; but on the following day Kuroda an­
nounced his intention of resigning his posts as Council 
Adviser and Major General on a plea of illness. Kuroda's 
sulking at this juncture was decisive in drawing his 
Satsuma followers towards Ito and did much to make his 
coming assumption of the Presidency a success.
On the 22nd of December,1885, Sanjo presented a 
petition to the Emperor asking to be relieved of his 
post as President, and for a new Council(Naikaku) to 
replace the old Council of State(Dajokan). He stated 
that in the previous syst em, the Executive Departments
4-. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.168-171
208
had sent administrative orders(Shirei) to the Council, 
which sent back notice of their adoption and ordered 
the Departments to put them into effect. Thus all 
official documents had to pass through the Council, to 
which the Departments stood in much the same relation 
as trie Bureaux within a Department stood towards the 
Department itself. This was a makeshift arrangement 
which was not only unable to maintain uniformity in the 
government, but in lightening the responsibilities of 
Heads of Departments led to the evil of obstruction in 
handling business. The Emperor had now reached an age 
of discretion and was able to grasp the reins of govern­
ment, attending the Council and summoning Ministers for 
advice on civil and military affairs. In the face of 
pressing affairs both domestic and foreign, and with the 
need to strengthen the official system and to exercise 
strict economy in government finance, it was now time 
for a change. The system, whereby a Council of State was 
set up over the Executive Departments should be replaced 
by a Council in which Ministers should meet before the 
Emperor to handle all matters of state expeditiously.
The Ministers should attend the Council to assent to 
matters of government, and return to apply them in their 
respective Departments, thus acting as the hands, feet, 
ears and eyes of the Emperor. But one Minister should
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be chosen to apply himself especially to both foreign 
and domestic business, and to advise the -^mperor with 
the special aim of preserving the balance and unity of 
all the Departments, It was in this principle that 
the ancient system of direct government by Imperial 
decision had consisted, and this was the principle of 
the Constitution.^^
On the same day, December 22nd,1885, the old offices 
of President, Vice-President, Junior Councillors and 
Heads of Departments were abolished; and a President 
(NaikakuSoriDaijin) and Ministers(Daijin) of the Palace, 
Foreign, Home, Finance, Army, Navy, Justice, Education, 
Agriculture and Commerce and Communications Departments 
were set up. ^  ^ The President and Ministers, with the 
exception of the Minister of the Palace Department, 
corporately formed the Counci1(Naikaku). On the same 
day, a new office of Household Minister(NaiDaijin) was 
established to keep the Imperial seal and the Seal of 
State, to be the Personal Adviser(Jotai Hohitsu) of the 
Emperor and to preside over the Assembly of the Palace 
Advisers(Kyüchü Komon). Up to 15 men of Chokunin rank 
were to be appointed Palace Advisers, for consultation 
and advice on Court ceremonies
The new Council consisted of ^to as President, and
5. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.809-10.
6. HRZS. Dajokan No.69 lasshi.
7. HRZS. Dajokan No.68 Tasshi.
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Inoue, Yamagata, Matsukata, Öyama, Saigö, Yamada, Mori, 
Tani and Enomoto as Ministers of the Foreign, Home, 
Finance, Army, Navy, Justice, Education , Agriculture 
and Commerce, and Communications Departments respectively. 
Itö remained Head of the Palace Department; San jo was 
appointed Household Minister(NaiDaijin), and Kawamura, 
Fukuoka, Sasaki, Terashima, Sano and Yamao were appointed 
Palace Advisers (Kyuchii Komon).
The functions of the Council were defined as follows.
1. The President at the head of the Ministers reports all 
matters to the Emperor, and in response to his wishes 
directs the policy of the government, exercising a 
general supervision over all branches of the administra­
tion.
2. The President in considering their conduct of affairs 
may demand explanations and particulars from the Executive 
Departments.
3. The President when he deems it necessary may suspend 
the actions or orders of all branches of the administra­
tion pending a decision by the Emperor.
4. The President supervises the legal drafting committees 
(Horitsu Kian Iin) of all branches of the administration.
5. All Legal Orders(Horitsu Meirei) are countersigned 
by the President; those concerning the business of Exec­
utive Departments are countersigned by the President and
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and the Minister responsible.
6. Ministers are to report to the President from time to 
time on the business under their charge. Although the 
Chief of the General Staff Office reports to the Emperor 
directly on military matters, the Army Minister is to 
report such matters to the President.
7. When a Minister is indisposed , another Minister may 
handle his business on receipt of special orders.
On the 23rd of December,1885, a special message from 
the Emperor spoke of the need to adopt a simplified 
Council system in which Ministers should individually 
bear responsibility for their Departments under the 
direction of the President. It was hoped in this way 
to avoid the delays and complexities of the previous 
system in which the Executive Departments made reports 
to the Council and awaited orders before acting. The 
need was for responsibility to be made clear in all 
branches of the government to reduce wasteful expenditure, 
delay and inefficiency.^^
Again on the 23rd of December, the Legislation Bureau 
(HoseiKyoku) was re-established in the Council Secretariat 
to replace the San,ji-In and the Official System Invest­
igations Bureau which were abolished on the previous 
d a y . ^ ^  The new Legislation Bureau consisted of a
8. Otsu. DNHKSS. 2. p.812.
9. HRZS. Chokusho. p.l.
10. HRZS. Naikaku No.74 Tasshi.
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Head of Chokunin ranfc, and 20 officials(Sanjikan) of 
Secretarial rank. Yamao Yözö of Choshü who had been 
Vice-Chairman of the Sanji-In at the time of its abolition 
was appointed Head of the Legislation Bureau in addition 
to his post as Palace Adviser. It is note-worthy that 
whereas the members of the Sanji-In had been of Chokunin 
rank drawn mainly from the Genro-In, the members of the 
new Legislation Bureau were alL of secretarial rank. The 
Bureau was unden the jurisdiction of the Council President 
so, as ever, Ito retained c ontrol of the organ for 
drafting government legislation. The members of the 
Bureau were divided into three sections(Bu); an Executive 
Section(Gyöseibu) to draft and examine regulations con­
cerning the business of the Executive Departments; a 
Legislation Section(Hoseibu) to draft and examine Civil 
Codes, Laws of Appeal, Commercial Laws and Criminal Laws 
and instructions relating to them; and a Justice Section 
(Shihobu) controlling amnesties and special favours, the 
constitution of the courts and the administration of 
justice. This Bureau also adjudicated disputes between 
local G overnors and local Assemblies.
The Council Secretariat was also streamlined. On 
the 24th of December, an instruction was issued that 
four secretaries were to be appointed Council Secretaries 
(Naikaku Shokikan) to handle correspondence and keep
213.
documents concerning the personal status of officials
of secretarial rank and above under the orders of the
Council President^11  ^ On the same day, three Bureaux
were established to handle Records(KirokuKyoku), Accounts
(KaikeiKyoku) and the Official Gazette(KampoKyoku)• Each
of these Bureaux was headed by a secretary, assisted by
('12')another secretary.v ' On the 28th of December, the 
Board of Statistics was reduced to a Bureau(TökeiKyoku) 
This was part of a general move to simplify the 
working of the government on lines laid down by Itö in 
the Instructions to Ministers issued on the 26th of Be- 
cember,1885. These Instructions were under five
headings; the definition of official responsibilities, 
appointments, the superabundance of documents, the re­
duction of superfluous expenditure, and discipline.
Besides the need for economy in government finance, there 
was the need to free the Council from the mass of business 
sent up for ratification by the Executive Departments.
On the subject of the superabundance of official documents, 
Ito declared that at the time of the Restoration when the 
old was constantly giving way to the new, inferior 
officials had to apply to their superiors for instruction 
in their duties, no matter how trifling. This had become
11. HRZS. Naikaku No.75 Tasshi.
12. HRZS. Naikaku No.76 Tasshi.
15. HRZS. Naikaku No.83 Tasshi.
14. HRZS. 1885. p.1053-60.
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a h a b i t ,  and  w henever an  o r d e r  was i s s u e d  a h u n d re d  
q u e s t i o n s  w ere  i n s t a n t l y  a s k e d  a s  t o  i t s  m ea n in g .  Such 
was t h e  m ass o f  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  th u s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  t h a t  
som etim es  s i x  o r  tw e lv e  m onths w ere  d e v o te d  t o  t h e  s e t t l e ­
ment o f  a s i n g l e  s u b j e c t .  To t h i s  I t ö  a t t r i b u t e d  th e  
a c c u m u la t io n  o f  b u s i n e s s  and  t h e  v a s t  i n c r e a s e  i n  s u p e r ­
f l u o u s  o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  S e c r e t a r i a t  and  i n  t h e  
-E xecu tive  D e p a r tm e n ts .  The rem edy  was t o  be s o u g h t  i n  
t r a n s m i t t i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  t o  governm en t o f f i c e s  w i th  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  a t t a c h e d .  L o c a l  G o v e rn o rs  and Heads o f  
B ureaux  and  S e c t i o n s  w ere t o  be f o r b i d d e n  t o  a s k  f o r  
g u id a n c e  i n  e x e c u t i n g  o r d e r s  when t h e s e  w ere  accom pan ied  
by  a n  e x p l i c i t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n .  When no 
su ch  s t a t e m e n t  was g iv e n ,  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
was t o  be t a k e n  a s  a  g u id e .
The r e s p e c t i v e  o f f i c e s  o f  P r e s i d e n t  and  M i n i s t e r s ,  
C o u n c i l  and  E x e c u t iv e  D e p a r tm e n ts  w ere  c l a r i f i e d  i n  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  O f f i c i a l  Docum ents i s s u e d  on t h e  2 4 th  o f
f i t ; ' )  _
F e b r u a r y , 1 8 8 6 .v J '  L a w s ( H o r i t s u )  and O r d in a n c e s ( C h o k u r e i )  
w ere t o  be  i s s u e d  by  t h e  E m p ero r .  Laws r e q u i r i n g  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  d e l i b e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  G e n r o - I n  w ere  t o  f o l lo w  
t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  p a s t .  A l l  Laws and  O rd in a n c e s  w ere  
t o  be d r a f t e d  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  o r  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  
by  t h e  D e p a r tm en t  M i n i s t e r s .  I n  a l l  c a s e s ,  t h e y  w ere
15 . HRZS. C h o k u re i  N o . l
presented to the throne by the President for the Imperial 
assent. After Imperial assent, all Laws and Ordinances 
received the Imperial seal and were dated and counter­
signed by the President. If the Law or Ordinance related 
to a particular matter under the charge of a Department 
Minister, it was countersigned by the President and the 
Minister concerned. The President and the Department 
Ministers within the limits of the powers delegated to 
them by Laws and Ordinances could respectively issue 
Council Instructions(Kakurei) or Department Instructions 
(Shörei) for the purpose of regulating details connected 
with the enforcement of Laws and Ordinances and for 
maintaining public peace and order. Regulations(Kisoku) 
applicable to all government offices were to be issued 
by the President; regulations for individual offices for 
the conduct of their business were issued by the Depart­
ment Minister concerned. All Laws and Ordinances were 
to be published in the Official Gazette(Kampö). The 
State Seal and the Imperial Seal were kept by the House­
hold Minister(NaiDaijin), and were applied by him to 
Laws and Ordinances after the Emperor had signed them. 
Laws and Ordinances, appointments of Chokunin and Sonin 
received the Imperial seal; Treaties, Letters of Author­
isation and uonours received the State seal.
Regulations were issued for the Executive Departments
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on the 26th of February,1886.^ ^  Ministers were em­
powered to issue Department Instructions and to draw 
up detailed regulations for the conduct of business 
within the Bureaux and Sections of the Department. But 
they were forbidden to create, abolish, subdivide or 
amalgamate the Bureaux and Sections within the Depart­
ment, or to increase the number of executives(Chokunin)
and secretaries(Sonin) within the Department unless by
(17)Imperial sanction after the discussion of the Council. ( '
In these same regulations, the structure of the 
Executive Departments was closely modelled upon that of 
the Council Secretariat. In response to the delegation 
of legislative power to draw up Instructions and regu­
lations for the conduct of business in the Department, 
a number of officials of secretarial rank were to be 
appointed as Sanjikan in parallel to the Sanjikan of 
the Legislation Bureau of the Council Secretariat.
The new system was avowedly an attempt to make 
Ministers directly responsible to the Emperor. The 
principle of the joint responsibility of the Cabinet 
could not be admitted for fear of invading the Imperial 
prerogative. But the powers of the President in the 
new system were extensive, and he retained a firm control 
of the Legislature. The true object of the reform of
16. HRZS. Chokurei No.2.
17. ibid. Clauses 6,8,14
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December,1885 was not to free the Executive Departments 
from Council control, but to free the Council from an 
excessive burden of enquiries on minor administrative 
matters sent up from the Executive Departments for 
approval.
With the near prospect of constitutional government, 
the President and Ministers devoted themselves in their 
several capacities to the general improvement of the 
administration. It was the efforts of Inoue as Foreign 
Minister to secure Treaty revision that brought about 
the next crisis in the Council.
From May 1st,1886, until April 22nd,1887, Inoue con­
ducted negotiations with the representatives of the major 
treaty powers in Tokyo. On June 24th,1887, a newspaper 
leader reported a rumour that Inoue had agreed to the 
employment of foreign judges as procurators in courts 
trying cases involving foreigners as a condition for 
the abolition of extra-territoriality. An immediate 
outcry was raised by the political party opponents of 
the government; but within the Council itself there had 
been disquiet for some time at the way in which Inoue 
was conducting the negotiations. Inoue considered that 
treaty revision could not be obtained unless the Powers 
were cvonvinced of the social as well as of the political 
"europeanisation" of Japan, and treated the diplomatic
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representatives in Tokyo to entertainments and fancy- 
dress balls in the Rokumeikan, a building specially 
erected for the purpose.
Kuroda returned from a visit to Europe in the spring 
of 1887, and taking offence at the "europeanisation" 
policy of Ito and Inoue secretly approached Itagaki and 
Goto, the principal leaders of the political party 
opposition. At the same time, ökuma w^s also approaching 
Itagaki and Goto, and the three of them met at Goto‘s 
residence on the 13th of July, 1887* Meanwhile,
Tani Kanjo, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, 
had resumed his duties on the 24th of June after an 
overseas tour and began a fierce attack upon Inoue' s 
policies in negotiating treaty revision. In a memorial 
to the Council, Tani insisted that foreign interference 
in the internal affairs of Japan should not be tolerated 
and urged that a strong attitude was more likely to 
bring success than an over-conciliatory one. But he 
also objected to treaty revision being secretly negot­
iated in the Foreign Department, pointing out that he 
himself as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce had 
a great interest in treaty revision from the customs 
angle. An affair like treaty revision which concerns 
the country as a whole ought to be discussed by the
18. Otsu. DNHKSS. 3. p.69
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whole Council. In Europe and America when any great
event occurs, the Minister of each Department was called
upon to state his views and the Foreign Department
fiq)authorised to act after their deliberations. y
It was a fact that members of the Council were 
working on projects on which the other Council Ministers 
were not necessarily fully informed. Yamagata's work 
on local self-government, for example, was largely his 
private affair and he had embarked upon it in the face 
of opposition from Ito.^0^
On June 7th,1887, a Council meeting was held in which 
Tani presented his memorial. Several meetings were held 
to discuss the matter in the next fortnight, and the 
Genro-In was also consulted. Those opposed to Inoue's 
proposals were Kuroda, Council Adviser(Naikaku Komon), 
Katsu, Palace Adviser(Kyüchü Komon), Tani, Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, and Saigö, Navy Minister. 
Boissonade, the legal adviser to the government, also 
opposed the appointment of foreign judges and procurators 
to the courts. J Tani's memorial had called for the 
suspension of treaty revision negotiations until 1890, 
when the Assembly had been opened and the government 
couldi confront the treaty powers with a united public 
opinion to reinforce its demands; the other Council
19. Japan Weekly Mail, July 7th 1887. p.572-6; quoted, 
McLaren. Japanese Government Documents, p.457-480.20. Meiji Kensei Keizai Shiron. p.398.
21. Hirota. Naikaku Kotetsu Gojünen Shi. p.24-5.
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Ministers did not agree, and in an interview with the
Emperor on the 20th of July, Tani asked to be allowed to
resign. On the 24th of July, his resignation was accepted
and Hijikata replaced him as Minister of Agriculture and 
(22)Commerce. '
Faced with opposition within the Council and: mount­
ing indignation outside, Ito planned a strategic with­
drawal. On the 16th of September, Inoue resigned from 
Foreign Minister and was appointed to a retired post as 
Palace Adviser(Kyuchu Komon); Ito took over the Foreign 
Department as an additional post and relinquished the 
Palace Department to Hijikata. Kuroda entered the Cabinet 
as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Ito was now 
planning for Kuroda to succeed him as President, and 
Ito and Inoue assisted Kuroda to persuade Okuma to serve 
under him as Foreign Minister. Okuma attempted to get 
a promise from Ito and Kuroda that political party 
cabinets should be formed in. ten years time as a condition 
for his re-entry to the government. But Ito adamantly 
refused, and Okuma finally agreed to «join the Cabinet
f jz \without conditions. J Accordingly, on the 1st of 
February,1888,Ito resigned his additional post as Foreign 
Minister, and ökuma replaced him.
Before resigning the Presidency of the Council to
22. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.646.
2$. Ötsu. DNHKSS. 3. p.70.
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Kuroda, Ito created a new body called the Sumitsu-In.
On the 28th of April,1888, an Ordinance was issued setting
( ' j _up the new body.v ' The preamble stated that the Sumitsu 
In was the supreme organ for advising the Emperor(Shiko 
Komon no Fu), in which the Emperor consulted persons who 
have rendered distinguished services- to the state(Genkun) 
and men learned in state affairs. The regulations for 
the Sumitsu-In state that it was the place in which the 
Emperor held consultations on important matters of state. 
It was composed of one Chairman, one Vice-Chairman and 
12 or more Advisers(Komonkan) who were all directly ap~ 
pointed by the Emperor(Shinnin). Its function was to 
hold deliberations and to present opinions to the Emperor 
on the following matters.
1. Differences of opinion as to the interpretation of 
the Constitution or of Laws appertaining thereto; and 
questions relating to the Estimates or other financial 
matters•
2. Drafts of amendments to the Constitution or to the 
Laws appertaining thereto.
3* Important Ordinances(Chokurei).
4. Drafts of new Laws and drafts for the abolition or 
amendment of existing Laws; Treaties with Foreign powers; 
the planning of administrative organisations.
24. HRZS. Chokurei No.22.
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5, Any other matters touching important administrative 
or financial measures upon which the opinion of the 
Sümitsu-In is specially required hy the order of the 
Emperor, and matters upon which the opinion of the Sumitsu- 
In has to be taken by reason of some special Law or 
Ordinance, (Clause 6)
Although the Sumitsu-In was the Emperor's supreme ad­
visory body on legislative and executive matters, it was 
not to be directly concerned with the executive,(Clause 8) 
Department Ministers by virtue of their office were en­
titled to sit in the Sumitsu-In as Advisers(Komonkan) 
and had the right to vote.(Clause 11) The Chairman ex­
ercised supreme control over all the business of the 
Sumitsu-In and signed every document that proceeded from 
it. (Clause 12)
The detailed regulations for the business of the 
Sümitsu-In state that it was forbidden to receive petitions 
or other communications from the National Assembly, from 
either House of the same, or from any of the Emperor's 
subjects. (Clause 2) The Sümitsu-In was to have official 
relations only with the Council and the Department 
Ministers. (Clause 3) The decisions of the Sümitsu-In 
were presented to the Emperor, and a copy sent to the 
President of the Cabinet.(Naikaku Söri Daijin),(Clause 13)
On the 30th of April,1888 Ito resigned the Presidency
of the Cabinet(Naikaku) to Kuroda, and was appointed 
Chairman( Gicho) of the Privy Counci 1 (Sümitsu-In). Under 
him as Privy Council Advisers were öki from his post as 
Chairman of the Genro-In, Higashikuze as an additional 
post to Vice-Chairman of the Genro-In, Yoshii as an 
additional post to Vice-Minister of the Palace Depart­
ment, Shinagawa, Soejima, Fukuoka, Sasaki, Terashima and 
Sano from posts as Palace Advisers, and Katsu and Kawano.
The creation of this body marks the final definition 
of Council and Executive, and was the sum of twenty years 
of continuous constitutional development. Since the 
abolition of the Santji-In as part of the reform of 1885, 
the legislature had centred on the Legislation Bureau 
(HoseiKyoku) of the Council Secretariat with a staff of 
secretarial officials. This Bureau was under the di­
rection of the Cabinet President; but on relinquishing 
this post, Itö became Chairman of the Privy Council which 
was clearly to be the final authority in matters of 
legislation. This final authority was not to rest with 
the Cabinet President who henceforth became the director 
of the Executive, nor with the Upper and Lower Houses 
of the National Assembly which was to remain largely 
a consultative organ, as all Assemblies had been since 
the Restoration. It rested with the Privy Council which 
stood above both Cabinet and Assembly.
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But the purpose of the Sumitsu-In was not simply 
to act as the final authority of the legislature* Ito 
considered it essential that an advisory body should 
be created to give support to the Emperor in the solution 
of difficult questions and to support the Cabinet in 
clashes with the political party opposition in the Lower 
House of the National Assembly^) In the sümitsu-In 
the Emperor was provided with a permanent Privy Council 
which was not engrossed! in administrative details and 
which stood above Departmental rivalries and political 
party opposition.
The composition of the Sumitsu-In is also instructive 
The post of Palace Adviser(Kyuchu Komon) had been set up 
in 1885 as a resting-place for potential Ministers, but 
its duties were limited to advice on Court ceremonies.
In the new Privy Council, ex-Ministers and potential 
Ministers could be usefully employed in higher Council 
functions. Later in 1888, Motoda Nagasane was appointed 
to the Privy Council from a post as Palace Adviser,
Yoshida and Torio from posts as members of the Genro-In 
and Nomura from a post as Vice-Minister or the Communi­
cations Department. The new Privy Council thus became 
a body comprising the principal figures of the Palace 
Department and the Genro—In as well as men drawn from
25. Suzuki. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi. 57. No.9. p.50.
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Cabinet and Executive Department posts, and the differing 
pretensions of all these bodies were thus united into 
a single whole. Also, it is interesting to note that 
the balance of power within the government was accurately 
reflected in the Privy Council. Ito of Choshü was Chair­
man, Terashima of Satsuma Vice-Chairman. Under them, 
Satsuma, Choshü, Tosa and Hizen had three members each, 
with one Court nohle, one ex-Bakufu retainer and one 
man from Kumamoto.
The true significance of the Sumitsu-In as in effect 
a new super-Council was disguised for the moment by its 
first task of debating the Constitution. It was opened 
by the Emperor on the 8th of May,1888; under Clause 11 
of its regulations Department Ministers were entitled 
to take part in its deliberations and to vote in its 
decisions, and on the 18th of Mayy Imperial princes 
resident in Tokyo were required to attend its sessions. 
Sanjö as Household Minister was also required to attend. 
The final drafts for the Constitution, the Law of the 
Imperial Household and the Election Law of the Lower 
House of the National Assembly were debated in the Privy 
Council in the presence of the Emperor by a full quorum 
of high officials reminiscent of the conferences by which 
all major changes in the government had been ratified 
since the Restoration. But thereafter in actual practice
Cabinet Ministers were regarded as not permitted to sit 
in the Privy Council*
On the 11th of February,1889,the Constitution was
promulgated by the Emperor. Article 5 stated that "the
Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent
(27)of the Imperial Diet:' Ito’s commentaryv adds that 
the legislative power belongs to the sovereign power 
of the Emperor, but this power shall always be exercised 
with the consent of the Diet. The Emperor will cause the 
Cabinet to make drafts of laws, or the Diet may initiate 
projects of laws; and after the concurrence of both 
Houses of the Diet has been obtained thereto, >the Emperor 
will give them his sanction, and then such drafts or 
projects shall becom,e law. Thus the Emperor is not only 
the centre of the executive, but is also the source and 
fountain-head of the legislative power...The legislative 
power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, 
while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. 
Thus between the Emperor and the Diet, a distinction is 
strictly to be maintained as to their relative positions. 
Article 6 of the Constitution continues " the Emperor 
gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated 
and executed"; Ito's commentary adding that if the 
Emperor can sanction, he can also refuse.
26. Yamazaki. Naikaku Hon. p.110.
27* ltd. Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.
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From these two articles, it is quite clear that legis­
lative authority would continue to reside in the Privy 
Council and Cabinet. In Ito's original draft of the 
Constitution, the Diet was not even permitted to initiate 
debates or to memorialise the Emperor. It was only on 
the strong objections of Terashima and 1'orio iin the 
Sümitsu-In that in Articles 38 and 49 of the Constitution 
both Houses of the Diet were enabled to initiate projects 
of law(Horitsuan) and to present addresses to the Emperor 
(Joshin).Vv } But of course the Emperor was no more 
bound to accept such drafts or addresses than he was in 
the case of similar powers granted to the Genro-In.
Apart from the power of the Emperor to issue Emer­
gency Ordinances in the place of law while the Diet was 
not in session(-4rticle 8), the Emperor was also empowered 
to issue, or cause to be issued, Ordinances necessary for 
the carrying out of Laws, or for the maintenance of 
public peace and order, and for the promotion of the 
welfare of the subjects(Ärticle 9). Although this article 
goes on‘to stipulate that no Ordinance shall in any way 
alter any of the existing laws, the power of the Emperor 
to issue Ordinances which applied the laws secured the 
government with wide powers to interpret and apply the 
laws as it saw fit.
28. Otsu. DNHKSS. 3. p.83-4
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Ito's commentary on Article 9 states that a law 
requires the consent of the Diet, while an ordinance 
holds good solely by decision of the Emperor. There are 
two occasions for the issuing of an ordinance: the first 
is, when it is required to regulate measures and details 
for the carrying out of any particular law; the second, 
when it is required to meet the necessity of maintaining 
the public peace and order and of promoting the welfare 
of the subjects. All these matters may, without having 
been passed through the regular course of legislation, 
form the subjects of legal enactments having binding 
effect upon the people at large by virtue of the executive 
power of the Emperor. As to a binding effect upon the 
people, there should not be the slightest difference 
between a law and an ordinance, save that a law can make 
alterations in any of the existing ordinances, whereas 
no ordinance can alter any of the existing laws. In case 
of a conflict between law and ordinance, the law will 
always have the preponderance over ordinance.
Article 57 of the Constitution states that every 
law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet. Ito's 
commentary continues that as to the question, what sort 
of matters ought to be settled by law, no general enumer­
ation of them can be comprehensive enough to cover the 
whole ground. What comes within the sphere of law and
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what within that of ordinance, differ according to the 
political development of each country. These limits 
ought to he ascertained for each country by reference to 
its constitutional history. But there are two definite 
cases of limitation first, when a given matter is re­
quired to be embodied in a law by an express provision 
of the constitution; and secondly, in the case of the 
modification of a law, in which case nothing but law can 
effect the modification. Such is the universal practice 
of constitutional countries.
The Constitution thus did not bring about any great 
change in the operation of the Legislature. Before the 
Constitution came into effect, the government had drawn 
up the basic laws of the realm by which it consented to 
be bound. For the future, it reserved to itself the 
right of determining what a law was, and by what means 
it should be specifically applied.
The powers of the Cabinet and the Privy Council 
are the subject of Chapter 4 of the Constitution.
Article 55 states that the respective Ministers of State 
shall give their advice to the ISmperor and be responsible 
for it. All Laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial 
Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs 
of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister 
of State. Ito's commentary declares that every Minister
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of State shall, on the one hand, take part in the de­
liberations of the Cabinet, while, on the other, he shall 
have charge of the affairs of some Department of State, 
and shall have to bear his responsibility in the affairs 
of State*..the Ministers of State have towards the 
Emperor the duty of encouraging all that is proper and 
discountenancing all that is improper; and when they fail 
to discharge this duty, they will not be able to release 
themselves from responsibility by pleading an Order of 
the Sovereign...After the Restoration, modifications were 
successively introduced until the Cabinet was organised 
by Imperial Rescript in the 18th year of Meiji(1885).
By the said reorganization, the Ministers of State were 
each made separately to bear his(sic) share of respon­
sibility to the Emperor directly. Over them was placed 
the Minister President of State. The object of this 
change was, on the one hand, to give weight to the 
functions of the Ministers of State and to impress upon 
them a higher sense of their responsibility, and, on the 
other, to maintain the unity of the Cabinet and to avoid 
all complications and variances therein...If Ministers 
of State were not responsible, the executive power could 
easily overstep the limits of law, which would thus be­
come a mere collection of nominal enactments. When a 
Minister errs in the discharge of his functions, the
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power of deciding upon his responsibility belongs to the 
Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a Minister, 
who has appointed him...it is only a legitamite con­
sequence, that the power of deciding as to the respon­
sibility of Ministers, is withheld from the Diet. But 
the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand 
open answers from them before the public, and it may 
also present addresses to the sovereign setting forth 
its opinions. Moreover, although the Emperor reserves 
to himself in the Constitution the right of appointing 
his ministers at his pleasure, in making an appointment 
the susceptibilities of the public mind must also be 
taken into consideration. This may be regarded as an 
indirect method of controlling the responsibility of 
Ministers.
...The Minister President of State is to make repre­
sentations to the Emperor, on matters of State, and to 
indicate, according to his(i..e. the Emperor's) pleasure, 
the general course of the policy of the State, every 
branch of the administrative being under the control of 
the said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, 
and his responsibility cannot but be proportionally great. 
As to the other Ministers of State, they are severally 
held responsible for the matters within their respective 
competency: there is no joint responsibility among them
in regard to such matters. For, the Minister President 
and the other Ministers of State, being alike personally 
appointed by the Bmperor, the proceedings of each of 
them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of 
the Bmperor, and the minister President himself has no 
power of control over the posts occupied by other 
Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent 
upon the former. In some countries, the Cabinet is 
regarded as constituting a corporate body, the Ministers 
are not held to take part in the conduct of the govern­
ment each one in an individual capacity, but joint res­
ponsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is, 
that the power of party combination will ultimately over­
rule the supreme power of the Sovereign. Such a state 
of things can never be approved of according to our 
Constitution. But with regard to important internal 
and external matters of state, the whole Government is 
concerned, and no single Department can, therefore, be 
exclusively charged with the conduct of them. As to the 
expediency of such matters and as to the mode of carrying 
them out, all the Ministers of State shall take united 
counsel, and none of them is allowed to leave his share 
of the business a burden upon his colleagues. In such 
matters, it would of course be proper for the Cabinet 
to assume joint responsibility.
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.•••The countersignature of a Minister or of Ministers 
of State has the two following effects: First, laws, 
Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts that relate 
to affairs of the State can be put into force only by 
virtue of the countersignature of a Minister or of 
Ministers of State, Without it, they can take no effect; 
and when issued through any other than a Ministerial 
channel, none can be carried out by the functionaries 
charged with its execution. Secondly, the counter- 
signature of a Minister or Minister of State attests the 
right of the said Minister or Ministers to carry out the 
law, Imperial Ordinance or Imperial Rescript in question, 
and also his or their responsibility for the same. The 
Ministers of State are the channels, through which the 
Sovereign's Orders are to flow, both at home and abroad. 
This is made clear by their countersignatures. But the 
political responsibility of Ministers can not be regarded 
only from a legal point of view: moral considerations must 
also enter into the question...when a mistake has been 
committed by the Government, responsibility should not 
be confined to the countersigning Minister or Ministers, 
but those Ministers also, who though not countersigners, 
have been consulted about the matter, ought to be held 
responsible for the mistake.
Article 36 of the Constitution declared that the
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Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions 
for the organisation of the Privy Council, deliberate upon 
important matters of State, when they have been consulted 
by the Emperor. Ito's commentary continues,•.The Emperor, 
on the one hand, maintains the supreme control of admin­
istrative affairs through the medium of the Cabinet, while, 
on the other, he has established the Privy Council, so 
that in his wisdom he may have at command its assistance, 
and that the information he obtains may be thorough and 
impartial. Ministers of State have to be acute of mind, 
quick and active in the dispatch of internal and external 
affairs. But the task of planning far-sighted schemes 
of statecraft and of effectuating new enactments, by 
leisurely meditation and calm reflection, by thorough 
investigations into ancient and modern history, and by 
consulting scientific principles, must be entrusted to 
a special institution made up of men of wide experience 
and of profound scholarship...If the Privy Council is 
competent to lend assistance to the wisdom of the Emperor, 
to be impartial, with no leaning to this or that party, 
and to solve difficult problems, it will certainly prove 
an important piece of constitutional mechanism. %)reover, 
when an Emergency Ordinance is to be issued or a state 
of siege is to be declared, or when some extraordinary 
financial measure is deemed necessary to be taken, the
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opinion of the Privy Council is to be sought before the 
measure is carried out, thereby giving weight to the 
measures of the administrative in the matter. In this 
way, the Privy Council is the palladium of the Constit­
ution and of the law. Such being the importance attached 
to the functions of the Privy Council, it is the estab­
lished rule that every Imperial Ordinance on which the 
advice of the Privy Council has been asked shall contain 
a statement of that fact in the preamble to it. The Privy 
Council is to hold deliberations only when its opinion 
has been asked for by the Emperor; and it is entirely 
for him to accept or reject any opinion given...As to 
a matter about which the opinion of that body has been 
furnished to the Emperor, no publicity can be given to 
it, however trifling it may be, without his special 
permission.
Besides giving consent to laws, the Diet was also 
to give consent to all new taxes and national loans 
(article 6P) and to state expenditure and revenue by 
means of an annual Budget(Article 64). The final account 
of state expenditure and revenue was to be verified and 
confirmed by the Board of Audit, and submitted by the 
government to the Diet(Article ?P)* Ito regarded these 
provisions as essential to check waste and extravagance 
in government finance. But the Diet was unable to
^36
obstruct the working of the government by refusing to 
consent to the Budget, since by Article 71 "the govern­
ment was empowered to carry out the Budget of the pre­
ceding year when one or both Houses of the Diet would 
not vote the Budget submitted to them*
On the 9th of May,1889, revised regulations were
issued for the Board of Audit to ensure its independence
(pq )from the Council. ' The Board of Audit was henceforth 
to be under the direct control of the Emperor, and to 
occupy an independent status towards the Cabinet.
Article 61 of the Constitution required that suits 
of law relating to rights alleged to have been infringed 
by the illegal measures of the administrative authorities 
should come within the competence of the Court of Admin­
istrative Litigation(Gyosei Saibansho) specially estab­
lished by law. Accordingly, on the R8th of June,1890,^ ^  
this Court was set up in Tokyo. The Head(Chokan) and 
Assessors(Hyojökan) were appointed by the Emperor on 
the recommendation of the Cabinet President. They were 
forbidden to have government, political party or commer­
cial connections. Once appointed, they were only to be 
dismissed by the action of the Criminal 00£e or for the 
breach of disciplinary regulations; unless by a decision 
of the general assembly of the Court itself they were
P9. HRZS. Horitsu No.15 
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found unable to perform their office by reason of weak­
ness of body or mind, which decision was reported to the 
Emperor by the Cabinet President. This was another 
function previously controlled by the Cabinet which was 
henceforth to be exercised by an independent body, though 
the Cabinet President made the recommendations for appoin­
tments to it.
Meanwhile, the Kuroda Cabinet was expected to be 
the first to meet the Diet, and Kuroda sought to attract 
the leading figures both within and without the govern­
ment to serve as Cabinet Ministers. Thus Inoue was 
appointed Minister of Agriculture and Commerce on the 
25th of July,1888, and Goto was appointed Minister of 
Communications on the 22nd of March,1889.
Ökuma since his appointment as Foreign Minister 
vigorously pursued his plans for treaty revision, which 
promised to be a great personal triumph for both himself 
and Kuroda if it could be achieved before the first 
assembly of the Diet. The contents of the treaties 
were of course secret; but Komura. Toshitaro, then a 
minor official in the Translations Bureau of the Foreign 
Department, was angered at what he considered to be 
humiliating conditions in the Treaties and indicated hi 
disapproval to a friend in the "Nihon Shimbun'.’ ^ 1) jj±S
31. Otsu. DNHKSS.3. p.304-5. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi 
Takayuki. p.654.
238
friend kept silent for the moment since to publish an 
account of the Treaties would bring trouble to Komura 
for the leakage. But on the 19th of April, 1889., an 
account of ökuma's treaty proposals was published in 
the London "Times” In the following month, all the 
Tokyo newspapers published translations of this article 
and at once a great public outcry was raised against 
Ökuma. At this time, Ito believed that the naturalisation 
lav/ proposed by ökuma for the foreign «judges would enable 
a breach of the Constitution to be avoided; and none of 
the other Cabinet Ministers were opposed to ökuma’s pro­
posals since they felt that the appointment of foreign 
judges was inevitable and that the treaty revision pro­
gramme had to go through.(32) 0n the 2nd of August,1889, 
a meeting was held in Kuroda's residence of all the 
Cabinet Ministers, and Ito also attended as Chairman of 
the Privy Council. In this meeting general agreement 
was given to Ökuma’s proposal that the foreign judges 
should be naturalised; Ito did not share Ökuma’s con­
fidence that the objections of Britain and France to his 
proposals could be overcome, but he did not think that 
the negotiations snouldbe broken off, and was still 
anxious for Ökuma to continue his efforts. However,
outside the government opposition to ökuma's proposals
32. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.305.
33. ibid, p.308-10.
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continued to grow fiercer, and he was soon faced with 
opposition from within the Cabinet and the Privy Council.
When Sasaki returned to Tokyo on the 3rd of Septem­
ber, he was met by Hijikata, now Palace Minister, who 
told him that within the Cabinet Kuroda and ökuma were 
supported by Yamada and Enomoto, but opposed by Goto 
and Matsukata. Saigo and Öyama were silent, and Ito 
and Inoue were assuming an air of indif f erence.
Within the Privy Council, Oki and Kawano supported ökuma's 
(35)proposals, but Torio and Soejima were strongly op­
posed and were demanding that the negotiations be sus­
pended. They were supported in their opposition by Tani, 
who still retained his commission as a Major-General, 
by Kaieda, Harada and Kusuda of the Genro-In , and by 
Nishimura, Miura and Asano from Palace posts. Torio 
presented his views in a memorial to Kuroda, and joined 
with the others in calling upon ökuma and remonstrating 
with him.
On the 23rd of September, the Emperor called a joint 
meeting of the Privy Council and the Cabinet to discuss 
the matter. Ito wanted the Cabinet alone to settle the 
problem, but the Emperor was anxious for Ito, Kuroda and 
Ökuma to reach a joint decision.^^ But no decision 
could be reached, and within the Privy Council Ito,
34. Tsuda. Meiji Seijö to omi Takayuki. p.667.
35. Hirota. Naikaku Kotetsu Gojünen Shi. p.256.
36. Otsu. DNHKSS.3. p.288-89.
37. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.310-11.
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Terashima, Sasaki and Motoda were inclining to the oppo­
sition, The situation had by now reached a complete 
deadlock, for although Ito and Inoue were opposed to 
Ökuma's proposals, they could not openly express their 
opposition for fear of causing a split in the Privy 
Council and the Cabinet,
At this point, Yamagata was due to return to Japan 
from an overseas tour. His attitude was likely to be 
decisive, and both sides were eager to canvass him in 
their support, Kuroda and Ökuma went down to Yokohama 
to meet him on his arrival on the Pnd of October; but 
Matsukata, Saigo and Oyama, who as Satsuma men could not 
express too open an opposition to Kuroda, had also got 
together to form a plan to meet Yamagata, to inform him 
of their doubts about the treaty revision proposals and 
to urge him to oppose Kuroda, On the morning of October 
Pnd, öyama met face to face with Kuroda at the station, 
and knowing of Matsukata's plan to get in the first word 
with Yamagata, he managed to delay Kuroda by a clever 
piece of impromptu strategy. It is not known whether 
the Satsuma opposition managed to get word to Yamagata, 
but the Choshü men who opposed ökuma's proposals, such 
as Miura, had arranged a similar plan to get word to 
Yamagata through Shinagawa, a Choshü Privy Councillor.
38. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.331.
Shinagawa managed to get a long letter to Yamagata while 
he was still on board ship, explaining that only the 
obstinacy of Kuroda and Ökuma was sustaining the treaty 
revision proposals in spite of general opposition. 
Shinagawa was confident that Yamagata would read this 
letter first, and called on him after the welcoming 
ceremony to put his views to Yamagata for several hours. 
The next day, Nomura Yasushi, another Ghöshü Privy 
Councillor, called on Yamagata to oppose the proposals; 
and three or four days later, Inoue Ki also called to
(7>Q)express his opposition. - yy By this time, Yamagata's 
mind was made up. Sensing this, Ito suddenly announced 
his intention to resign from his post as Chairman of the 
Privy Council on the 11th of October. Ito explained 
to Okuma that since Yamagata was opposed to treaty re­
vision, success was now impossible and that he was bound 
to resign. Ökuma, knowing nothing of Yamagata's oppo­
sition, denied that this was so; Ito and Ökuma therefore 
went together to see Jamagata. Ökuma put his views to 
Yamagata, who agreed that Ito should not resign but does 
not seem to have made his own views clear. On the 14th 
of October, Yamagata returned to Tokyo. On the 15th, 
a Cabinet meeting was called. The argument for either 
was stated by Ökuma and Goto; Yamagata himself merely 
stated that he had not had enough time to study the
39. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.331.
question and thatb he would send a memorial with his views 
later. On the 18th of October, Yamagata sent in a memor­
ial which made no mention of the current objection that 
the appointment of foreign judges would be a breach of 
the Constitution; it simply declared that the legal pre­
parations for the abolition of extra-territoriality were 
not complete and that the question ought to be post­
poned#^^ By this time, Terashima, Soejima, Sasaki, 
Kawamura, Sano, Torio and Motoda in the Privy Council 
advocated the suspension of negotiations; and on the 
16th of October, Terashima the Vice-Chairman with Soejima 
and Sasaki as representatives of the whole body had an 
audience with the Emperor in which they expressed the 
general opposition of the Privy Council to treaty re­
vision, only öki and Kawano being still in favour.
At this time, Miura took advantage of the direct access 
to the Emperor which his position as Head of the Gaku- 
shu-In allowred him to present a memorial to the Emperor 
against the employment of foreigners as judges. Miura 
returned home after confessing that in speaking of 
national affairs he had perpetrated a great crime, worthy 
of a thousand deaths. While he waited at home for the 
Imperial orders, ready to commit suicide, Motoda came 
to congratulate him on his action. Motoda told him that
40. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyü. p.333-34.
41. Omachi. Hakushaku Goto Shojirb. p.661.
the Emperor had shown him his memorial, and that they 
had discussed it together. It was by no means untimely 
or improper to have done what he did; Motoda himself
(HZ')had been doing the same. '
Skuma was aware that the opposition was too strong 
for him; and was pleased to find in Yamaga-ta's memorial 
an objection which saved him loss of face. He finally 
prevailed upon Kuroda to agree to suspend the negotiations 
for treaty revision indefinitely. On the afternoon of 
the 18th of October, just after this decision had been 
made, ökuma was severely wounded by a bomb thrown into 
his carriage by an ultra-nationalist fanatic.
On the 24th of October,1889, Kuroda as Cabinet Pres­
ident and all the Caoinet Ministers,with the exception 
of ökuma who was lying desperately wounded, presented 
their resignations. On the following day, Kuroda was 
appointed to the Privy Council and Sanjö was appointed 
temporary President over the previous Ministers whose 
resignations were all refused. On his resignation, Kuroda 
had suggested Yamagata as his successor, but Yamagata 
would not accept. Yamagata did not want to appear res­
ponsible for the overthrow of the Kuroda Cabinet, and 
did not wish to inherit the aftermath of the suspension 
of treaty revision negotiations. The unpleasant task of
4P. Kanju Shogun Kaikoroku. p.271-78*
^ 4 4
calling on the ambassadors of countries which had already
signed treaties to explain that these must now be post-
- (^ -6 )poned therefore fell to Sanjo.
On announcing his intention to resign on the 11th 
of October, Itö had taken no further part in the dispute 
over treaty revision. His resignation was finally ac­
cepted on the 30th of Octoher, when he relinquished the 
Chairmanship of the Privy Council to öki and was appoint­
ed to a retired post as Palace Adviser.
On the lPth of December,1889, Sanjö requested that 
he should be allowed to resign, but the question of the 
next Council President remained to be solved. It was 
generally agreed that since Ito had drawn up the Con­
stitution, he should form the Cabinet to meet the first 
Diet. But Kuroda had regarded Ito’s conduct in resigning 
at the height of the treaty revision dispute as very mean 
and was extremely angry with him^t^ Ito was then able 
to use the excuse that to succeed Kuroda immediately 
would be very bad for Satsuma and Chöshü harmony. But 
his refusal was interpreted by some as a desire to avoid 
being the target for the inevitable onslaught of the 
political parties againstc the government in the Lower 
House of the Diet.^^
43. Watanabe. Meiji Shi Kenkyu. p.335.
44. ibid, p.311.
45. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi Takayuki. p.677-78.
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Since Itö would not come forward, Yamagata was the 
next choice. Saigo advocated’ that Yamagata should he 
Council President, Aoki Foreign Minister and Yoshikawa 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in a predominantly 
Choshü Cabinet; but there were many conflicting opinions. 
Latent Satsuma and Choshü hostility broke forth dramatic­
ally when on the 15th of December Kuroda broke into 
Inoue's residence in a drunken state to abuse him as a 
traitor to the country. Fortunately Inoue was not at 
home, and Kuroda was persuaded to leave the house before 
he returned. Next day it was Inoue's turn to call at 
Kuroda*s residence in a fury, and an unpleasant incident 
was only avoided by Kuroda's discreet refusal to meet
him. Saigo and Yamada managed to pacify Inoue, and Kuroda 
( 4 6 ')apologised. But Inoue took the occasion to resign
from his post as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce 
on the 25rd of December.
Finally, on the 24th of December,1889, Sanjo resigned 
and Yamagata was appointed Cabinet President. But just 
before this change, Sanjo and all the Cabinet Ministers 
sent a joint Opinion to the Emperor requesting reforms 
in the Cabinet regulations/4^  This Opinion stated that
46. Tsuda. Meiji Seijo to omi ^akayuki. p.676-67. Also, 
Sawada. Segai Ko Jireki Ishin Zaisei Dan.p.461-64. Inoue 
states that Kuroda*s antipathy towards him arose out of 
reforms he made in Hokkaido, when after a tour of inspect­
ion with Yamagata several hundred Satsuma officials were 
dismissed.
47. Otsu. DNHKSS. 3. p.310-11.
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snould the organisation of the Cabinet be weak, its res­
ponsibilities indistict and its administrative methods 
inexact, then the whole government must be unsound. Ac­
cording to the Constitution, the responsibility for 
discharging administrative functions rests with the 
Ministers of State. The Cabinet President acts as Chief 
Minister, and countersigns all Laws and Ordinances to­
gether with the Minister whose Department they directly 
concern. But this is an excessive extension of the juris­
diction of the Cabinet President, and the regulations for 
the Cabinet ought to be revised to make each Minister 
solely responsible for countersigning the documents re­
lating to the business of his Department. For personal 
responsibility is the duty of the Cabinet under the 
Constitution.
Under the Constitution, Ministers of State are con­
sulted by the Emperor; but whether their views are adopted 
or rejected, they are not permitted to disclose them 
privately to the Diet or to other persons without the 
special permission of the Emperor. Failure to observe 
this restriction makes the offender not only incompetent 
to hold the important position of advising the Emperor, 
but also guilty of a breach of moral probity. The foun­
dation of Cabinet organisation is that the Cabinet should 
consist of Ministers who think alike and are united.
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Though each member in discussions within the Cabinet it­
self may express opinions more or less diverse, they must 
necessarily be careful to preserve unity in communications 
to the public and in the programme of the government.
It is essential that a rigid secrecy be preserved in 
Cabinet matters. Publicity is a leading feature of the 
constitutional form of government, and the debates of 
the Diet are open to the world. But in Cabinet dis­
cussions privacy is of prime importance; the opinions of 
individual Ministers must not in any way be disclosed 
or made subject to public criticism. If a Minister re­
signs because his views on an important subject are re­
jected by the Emperor, or because he differs from the 
majority of his colleagues, his duty bo remain silent 
is even more imperative than when in office. This is 
the moral duty of members of the Cabinet. The morality 
of the Cabinet exercises an important influence on the 
Diet and the people. If this principle could not be 
maintained in the Cabinet, trouble could be expected in 
the future.
Thus, while the Cabinet President was held to exer­
cise too sweeping a control ove? the other Cabinet Minis­
ters, it was also felt that the corporate loyalty of 
the Cabinet needed to be strengthened. In the light of 
recent disputes, it was clear that the functioning of
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the Cabinet left much to be desired.
On the same day, the 24th of December,1889, revised 
regulations were issued for the Cabinet ^he Cabinet
President now "preserved the unity of the Cabinet"
(Toitsu o Hoji) in place of "exercising a general super- 
vision"(Totoku). Ordinances affecting the business of 
a single Department were to be countersigned by its 
Minister alone. Matters to be submitted to the Cabinet 
conference were defined as follows; drafts of Laws, 
estimates and final accounts; treaties with foreign 
countries and important national affairs; Ordinances 
affecting the official system, or the carrying out of 
Laws and regulations; disputes of jurisdiction arising 
between Executive Departments; petitions of the people 
sent down by the Emperor or forwarded from the Diet; 
expenditures outside the estimates; the appointment, 
promotion and demotion of Chokunin officials and Local 
Governors; all important matters of high administration 
connected with the business of the Executive Departments. 
Department Ministers were able to lay any matter whatso­
ever before the Cabinet President and to request a 
Cabinet conference(Kakugi). In addition to the Depart­
ment Ministers, other persons could be authorised by 
the special instructions of the Emperor to be a member
48. HRZS. Chokurei No.135*
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of the Cabinet,
On the 27th of December,1889, the Legislation Bureau 
(HoseiKyoku) in the Cabinet Secretariat issued a notif­
ication defining the handling of official documents under
( Z l Q")the revised regulations. It stated that Ordinances
which concern administration in general, or which concern 
the business of two or more Departments were of three 
kinds. Firstly, Ordinances on the form of official 
documents and general regulations for the official system; 
these were to be signed by the Cabinet President and all 
the Cabinet Ministers. Secondly, Public Peace Regulations 
which were to be signed by the Cabinet President and 
the Home and Justice Ministers. Thirdly, regulations for 
the official system of the Departments; which were to be 
signed by the Cabinet President and the Minister of the 
Department concerned. Matters of grave import not clearly 
defined in the Laws and Ordinances which must of necessity 
be submitted to the Cabinet conference(Kakugi) were also 
of three kinds; matters which although within the juris­
diction of an Executive Department would determine or 
alter government policy if handled by the Department; 
elemental catastrophes; and popular disturbances.
Outside these provisions, Department Ministers were 
empowered to issue Ordinances under their own signature
49. HKBRTZ.2.KSM. Naikaku. p.47-8
to enforce the Laws in relation to business for which 
their Department was solely responsible. The Cabinet 
President was thus reduced in status to the President 
of the Cabinet conference, rather than the over-all 
director of the administration. In contrast to the 
regulations of 1885, the Cabinet President was not now 
empowered to demand explanations and particulars from 
the Executive Departments in respect to their conduct 
of affairs.
On the 28th of December,1889 article 5 of the Offic­
ial Documents Ordinance was revised to enable Department 
Ministers to issue Ordinances relating solely to the 
business of their Departments without the countersignature 
of the Cabinet President. On the 25th of February, 
1890, the Executive Departments were joiintly ordered to 
draw up regulations on a unified pattern; ancl on 
the 27th of March,1890, simplified regulations were issued 
for all Departments of the government.  ^ In the course 
of June,1890 each Department issued separate regulations 
specifying the Bureaux within the Department and the 
number of Secretaries, probationers and clerks to be 
employed. On this, the definition of the scope of the 
Executive Departments was complete.
On the 11th of June,1890,regulations were issued for
50. HRZS. Chokurei No.159.
51. HKBRTZ.2.KSM. Vol.72. p.2-5.52. HRZS. Chokurei No.50.
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the Legislation Bureau(Hoseikyoku).(53) p-fc was placed 
under a single Head of Chokunin rank, with 3 Section 
Heads(BuChö) of Chokunin or 1st class secretarial rank. 
Under them, 15 officials(Sanjikan) of secretarial rank 
drafted Legal Orders(Horitsu Meirei) under the instruct­
ions of the Cabinet President, supplied the Cabinet with 
opinions on the enactment, abolition or amendment of 
Laws and Ordinances, and gave opinions upon or amended 
drafts of Laws and Ordinances put up by Department Minis­
ters for discussion in the Cabinet conference. These
officials were divided into 3 Sections: Home, Foreign, 
Military and Educational Affairs; Financial, Industrial, 
Transport and Communications Affairs; Legal Codes, Am­
nesties and Judicial Affairs. Department Ministers could 
attend the General Meetings of the Bureau, or send a 
responsible official to explain matters concerning the 
Department.
On the 7th of October,1890,revised regulations were 
issued for the Privy Council. ^ 4) was conspst; 0f 
one Chairman, one Vice-Chairman and 25 members(Koraonkan). 
Its agenda comprised matters within the scope of the 
Imperial Household Gode, drafts affecting and doubtful 
points arising out of the articles of the Constitution, 
Laws and Ordinances connected with the Constitution,
53. HRZS. Chokurei No.91.
54. HRZS. Chokurei No.216.
treaties and engagements with foreign countries, the 
official system and regulations for the business of 
the Privy Council itself, and advice to the Emperor 
on emergency matters.
On the resignation of Sanjö on the 24th of December, 
1889, Tamagata became Cabinet President in conjunction 
with his post as Home Minister. Saigo, Yamada, Matsukata 
Öyama, Enomoto, Goto, Aoki and Iwamura served under him 
as Ministers, öki replaced Ito as Chairman of the Privy 
Council, Terashima remained Vice-Chairman; Higashikuze, 
Kawamura, Yoshii, Shinagawa, Katsu, Kawano, Soejima, 
Fukuoka, Sasaki, Sano, Motoda, Yoshida, Torio, Nomura, 
Kuroda and ökuma served as members(Komohkan). Between 
them, these two bodies formed the Council of the Emperor 
in its active and advisory capacities. In spite of the 
regulations, the precise relation of the two arms of the 
Council to each other was beyond definition. But at any 
rate, there could be little risk of the Emperor being 
dominated by a single faction.
On the 20th of October,1890,the Genro-In was abol­
ished. Ito emerged from retirement on the 24th of October 
to become the Chairman of the Upper House of the Diet, 
with this, the final arrangements for the new era of 
constitutional government were complete.
CONCLUSION.
By 1890, the Council had thus taken final shape.
The Privy Council had a corporate duty to advise the 
Emperor on important affairs or when consulted in an 
emergency; the Cabinet Ministers directed the working 
of the Executive Departments and were individually 
responsible to the Emperor. The danger of both corporate 
and individual responsibility to the Emperor were thus 
avoided, and the preponderance of the Council-Executive 
at last remedied.
The preponderance of the government as a whole in 
relation to its political party opponents in the Lower 
House of the National Assembly was, however, by no means 
diminished. The problem of the separation of the Legis­
lature and the Executive was a problem for the government 
within itself; even after the opening of the National 
Assembly, the government maintained its habitual tight 
grasp of the Legislature.
The basic problem of the egrly Meiji period was to 
create a body of sufficient diversity to avoid preponder­
ance, but of sufficient unity to maintain the Imperial 
sovereignty intact and to direct the Executive efficiently
Once such a body had been formed, the future of the 
regime was secure.
The history of the Council between 1868 and 1890 
is the record of the formation of such a body. Special 
tributes must be paid to the tact and energy of Iwakura 
in the first desperate years, to the fortitude of ökubo 
in the middle years, and to the legislative skill of 
Ito in embodying the new regime in a durable Constitution
The Constitution was the end of a process rather 
than the beginning of a new one. The symbol of the new 
regime was perhaps Yamagata, whose qualities as a soldier 
administrator and patron of men made him at once the 
finest flower of Meiji statesmanship and the greatest 
obstacle to further constitutional progress.
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